Chernukha (Russia) - Revision history

Editor2018 at 10:28, 12 May 2020

2020-05-12T10:28:17Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:28, 12 May 2020
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	\| authorofpiece =Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval		\| authorofpiece =Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval
	\| authorinstitution =School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK		\| authorinstitution =School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK
	\| authorwebsite =~~[https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/languages/staff/1261/ilya-yablokov Profile page at UL]~~}}		\| authorwebsite =}}
	<big>'''By Ilya Yablokov, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK and Nadezhda Dreval, independent researcher'''</big>		<big>'''By Ilya Yablokov, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK and Nadezhda Dreval, independent researcher'''</big>
	[[Category:Domination]]		[[Category:Domination]]
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	The use of ''chernukha'' is common in the worlds of advertising, business and political communication, but peaks in electoral technologies. During electoral campaigns, political technologists aim not merely to improve the chances of their particular candidate, but also to use all available legal and illegal means to ruin the prospects of his or her rival. Andrew Wilson notes that the difference between legal PR campaigns and ''chernyi'' PR is that ‘the latter’s intent or true message is hidden, possibly even contrary to the superficial message’ <ref>Wilson, A. 2005. Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. p.70. </ref>. For instance, a random individual might be quoted in social media as saying something along the lines of, ‘I am interested only in an effective outcome, not in whether or not a mayoral candidate takes drugs; that is his or her business.’ While such a statement is not illegal, it may well create a negative image of the candidate with voters, thereby undermining the candidate’s electoral prospects.		The use of ''chernukha'' is common in the worlds of advertising, business and political communication, but peaks in electoral technologies. During electoral campaigns, political technologists aim not merely to improve the chances of their particular candidate, but also to use all available legal and illegal means to ruin the prospects of his or her rival. Andrew Wilson notes that the difference between legal PR campaigns and ''chernyi'' PR is that ‘the latter’s intent or true message is hidden, possibly even contrary to the superficial message’ <ref>Wilson, A. 2005. Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. p.70. </ref>. For instance, a random individual might be quoted in social media as saying something along the lines of, ‘I am interested only in an effective outcome, not in whether or not a mayoral candidate takes drugs; that is his or her business.’ While such a statement is not illegal, it may well create a negative image of the candidate with voters, thereby undermining the candidate’s electoral prospects.

	Another example illustrates how ''chernukha'' may be used in business. At the height of the financial crisis of November/December 2014, when the value of the rouble plummeted relative to other world currencies, many Russians withdrew roubles from their bank accounts and changed them into foreign currency. As a result, Russian banks suffered a shortage of cash. In mid-December, the Russian press and social media spread rumours that, as of 18 December, Russia’s biggest bank, Sberbank, would limit cash withdrawals made at automated cash points<ref>BBC Russian Service. 2014. ‘Sberbank prizval klientov ne shturmovat’ bankomaty’, 19 December, http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/business/2014/12/141219_russia_sberbank_panic</ref>. Sberbank promptly denied the reports, calling them a provocation. At the same time, however, unidentified men were seen sticking notices on Sberbank ATMs asking clients to ‘withdraw less cash so that there will be enough for other customers, in light of the restrictions soon to be imposed by Sberbank.’ An investigation by Sberbank discovered that the rumours were being spread by a financial pyramid scheme. According to Sberbank, the scheme’s organisers had posted on their social media sites statements such as: ‘The banks will cheat you! Come to us, we are honest!’<ref>Zakharets, O. 2014. ‘V Sberbanke rasskazali pravdu, budut li zablokirovany karty 18 dekabria’, ''Metro'', 19 December, http://www.metronews.ru/novosti/v-sberbanke-rasskazali-pravdu-budut-li-zablokirovany-karty-18-dekabrja/Tponlr---JyOoIgKauyQVE/</ref>.		Another example illustrates how ''chernukha'' may be used in business. At the height of the financial crisis of November/December 2014, when the value of the rouble plummeted relative to other world currencies, many Russians withdrew roubles from their bank accounts and changed them into foreign currency. As a result, Russian banks suffered a shortage of cash. In mid-December, the Russian press and social media spread rumours that, as of 18 December, Russia’s biggest bank, Sberbank, would limit cash withdrawals made at automated cash points<ref>BBC Russian Service. 2014. ‘Sberbank prizval klientov ne shturmovat’ bankomaty’, 19 December, http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/business/2014/12/141219_russia_sberbank_panic</ref>. Sberbank promptly denied the reports, calling them a provocation. At the same time, however, unidentified men were seen sticking notices on Sberbank ATMs asking clients to ‘withdraw less cash so that there will be enough for other customers, in light of the restrictions soon to be imposed by Sberbank.’ An investigation by Sberbank discovered that the rumours were being spread by a financial [[pyramid scheme]]. According to Sberbank, the scheme’s organisers had posted on their social media sites statements such as: ‘The banks will cheat you! Come to us, we are honest!’<ref>Zakharets, O. 2014. ‘V Sberbanke rasskazali pravdu, budut li zablokirovany karty 18 dekabria’, ''Metro'', 19 December, http://www.metronews.ru/novosti/v-sberbanke-rasskazali-pravdu-budut-li-zablokirovany-karty-18-dekabrja/Tponlr---JyOoIgKauyQVE/</ref>.

