Category:Motivational ambivalence - Revision history

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			The entries in this category characterise the working of informal power and its motivational ambivalence. Informal power works through both incentives (carrots) and disincentives (sticks) that are not exercised exclusively top-down or bottom-up. In most cases, however, informal power is exercised in less violent and more nuanced forms of indirect pressure that result in compliance and even self-censorship. Peer pressure and informal checks and balances are the instruments of informal governance but are also examples of motivational ambivalence.

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	~~===The motivational ambivalence: The blurring of the public and the private in the workings of informal power===~~
	~~Preface by Alena Ledeneva~~


	'''Part Four''' aims to characterise the working of informal power and its motivational ambivalence. Informal power is often envisaged as parallel to, or hiding behind, the pyramid of formal power. However, as the entries in this part show, the complexity of informal practices in the domination mode does not fit the model of a shadow pyramid. Informal power is not merely about informal influence, associated with personal attributes such as family, class, capital, patronage and connections not directly resulting from one’s formal position. Rather, as the entries in this part show, informal power resides in the grey zones between the public and the private domains. Most entries dwell on the blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private, and thus present the case for the inadequacy of the public/private dichotomy for grasping symbiotic patterns and complexities of present-day societies (such as vertical crowdsourcing, use of semi-state agencies in cyber-attacks, or publicising people’s private lives on the Internet).

	Informal power works through both incentives (carrots) and disincentives (sticks) that are not exclusively top-down or bottom-up. Practices of co-optation, co-dependence and informal control are often diffuse. They may be exercised through provision of access to material resources (privileges, allowances or loans) or to more symbolic resources (such as access to decision-makers). They may also be exercised by the application of pressure or uncertainty, the threat of suspended punishment, and the destabilisation of private lives ([[Zerzentung]]). Informal power may also be applied by the direct misuse by the authorities of public institutions (such as psychiatric hospitals or courts). In most cases, however, informal power is exercised in less violent and more nuanced forms of indirect pressure that result in compliance and even self-censorship. Peer pressure and informal checks and balances are the instruments of informal governance but are also examples of motivational ambivalence.

	Similar to the order of entries in the other parts of this volume – from social to instrumental in re-distribution, from us to them in solidarity, from need to greed in market behaviour – the entries in Part Four are ranged according to the incentives used for domination: from ‘more of a carrot’ to ‘more of a stick.’ ‘Carrots’ (albeit with strings attached) are aimed at informal co-optation into the system of domination by satisfying someone’s needs whatever they might be: from a financial loan to a certain degree of impunity. ‘Sticks’ illustrate how the system can punish people informally by using formal institutions selectively, as ammunition (Russia’s [[telefonnoe pravo]] in courts and [[kompromat]] in the media are far from being exclusively Russian phenomena), or by using informal leverage in formal contexts. Motivational ambivalence is a central theme in this part: whatever the declared motivation in a legal case or an anti-corruption campaign, some hidden interests may also be served in the process. In most cases, it is impossible to establish with certainty whether the public motive takes precedence over the private, or the private over the public.

	'''Chapter 7''', Co-optation: Recruiting Clients and Patrons, deals with the ways in which resources are allocated in order to create manageability and control. In his [[Carrots versus sticks in patron–client networks\|'''introduction''']], Paul Heywood provides a fascinating typology of the forms of co-optation into patron-client networks: top-down and bottom-up (reverse co-optation); parallel systems of recruitment and governance associated with criminal groups and their mergers with charities; and the role of political parties in organising resource-allocation and maintaining informal networks. ‘Carrots’ are essential to co-opt those with the required skills or influence, to integrate weaker groups or individuals, and to neutralise potential opponents. The trade-off is: the loss of independence – for the gain of privileges (that may include immunity) on condition of loyalty and compliance with the party line. In [[Do patron–client relationships affect complex societies\|'''conclusion''']], Elena Semenova questions the theoretical conceptualisation of patron-client relationships in historical perspective and discusses the ways in which the fundamental patterns of patron-client relations – reciprocity, hierarchy and repetition – adapt to the workings of complex societies. Semenova’s take on the themes of timing, symmetry and status in patron-client relationship in modern societies are related to the ideas of the ambivalence of interested and disinterested giving discussed in Florence Weber’s conclusion to Chapter 1, but political scientists, as Semenova points out, tend to emphasise the detrimental effects of patron-client relations for resource mobilisation, democratic accountability, party formation and institutional development.

