View source for Katta-yoshli zobitlar hukmronligi (Uzbekistan)

{{infobox
| nameofpractice = Katta-yoshli zobitlar hukmronligi
| flagemoji =
| definition = In Uzbekistan, the term katta-yoshli zobitlar hukmronligi, translated as rule by senior officers, refers to military hazing – practices of abuse, extortion, and violence – often committed by older soldiers or officers over new conscripts
| location = Uzbekistan 
| imagemap = Uzbekistanmap.png
| clusters = [[Informal Governance]] – [[Control]] – [[Domination]]
| categories = [[Informal Governance]] – [[Military]] – [[Ethnicity]] - [[Extortion]] 
| authorofpiece = Anvar Whitlock, Alumnus 
| authorinstitution = School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK
| authorwebsite =
}}
<big>'''By Anvar Whitlock. Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK '''</big>
[[Category: Uzbekistan]]
[[Category: Former Soviet Union]]
[[Category: Control]]
[[Category: Informal Governance]]
[[Category: ]]
[[Category: ]]
[[Category: Entry]]
[[Category: 2025]]

{| class="wikitable"
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|style="font-size:1.1em;"| In Uzbekistan, the term katta-yoshli zobitlar hukmronligi, translated as rule by senior officers, refers to military hazing – practices of abuse, extortion, and violence – often committed by older soldiers or officers over new conscripts. While officially denied or ignored, such practices are widespread enough to be considered systemic. This phenomenon is not unique to Uzbekistan. Hazing is common in total institutions like armies, universities, and boarding schools (Allan and Madden 2012<ref>E.J. Allan, M. Madden '' The nature and extent of college student hazing'', (International Journal of Adolescent Medicine and Health, 2012), 89.</ref>). However, Uzbekistan’s version bears specific traits inherited from the Soviet military and sustained by the country’s authoritarian governance and weak civil society.
|}

Practices of hazing take place within “total institutions” that isolate individuals from wider society and subject them to a strict internal hierarchy (Goffman and Helmreich 2007<ref>E. Goffman, W.B. Helmreich. ''Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates'', (Oxford:Routledge), 14.</ref>). Within such environments, hazing becomes a method of enforcing obedience and internal control. In armies around the globe, new recruits are often subjected to rituals of mockery, humiliation and violence, ritualising and reinforcing their subordinate status. The closed nature of the military service makes it difficult for new soldiers to resist or report abuse, especially in the absence of external oversight or accountability.

In Uzbekistan, this institutional logic intersects with traditional power dynamics associated with age and hierarchy, as well as political and social structure, exacerbating the problem. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan has become an authoritarian regime, with only one peaceful transition of presidential power—from Karimov to Mirziyoyev in 2016. As formal positions are not accountable, political processes tend to be hidden or occur informally. In this environment, leadership faces minimal pressure to reform military practices or respond to reports of abuse. The lack of free elections and media scrutiny mean there is little incentive to address hazing. Moreover, military hazing functions to discipline new conscripts, which otherwise may have been executed formally.

The atmosphere of habitual corruption and weak rule of law further compound the issue. Courts are politicised and subject to executive control, while legal professionals are constrained by peer pressure  (Lewis 2015<ref>D. Lewis, ''Illiberal Spaces: Uzbekistan’s extraterritorial security practices and the spatial politics of contemporary authoritarianism'', (Nationalities Papers, 2015), 140-159.</ref>). The general public is uninformed of its rights, and soldiers have virtually no legal recourse if they are abused during service. The acceptance of hazing takes place partly because the civil society in Uzbekistan is too weak to expose or challenge it. The fear of state retaliation discourages organised protest or whistleblowing. According to Freedom House, Uzbekistan ranks as “not free,” with extremely limited political and civil liberties. As a result, there is little external oversight of the armed forces.

[[File:Dedov_1.jpeg.png.JPG|thumb|300px|left| Source: EastView AUTHOR. © AUTHOR.]]
 
Civil liberties in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A score of 7 on the Freedom House index indicates the lowest degree of civil liberties, and 1 indicates the highest degree. Source: ‘Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses 1973-2022' published by Freedom House.