	''Chernukha'' involves negative campaigning which, scholarly research suggests, may play an essential role in democratic governance<ref>Mark, D. 2009. ''Going Dirty: The Art of Negative Campaigning.'' Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield</ref><ref>Schweitzer, E. J. 2010. ‘Global Patterns of Virtual Mudslinging? The Use of Attacks on German Party Websites in State, National and European Parliamentary Elections,’ ''German Politics'', 19(2): 200-211</ref><ref>Sullivan, J. and Sapir, E. V. 2012. ‘Modelling negative campaign advertising: evidence from Taiwan’, ''Asian Journal of Communication'', 22(3) 289-303 </ref><ref>Walter, A. 2014. ‘Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different?’ ''Political Studies'', 62: 42-60</ref>. What distinguishes Russian negative campaigning from its Western counterparts, however, is the ability of Russian political technologists to manipulate the law, treating it as an obstacle to be overcome and as a tool to be used on the path to victory. In addition, the weakness of Russian civil society, the absence of party politics, the underdeveloped culture of democracy and the volatile reputations of politicians all contribute to the effectiveness of ''chernukha'' as an electoral technology<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. ''How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business.'' Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp45-46.</ref>.		''Chernukha'' involves negative campaigning which, scholarly research suggests, may play an essential role in democratic governance<ref>Mark, D. 2009. ''Going Dirty: The Art of Negative Campaigning.'' Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield</ref><ref>Schweitzer, E. J. 2010. ‘Global Patterns of Virtual Mudslinging? The Use of Attacks on German Party Websites in State, National and European Parliamentary Elections,’ ''German Politics'', 19(2): 200-211</ref><ref>Sullivan, J. and Sapir, E. V. 2012. ‘Modelling negative campaign advertising: evidence from Taiwan’, ''Asian Journal of Communication'', 22(3) 289-303 </ref><ref>Walter, A. 2014. ‘Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different?’ ''Political Studies'', 62: 42-60</ref>. What distinguishes Russian negative campaigning from its Western counterparts, however, is the ability of Russian political technologists to manipulate the law, treating it as an obstacle to be overcome and as a tool to be used on the path to victory. In addition, the weakness of Russian civil society, the absence of party politics, the underdeveloped culture of democracy and the volatile reputations of politicians all contribute to the effectiveness of ''chernukha'' as an electoral technology<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. ''How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business.'' Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp45-46.</ref>.