	'''Chapter 8''', 'Control: instruments of informal governance’, continues the theme of compliance and maintaining order by controlling people and getting them to follow the party line. In his [[Politics of fear\|'''introduction''']], ‘Politics of fear’, Vladimir Gelman explains domination as setting incentives in such a way so that actors will be encouraged to observe the existing rules and be deterred from violating them or, on the contrary, so that they can be persuaded to violate rules that are seen as contradicting the interests of the ruling groups. The ‘politics of fear’ centres on the state’s use of oppressive instruments for the preserva- tion of an authoritarian regime, but this does not necessarily involve direct violence. Most of the instruments described in this chapter involve selective use of the law, manipulative use of state institutions (courts, hospitals), and invasion of personal privacy ([[dirt books]] in the UK, [[kompromat]] in Russia, [[songbun]] in North Korea, [[Zersetzung]] in the German Democratic Republic). Just as the mechanisms of co-optation target individual independence, the control mechanisms described here aim to destabilise individuals, undermine their independence and, in the final analysis, create a ‘personality’ suited for totalitarianism (Arendt 1973). In [[Informal constitutions and informal meta-rules\|'''conclusion''']], Scott Newton explores the conditions under which practices of circumventing the formal system become the rules, or ‘hidden constitutions’, according to which system operates. He argues that in Central Asian states formal institutions effectively serve and advance hidden interests, and emphasises the corrupt incentives that underpin the workings of ‘hidden’ institutions. Together, Gelman’s focus on disincentives and Newton’s focus on the institutionalisation of corrupt practices, highlight the conditions under which the dissent can be kept quiescent and speak to the themes of co-optation, accommodation, ambiguity and the ‘weapon of the weak’ discussed by Jan Kubik in Part II and Scott Radnitz in Part III. Just as the political implications of the weapon of the weak stem from the strategies of survival or gaming the system practices, political co-optation is a by-product of economic co-optation, both material and immaterial. Meanwhile, those excluded from economic and political co-optation are likely to engage in ‘gaming the system’ by camouflage, simulation, cynicism, cultural resistance and other informal patterns identified in this encyclopaedia, thereby enacting informal power.

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===The motivational ambivalence: The blurring of the public and the private in the workings of informal power===
Preface by Alena Ledeneva

'''Part Four''' aims to characterise the working of informal power and its motivational ambivalence. Informal power is often envisaged as parallel to, or hiding behind, the pyramid of formal power. However, as the entries in this part show, the complexity of informal practices in the domination mode does not fit the model of a shadow pyramid. Informal power is not merely about informal influence, associated with personal attributes such as family, class, capital, patronage and connections not directly resulting from one’s formal position. Rather, as the entries in this part show, informal power resides in the grey zones between the public and the private domains. Most entries dwell on the blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private, and thus present the case for the inadequacy of the public/private dichotomy for grasping symbiotic patterns and complexities of present-day societies (such as vertical crowdsourcing, use of semi-state agencies in cyber-attacks, or publicising people’s private lives on the Internet).

Informal power works through both incentives (carrots) and disincentives (sticks) that are not exclusively top-down or bottom-up. Practices of co-optation, co-dependence and informal control are often diffuse. They may be exercised through provision of access to material resources (privileges, allowances or loans) or to more symbolic resources (such as access to decision-makers). They may also be exercised by the application of pressure or uncertainty, the threat of suspended punishment, and the destabilisation of private lives ([[Zerzentung]]). Informal power may also be applied by the direct misuse by the authorities of public institutions (such as psychiatric hospitals or courts). In most cases, however, informal power is exercised in less violent and more nuanced forms of indirect pressure that result in compliance and even self-censorship. Peer pressure and informal checks and balances are the instruments of informal governance but are also examples of motivational ambivalence.