Kyrgyzstan scores better and offers an illustrative comparison. There, the Soldiers’ Mothers’ Fund, founded in 1994, allows families to file complaints and advocate for conscript rights. Since its establishment, reported abuse in the Kyrgyz army has decreased (Daucé and Sieca-Kozlowski 2006<ref>F. Daucé. E. Sieca-Kozlowski, ''Daucé, Françoise. and Sieca-Kozlowski, Elisabeth. (2006) Dedovshchina in the post-soviet military : hazing of Russian army conscripts in a comparative perspective / Françoise Daucé and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, eds. '', ( Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag (Soviet and post-Soviet politics and society 28, 2006).</ref>). Uzbekistan lacks equivalent civic organisations, enabling hazing to flourish unchecked. 

[[File:Picture3.png.JPG|thumb|300px|left| Source: EastView AUTHOR. © AUTHOR.]]
 
The chart represents the number of search results for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan separately combined with the term ‘dedovshchina’.The searches were conducted in the language of publication (Russian). Source: East View database.

Rather than undermining authority, hazing in Uzbekistan reinforces state control, and can be seen as a “complementary informal institution” that fills gaps in formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2004<ref>G. Helmke. S. Levitsky, ''Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda'', (Perspectives on Politics, 2(4), 2004), 725-740.</ref>). Hazing serves this role by maintaining discipline and hierarchy within military units. Senior officers rely on senior soldiers to enforce discipline informally, with acts of violence and intimidation serving as tools of control. Such acts are often camouflaged within peer dynamics, creating a system where abuse appears to be a norm of everyday army culture rather than a deviation. Additionally, the state promotes loyalty and obedience through tradition, religion, history. Military service is framed as both a civic and religious duty “in the name of Faith and Homeland” (Khoshimova 2020<ref>G. Khoshimova, ''SPIRITUAL AND MORAL BASIS OF MILITARY CULTURE OF THE ARMY OF UZBEKISTAN'', (Russia and the Muslim world (4), 2020), 70-74.</ref>). This narrative discourages criticism of the military, reinforcing a culture of silence and compliance.

Hazing in Uzbekistan also reflects path dependence – the persistence of practices rooted in historical institutions. The Soviet Union’s military system institutionalised dedovshchina (“rule by the elders”), a form of hazing where older conscripts dominated younger ones. Although modern Uzbek conscription lasts only 12 months, unlike the 18–24 months of the Soviet era, similar hierarchies persist. Informal practices are resistant to change and tend to be associated with the Soviet norms and the inherited practices of brutal initiation rites.

There is some evidence suggesting that in contemporary Uzbekistan, hazing may now target non-Uzbeks which can be seen as a response to unfair treatment toward non-Slavs in Soviet times. However, due to the limited freedom of the media in Uzbekistan, it is difficult to obtain updates on the practice of ethnic discrimination in the Soviet army, where Central Asians used to be marginalized (Smith 1998<ref>D.L. Smith, ''Opening Pandora's Box: Ethnicity and Central Asian Militaries'', (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 1998), 23-5.</ref>). 

In the independent Uzbekistan, hazing takes a form of retribution, particularly toward Russian-speaking or ethnically Slavic conscripts who may not speak Uzbek. Comparable instances are noted in Russia, where the term dedovshchina is replaced by kavkazshchina to describe – albeit jokingly – hazing by soldiers from the Caucasus as a reversal of past hierarchies (Daucé 2014<ref>F. Daucé, ''Dedovshchina After the Reform: Ethnicity as a Justification for Violence in the Russian Army'', (Problems of Post-Communism, 2014), 36-45.</ref>). Uzbekistan practices may be enacting a parallel sentiment, where historical grievances influence who hazes and who is hazed today.

Katta-yoshli zobitlar hukmronligi in Uzbekistan is not an isolated phenomenon but a systemic informal institution shaped by authoritarianism, inherited Soviet practices, and structural impunity. Its persistence is reinforced by the army’s closed nature, the absence of civil oversight, weak legal protections, and the complementary role it plays in sustaining internal military discipline. Bringing this issue to light is challenging due to media repression and the taboo nature of the subject within Uzbekistan. However, understanding hazing as a durable informal institution—rather than simply a set of aberrant acts—offers an insight into why it endures and what would be required to end it.

==References==
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