Admin at 09:23, 22 May 2019

2019-05-22T09:23:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:23, 22 May 2019
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	[[:Category:Russia\|Russia]] – [[:Category: FSU\| FSU]] – [[:Category: Reputation\| Reputation]] – [[:Category: Public opinion\| Public opinion]] – [[:Category: PR\| PR]] – [[:Category: Information\| Information]] – [[:Category: Elite\| Elite]]		[[:Category:Russia\|Russia]] – [[:Category: FSU\| FSU]] – [[:Category: Reputation\| Reputation]] – [[:Category: Public opinion\| Public opinion]] – [[:Category: PR\| PR]] – [[:Category: Information\| Information]] – [[:Category: Elite\| Elite]]
	\| authorofpiece =Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval		\| authorofpiece =Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval
	\| authorinstitution =School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK ~~and Management Consulting, Russian Federation~~		\| authorinstitution =School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK
	\| authorwebsite =[https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/languages/staff/1261/ilya-yablokov Profile page at UL~~], [https://ru.linkedin.com/in/nadejda-dreval-b466642a Profile page at LinkedIn~~]}}		\| authorwebsite =[https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/languages/staff/1261/ilya-yablokov Profile page at UL]}}
	<big>'''By Ilya Yablokov ~~and Nadezhda Dreval~~, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK and ~~Management Consulting~~, ~~Russian Federation~~'''</big>		<big>'''By Ilya Yablokov, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK and Nadezhda Dreval, independent researcher'''</big>
	[[Category:Domination]]		[[Category:Domination]]
	[[Category: Motivational ambivalence]]		[[Category: Motivational ambivalence]]

Admin at 09:21, 22 May 2019

2019-05-22T09:21:49Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:21, 22 May 2019
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	At the same time, if ''chernukha'' were employed as a means of administrative control, it would turn into a powerful political instrument of popular mobilization. One example of this might be the media campaign that began after President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in Spring 2012, and accelerated following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russian media experts have pointed out that the campaign of popular mobilization launched by the Kremlin to boost public support for its policies made heavy use of propaganda methods. These included undermining the reputations of the Kremlin’s political opponents by disseminating through the media fabricated stories aimed at creating a uniformly negative image both of the West and of the Russian opposition <ref>Gatov, V. 2015. ‘Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly’. London: Henry Jackson Society, pp.12-14. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Putin-Ivanovna-and-Ukrainians-on-the-Telly.pdf</ref><ref>Yakovlev, V. 2015. ‘''O propaganda''.’ Mulbabar, http://www.sguschenka.com/propaganda/</ref>.		At the same time, if ''chernukha'' were employed as a means of administrative control, it would turn into a powerful political instrument of popular mobilization. One example of this might be the media campaign that began after President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in Spring 2012, and accelerated following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russian media experts have pointed out that the campaign of popular mobilization launched by the Kremlin to boost public support for its policies made heavy use of propaganda methods. These included undermining the reputations of the Kremlin’s political opponents by disseminating through the media fabricated stories aimed at creating a uniformly negative image both of the West and of the Russian opposition <ref>Gatov, V. 2015. ‘Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly’. London: Henry Jackson Society, pp.12-14. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Putin-Ivanovna-and-Ukrainians-on-the-Telly.pdf</ref><ref>Yakovlev, V. 2015. ‘''O propaganda''.’ Mulbabar, http://www.sguschenka.com/propaganda/</ref>.

	It is not easy to analyse ''chernukha'' merely by tracing the sources of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some legislative norms and violates others, the producers of ''chernukha'' will in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they were framed. Even so, it is possible to research ''chernukha'' by means of in-depth [[interviews]] with experts and political technologists. In addition, opinion polls held before and after a defamation campaign make it possible to assess what impact ''chernukha'' has had on the general public. Opinion polls with specifically tailored questions may help to identify the key stereotypes used in the production of ''chernukha'' and how they have changed over time.		It is not easy to analyse ''chernukha'' merely by tracing the sources of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some legislative norms and violates others, the producers of ''chernukha'' will in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they were framed. Even so, it is possible to research ''chernukha'' by means of in-depth interviews with experts and political technologists. In addition, opinion polls held before and after a defamation campaign make it possible to assess what impact ''chernukha'' has had on the general public. Opinion polls with specifically tailored questions may help to identify the key stereotypes used in the production of ''chernukha'' and how they have changed over time.