Similar to the order of entries in the other parts of this volume – from social to instrumental in re-distribution, from us to them in solidarity, from need to greed in market behaviour – the entries in Part Four are ranged according to the incentives used for domination: from ‘more of a carrot’ to ‘more of a stick.’ ‘Carrots’ (albeit with strings attached) are aimed at informal co-optation into the system of domination by satisfying someone’s needs whatever they might be: from a financial loan to a certain degree of impunity. ‘Sticks’ illustrate how the system can punish people informally by using formal institutions selectively, as ammunition (Russia’s [[telefonnoe pravo]] in courts and [[kompromat]] in the media are far from being exclusively Russian phenomena), or by using informal leverage in formal contexts. Motivational ambivalence is a central theme in this part: whatever the declared motivation in a legal case or an anti-corruption campaign, some hidden interests may also be served in the process. In most cases, it is impossible to establish with certainty whether the public motive takes precedence over the private, or the private over the public.

'''Chapter 7''', Co-optation: Recruiting Clients and Patrons, deals with the ways in which resources are allocated in order to create manageability and control. In his [[Carrots versus sticks in patron–client networks|'''introduction''']], Paul Heywood provides a fascinating typology of the forms of co-optation into patron-client networks: top-down and bottom-up (reverse co-optation); parallel systems of recruitment and governance associated with criminal groups and their mergers with charities; and the role of political parties in organising resource-allocation and maintaining informal networks. ‘Carrots’ are essential to co-opt those with the required skills or influence, to integrate weaker groups or individuals, and to neutralise potential opponents. The trade-off is: the loss of independence – for the gain of privileges (that may include immunity) on condition of loyalty and compliance with the party line. In [[Do patron–client relationships affect complex societies|'''conclusion''']], Elena Semenova questions the theoretical conceptualisation of patron-client relationships in historical perspective and discusses the ways in which the fundamental patterns of patron-client relations – reciprocity, hierarchy and repetition – adapt to the workings of complex societies. Semenova’s take on the themes of timing, symmetry and status in patron-client relationship in modern societies are related to the ideas of the ambivalence of interested and disinterested giving discussed in Florence Weber’s conclusion to Chapter 1, but political scientists, as Semenova points out, tend to emphasise the detrimental effects of patron-client relations for resource mobilisation, democratic accountability, party formation and institutional development.

'''Chapter 8''', 'Control: instruments of informal governance’, continues the theme of compliance and maintaining order by controlling people and getting them to follow the party line. In his [[Politics of fear|'''introduction''']], ‘Politics of fear’, Vladimir Gelman explains domination as setting incentives in such a way so that actors will be encouraged to observe the existing rules and be deterred from violating them or, on the contrary, so that they can be persuaded to violate rules that are seen as contradicting the interests of the ruling groups. The ‘politics of fear’ centres on the state’s use of oppressive instruments for the preserva- tion of an authoritarian regime, but this does not necessarily involve direct violence. Most of the instruments described in this chapter involve selective use of the law, manipulative use of state institutions (courts, hospitals), and invasion of personal privacy ([[dirt books]] in the UK, [[kompromat]] in Russia, [[songbun]] in North Korea, [[Zersetzung]] in the German Democratic Republic). Just as the mechanisms of co-optation target individual independence, the control mechanisms described here aim to destabilise individuals, undermine their independence and, in the final analysis, create a ‘personality’ suited for totalitarianism (Arendt 1973). In [[Informal constitutions and informal meta-rules|'''conclusion''']], Scott Newton explores the conditions under which practices of circumventing the formal system become the rules, or ‘hidden constitutions’, according to which system operates. He argues that in Central Asian states formal institutions effectively serve and advance hidden interests, and emphasises the corrupt incentives that underpin the workings of ‘hidden’ institutions. Together, Gelman’s focus on disincentives and Newton’s focus on the institutionalisation of corrupt practices, highlight the conditions under which the dissent can be kept quiescent and speak to the themes of co-optation, accommodation, ambiguity and the ‘weapon of the weak’ discussed by Jan Kubik in Part II and Scott Radnitz in Part III. Just as the political implications of the weapon of the weak stem from the strategies of survival or gaming the system practices, political co-optation is a by-product of economic co-optation, both material and immaterial. Meanwhile, those excluded from economic and political co-optation are likely to engage in ‘gaming the system’ by camouflage, simulation, cynicism, cultural resistance and other informal patterns identified in this encyclopaedia, thereby enacting informal power.