	''Chernukha'' is closely intertwined with a number of informal practices such as ''krugovaya poruka'' (joint responsibility) and the use of ''kompromat'', both of which are integral to the workings of informal networks in contemporary Russia (see the relevant entries in this volume).		''Chernukha'' is closely intertwined with a number of informal practices such as ''krugovaya poruka'' (joint responsibility) and the use of ''kompromat'', both of which are integral to the workings of informal networks in contemporary Russia (see the relevant entries in this volume).

Editor2018 at 11:23, 16 May 2019

2019-05-16T11:23:33Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:23, 16 May 2019
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	{{infobox		{{infobox
	\| nameofpractice = Chernukha		\| nameofpractice =Chernukha
	\| location = Russia		\| flagemoji =🇷🇺
	\| imagemap = Russia map.png		\| definition =Use of PR to damage an opponent’s reputation
	\| ~~imageflag~~ = Russia ~~flag.png~~		\| location =Russia
	\| authorofpiece = Ilya Yablokov ~~, Nadezhda Dreval~~ and Nadezhda Dreval ~~(independent researcher)~~		\| imagemap =Russia map.png
	\| authorinstitution = University of Leeds		\| clusters =
	}}		[[:Category:Domination\|Domination]] – [[:Category: Motivational ambivalence\| Motivational ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Control\| Control]] – [[:Category: Informal governance\| Informal governance]]
			\| categories =
	'''''~~Original Text:~~ Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval, University of Leeds ,~~Nadezhda Dreval (independent researcher)''~~'''		[[:Category:Russia\|Russia]] – [[:Category: FSU\| FSU]] – [[:Category: Reputation\| Reputation]] – [[:Category: Public opinion\| Public opinion]] – [[:Category: PR\| PR]] – [[:Category: Information\| Information]] – [[:Category: Elite\| Elite]]
			\| authorofpiece =Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval
	~~<div~~ class="~~toccolours mw~~-~~collapsible mw~~-~~collapsed~~">		\| authorinstitution =School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK and Management Consulting, Russian Federation
	In Russia, the term ''chernukha'' refers to the creation and distribution of information as a means of undermining the reputation of a particular political or business figure. The term derives from the adjective ''chernyi'' (‘black’ in Russian) and the pejorative noun-making suffix -''ukha''. In late Soviet newspeak, it denoted a mode of criticising, or blackening, Soviet reality; later it shifted to depicting the grim reality of decaying a Soviet society ridden with alcoholism, sexual abuse and crime<ref>Graham, S. 2013. ‘Tales of grim: Seth Graham on the dark side of Russian cinema’, ''The Calvert Journal,'' 18 January, http://calvertjournal.com/comment/show/57/chernukha-little-vera-cargo-200</ref>. In the post-Soviet period, the term became associated with the emergence in Russia of ‘political technologists’ and their attempts to smear the reputations of their patrons’ political rivals. Today, however, the term is used far beyond the professional community of political advisers, technologists and spin-doctors.		\| authorwebsite =[https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/languages/staff/1261/ilya-yablokov Profile page at UL], [https://ru.linkedin.com/in/nadejda-dreval-b466642a Profile page at LinkedIn]}}
			<big>'''By Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds, UK and Management Consulting, Russian Federation'''</big>
			[[Category:Domination]]
			[[Category: Motivational ambivalence]]
			[[Category: Control]]
			[[Category: Informal governance]]
			[[Category:Russia]]
			[[Category: FSU]]
			[[Category: Reputation]]
			[[Category: Public opinion]]
			[[Category: PR]]
			[[Category: Information]]
			[[Category: Elite]]
			[[Category:Entry]]
			[[Category: Volume 2]]
			{\| class="wikitable"
			\|-
			\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| In Russia, the term ''chernukha'' refers to the creation and distribution of information as a means of undermining the reputation of a particular political or business figure. The term derives from the adjective ''chernyi'' (‘black’ in Russian) and the pejorative noun-making suffix -''ukha''. In late Soviet newspeak, it denoted a mode of criticising, or blackening, Soviet reality; later it shifted to depicting the grim reality of decaying a Soviet society ridden with alcoholism, sexual abuse and crime<ref>Graham, S. 2013. ‘Tales of grim: Seth Graham on the dark side of Russian cinema’, ''The Calvert Journal,'' 18 January, http://calvertjournal.com/comment/show/57/chernukha-little-vera-cargo-200</ref>. In the post-Soviet period, the term became associated with the emergence in Russia of ‘political technologists’ and their attempts to smear the reputations of their patrons’ political rivals. Today, however, the term is used far beyond the professional community of political advisers, technologists and spin-doctors.

	Related phrases include ''zapuskat’ chernukhu'', ''rasprostranyat’ chernukhu'' and ''chernyi piar'' (black public relations, or black PR)<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp.32-2</ref>.		Related phrases include ''zapuskat’ chernukhu'', ''rasprostranyat’ chernukhu'' and ''chernyi piar'' (black public relations, or black PR)<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp.32-2</ref>.
			\|}
	~~<div class="mw-collapsible-content">~~		The types of ''chernukha'' are defined by two variables: the legality or illegality of the method used, and the degree of transgression of moral/ethical values. Means used may include defamation, libel, slander or ''[[kompromat]]'' (compromising material)<ref>Szilagyi, A. 2002. ‘Kompromat and Corruption in Russia’, in Kotkin, S. and Sajo, A. (eds), ''Political Corruption in Transition: A Sceptic’s Handbook.'' Budapest: Central European University Press</ref><ref>Wilson, A. 2005. ''Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World''. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press </ref><ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp.58-9.</ref>, as well as the spread of any sort of unverified/unproven information that may potentially damage the reputation of a person or a business. The financial sources of ''chernukha'' are rarely disclosed but often involve dirty money.
	The types of ''chernukha'' are defined by two variables: the legality or illegality of the method used, and the degree of transgression of moral/ethical values. Means used may include defamation, libel, slander or ''kompromat'' (compromising material)<ref>Szilagyi, A. 2002. ‘Kompromat and Corruption in Russia’, in Kotkin, S. and Sajo, A. (eds), ''Political Corruption in Transition: A Sceptic’s Handbook.'' Budapest: Central European University Press</ref><ref>Wilson, A. 2005. ''Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World''. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press </ref><ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp.58-9.</ref>, as well as the spread of any sort of unverified/unproven information that may potentially damage the reputation of a person or a business. The financial sources of ''chernukha'' are rarely disclosed but often involve dirty money.

	The use of ''chernukha'' is common in the worlds of advertising, business and political communication, but peaks in electoral technologies. During electoral campaigns, political technologists aim not merely to improve the chances of their particular candidate, but also to use all available legal and illegal means to ruin the prospects of his or her rival. Andrew Wilson notes that the difference between legal PR campaigns and ''chernyi'' PR is that ‘the latter’s intent or true message is hidden, possibly even contrary to the superficial message’ <ref>Wilson, A. 2005. Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. p.70. </ref>. For instance, a random individual might be quoted in social media as saying something along the lines of, ‘I am interested only in an effective outcome, not in whether or not a mayoral candidate takes drugs; that is his or her business.’ While such a statement is not illegal, it may well create a negative image of the candidate with voters, thereby undermining the candidate’s electoral prospects.		The use of ''chernukha'' is common in the worlds of advertising, business and political communication, but peaks in electoral technologies. During electoral campaigns, political technologists aim not merely to improve the chances of their particular candidate, but also to use all available legal and illegal means to ruin the prospects of his or her rival. Andrew Wilson notes that the difference between legal PR campaigns and ''chernyi'' PR is that ‘the latter’s intent or true message is hidden, possibly even contrary to the superficial message’ <ref>Wilson, A. 2005. Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. p.70. </ref>. For instance, a random individual might be quoted in social media as saying something along the lines of, ‘I am interested only in an effective outcome, not in whether or not a mayoral candidate takes drugs; that is his or her business.’ While such a statement is not illegal, it may well create a negative image of the candidate with voters, thereby undermining the candidate’s electoral prospects.
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	[[File:Chernukha.png\|400px\|thumb\|left\|]]		[[File:Chernukha.png\|400px\|thumb\|left\|]]

	When publishing leaflets vilifying their opponents during electoral campaigns, PR agencies are legally bound to disclose information both about themselves and about the client who placed the order. Without that, there is little chance of a printer taking on the work. Therefore, PR agencies often use a candidate as a front, or pay someone to put their name to the ''chernukha'' content and thus accept liability. They may set up a shell organization with an impressive-sounding title (‘The Honest City’, ‘The Leninskiy District Council’) on whose behalf the leaflets will be published. Given that people rarely pay attention to the piles of electoral flyers that come through their letterboxes, and even less to the details of who placed the order, the main message of ''chernukha'' is delivered in the title. For example, the title at the top of a leaflet distributed in Tomsk in 2009 and pictured here reads, ‘A criminal case against Aleksandr Deyev,’ thereby appearing to incriminate the individual named (''Dezhurniy po gorodu''). The subtitle at the bottom of the page reads, ‘Was there or wasn’t there [such a case]?’ While this means that no direct accusation has been made, the damage has already been done to the individual’s reputation.		When publishing leaflets vilifying their opponents during electoral campaigns, PR agencies are legally bound to disclose information both about themselves and about the client who placed the order. Without that, there is little chance of a printer taking on the work. Therefore, PR agencies often use a candidate as a front, or pay someone to put their name to the ''chernukha'' content and thus accept liability. They may set up a shell organization with an impressive-sounding title (‘The Honest City’, ‘The Leninskiy District Council’) on whose behalf the leaflets will be published. Given that people rarely pay attention to the piles of electoral flyers that come through their letterboxes, and even less to the details of who placed the order, the main message of ''chernukha'' is delivered in the title. For example, the title at the top of a leaflet distributed in Tomsk in 2009 and pictured here reads, ‘A criminal case against Aleksandr Deyev,’ thereby appearing to incriminate the individual named (''Dezhurniy po gorodu''). The subtitle at the bottom of the page reads, ‘Was there or wasn’t there [such a case]?’ While this means that no direct accusation has been made, the damage has already been done to the individual’s reputation.

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	At the same time, if ''chernukha'' were employed as a means of administrative control, it would turn into a powerful political instrument of popular mobilization. One example of this might be the media campaign that began after President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in Spring 2012, and accelerated following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russian media experts have pointed out that the campaign of popular mobilization launched by the Kremlin to boost public support for its policies made heavy use of propaganda methods. These included undermining the reputations of the Kremlin’s political opponents by disseminating through the media fabricated stories aimed at creating a uniformly negative image both of the West and of the Russian opposition <ref>Gatov, V. 2015. ‘Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly’. London: Henry Jackson Society, pp.12-14. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Putin-Ivanovna-and-Ukrainians-on-the-Telly.pdf</ref><ref>Yakovlev, V. 2015. ‘''O propaganda''.’ Mulbabar, http://www.sguschenka.com/propaganda/</ref>.		At the same time, if ''chernukha'' were employed as a means of administrative control, it would turn into a powerful political instrument of popular mobilization. One example of this might be the media campaign that began after President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in Spring 2012, and accelerated following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russian media experts have pointed out that the campaign of popular mobilization launched by the Kremlin to boost public support for its policies made heavy use of propaganda methods. These included undermining the reputations of the Kremlin’s political opponents by disseminating through the media fabricated stories aimed at creating a uniformly negative image both of the West and of the Russian opposition <ref>Gatov, V. 2015. ‘Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly’. London: Henry Jackson Society, pp.12-14. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Putin-Ivanovna-and-Ukrainians-on-the-Telly.pdf</ref><ref>Yakovlev, V. 2015. ‘''O propaganda''.’ Mulbabar, http://www.sguschenka.com/propaganda/</ref>.

	It is not easy to analyse ''chernukha'' merely by tracing the sources of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some legislative norms and violates others, the producers of ''chernukha'' will in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they were framed. Even so, it is possible to research ''chernukha'' by means of in-depth interviews with experts and political technologists. In addition, opinion polls held before and after a defamation campaign make it possible to assess what impact ''chernukha'' has had on the general public. Opinion polls with specifically tailored questions may help to identify the key stereotypes used in the production of ''chernukha'' and how they have changed over time.		It is not easy to analyse ''chernukha'' merely by tracing the sources of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some legislative norms and violates others, the producers of ''chernukha'' will in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they were framed. Even so, it is possible to research ''chernukha'' by means of in-depth [[interviews]] with experts and political technologists. In addition, opinion polls held before and after a defamation campaign make it possible to assess what impact ''chernukha'' has had on the general public. Opinion polls with specifically tailored questions may help to identify the key stereotypes used in the production of ''chernukha'' and how they have changed over time.

	''Chernukha'' is closely intertwined with a number of informal practices such as ''krugovaya poruka'' (joint responsibility) and the use of ''kompromat'', both of which are integral to the workings of informal networks in contemporary Russia (see the relevant entries in this volume).		''Chernukha'' is closely intertwined with a number of informal practices such as ''krugovaya poruka'' (joint responsibility) and the use of ''kompromat'', both of which are integral to the workings of informal networks in contemporary Russia (see the relevant entries in this volume).

	In competitive elections, negative campaigning has the potential to affect the balance between parties and candidates. In societies with the rule of law and independent media, it may be helpful for voters to learn in detail about the political agenda of a vilified candidate <ref>Fernandes, J. 2013. 'Effects of Negative Political Advertising and Message Repetition on Candidate Evaluation', ''Mass Communication and Society'', 16(2): 268-291. p.286.</ref>. In the context of the abuse of law and media manipulation, however, ''chernukha'' practices are more likely to create popular distrust in the media, public institutions and the electoral process and to lead to a state of cynicism that will make it increasingly hard for public figures to win the trust of the electorate or to persuade voters to take an active interest in politics<ref>Ansolabehere, S. and Iyengar, S. 1996. ''Going Negative: How Political Ads Shrink and Polarize The Electorate''. New York: The Free Press</ref>.		In competitive elections, negative campaigning has the potential to affect the balance between parties and candidates. In societies with the rule of law and independent media, it may be helpful for voters to learn in detail about the political agenda of a vilified candidate <ref>Fernandes, J. 2013. 'Effects of Negative Political Advertising and Message Repetition on Candidate Evaluation', ''Mass Communication and Society'', 16(2): 268-291. p.286.</ref>. In the context of the abuse of law and media manipulation, however, ''chernukha'' practices are more likely to create popular distrust in the media, public institutions and the electoral process and to lead to a state of cynicism that will make it increasingly hard for public figures to win the trust of the electorate or to persuade voters to take an active interest in politics<ref>Ansolabehere, S. and Iyengar, S. 1996. ''Going Negative: How Political Ads Shrink and Polarize The Electorate''. New York: The Free Press</ref>.
	~~</div>~~
	~~</div>~~

	~~==Notes==~~
	~~<references />~~

	~~[[Category:Informal Practices]]~~		==References==
	~~[[Category:Russia]]~~
	~~[[Category:FSU]]~~
	~~[[Category:CIS]]~~
	~~[[Category:Motivational]]~~
	~~[[Category:Control]]~~
	~~[[Category:Entry]]~~

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	\| imageflag = Russia flag.png		\| imageflag = Russia flag.png
	\| authorofpiece = Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval		\| authorofpiece = Ilya Yablokov , Nadezhda Dreval and Nadezhda Dreval (independent researcher)
	\| authorinstitution = University of Leeds		\| authorinstitution = University of Leeds
	}}		}}

	'''''Original Text: Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval, University of Leeds'''''		'''''Original Text: Ilya Yablokov and Nadezhda Dreval, University of Leeds ,Nadezhda Dreval (independent researcher)'''''

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	''Chernukha'' involves negative campaigning which, scholarly research suggests, may play an essential role in democratic governance<ref>Mark, D. 2009. ''Going Dirty: The Art of Negative Campaigning.'' Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield</ref><ref>Schweitzer, E. J. 2010. ‘Global Patterns of Virtual Mudslinging? The Use of Attacks on German Party Websites in State, National and European Parliamentary Elections,’ ''German Politics'', 19(2): 200-211</ref><ref>Sullivan, J. and Sapir, E. V. 2012. ‘Modelling negative campaign advertising: evidence from Taiwan’, ''Asian Journal of Communication'', 22(3) 289-303 </ref><ref>Walter, A. 2014. ‘Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different?’ ''Political Studies'', 62: 42-60</ref>. What distinguishes Russian negative campaigning from its Western counterparts, however, is the ability of Russian political technologists to manipulate the law, treating it as an obstacle to be overcome and as a tool to be used on the path to victory. In addition, the weakness of Russian civil society, the absence of party politics, the underdeveloped culture of democracy and the volatile reputations of politicians all contribute to the effectiveness of ''chernukha'' as an electoral technology<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. ''How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business.'' Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp45-46.</ref>.		''Chernukha'' involves negative campaigning which, scholarly research suggests, may play an essential role in democratic governance<ref>Mark, D. 2009. ''Going Dirty: The Art of Negative Campaigning.'' Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield</ref><ref>Schweitzer, E. J. 2010. ‘Global Patterns of Virtual Mudslinging? The Use of Attacks on German Party Websites in State, National and European Parliamentary Elections,’ ''German Politics'', 19(2): 200-211</ref><ref>Sullivan, J. and Sapir, E. V. 2012. ‘Modelling negative campaign advertising: evidence from Taiwan’, ''Asian Journal of Communication'', 22(3) 289-303 </ref><ref>Walter, A. 2014. ‘Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different?’ ''Political Studies'', 62: 42-60</ref>. What distinguishes Russian negative campaigning from its Western counterparts, however, is the ability of Russian political technologists to manipulate the law, treating it as an obstacle to be overcome and as a tool to be used on the path to victory. In addition, the weakness of Russian civil society, the absence of party politics, the underdeveloped culture of democracy and the volatile reputations of politicians all contribute to the effectiveness of ''chernukha'' as an electoral technology<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. ''How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business.'' Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp45-46.</ref>.

	[[File:Chernukha.png\|400px\|thumb\|~~right~~\|]]		[[File:Chernukha.png\|400px\|thumb\|left\|]]

	When publishing leaflets vilifying their opponents during electoral campaigns, PR agencies are legally bound to disclose information both about themselves and about the client who placed the order. Without that, there is little chance of a printer taking on the work. Therefore, PR agencies often use a candidate as a front, or pay someone to put their name to the ''chernukha'' content and thus accept liability. They may set up a shell organization with an impressive-sounding title (‘The Honest City’, ‘The Leninskiy District Council’) on whose behalf the leaflets will be published. Given that people rarely pay attention to the piles of electoral flyers that come through their letterboxes, and even less to the details of who placed the order, the main message of ''chernukha'' is delivered in the title. For example, the title at the top of a leaflet distributed in Tomsk in 2009 and pictured here reads, ‘A criminal case against Aleksandr Deyev,’ thereby appearing to incriminate the individual named (''Dezhurniy po gorodu''). The subtitle at the bottom of the page reads, ‘Was there or wasn’t there [such a case]?’ While this means that no direct accusation has been made, the damage has already been done to the individual’s reputation.		When publishing leaflets vilifying their opponents during electoral campaigns, PR agencies are legally bound to disclose information both about themselves and about the client who placed the order. Without that, there is little chance of a printer taking on the work. Therefore, PR agencies often use a candidate as a front, or pay someone to put their name to the ''chernukha'' content and thus accept liability. They may set up a shell organization with an impressive-sounding title (‘The Honest City’, ‘The Leninskiy District Council’) on whose behalf the leaflets will be published. Given that people rarely pay attention to the piles of electoral flyers that come through their letterboxes, and even less to the details of who placed the order, the main message of ''chernukha'' is delivered in the title. For example, the title at the top of a leaflet distributed in Tomsk in 2009 and pictured here reads, ‘A criminal case against Aleksandr Deyev,’ thereby appearing to incriminate the individual named (''Dezhurniy po gorodu''). The subtitle at the bottom of the page reads, ‘Was there or wasn’t there [such a case]?’ While this means that no direct accusation has been made, the damage has already been done to the individual’s reputation.

Admin at 23:09, 12 August 2016

2016-08-12T23:09:51Z

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