Coima (Argentina) - Revision history

Editor2018 at 10:31, 12 May 2020

2020-05-12T10:31:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:31, 12 May 2020
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	[[:Category:Argentina\|Argentina]] – [[:Category: South America\| South America]] – [[:Category: Latin America\| Latin America]] – [[:Category: Bribe\| Bribe]] – [[:Category: Euphemism\| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Favour\| Favour]]		[[:Category:Argentina\|Argentina]] – [[:Category: South America\| South America]] – [[:Category: Latin America\| Latin America]] – [[:Category: Bribe\| Bribe]] – [[:Category: Euphemism\| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Favour\| Favour]]
	\| authorofpiece =Cosimo Stahl		\| authorofpiece =Cosimo Stahl
	\| authorinstitution =~~Alumnus, School~~ of ~~Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London~~, UK		\| authorinstitution =Basel Institute of Governance, Switzerland
	\| authorwebsite =[https://www.baselgovernance.org/about-us/people/cosimo-stahl Profile page at BG]}}		\| authorwebsite =[https://www.baselgovernance.org/about-us/people/cosimo-stahl Profile page at BG]}}
	<big>'''By Cosimo Stahl, ~~Alumnus, School~~ of ~~Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London~~, UK'''</big>		<big>'''By Cosimo Stahl, Basel Institute of Governance, Switzerland'''</big>
	[[Category:Redistribution]]		[[Category:Redistribution]]
	[[Category: Substantive ambivalence]]		[[Category: Substantive ambivalence]]

Admin at 17:33, 12 June 2019

2019-06-12T17:33:58Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:33, 12 June 2019
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	==References==		==References==
			<references />

			==Further Reading==

			: Peluso, D. 2018. 'Traversing the margins of corruption amidst informal economies in Amazonia', ''Culture, Theory And Critique'', 59 (4): 400–418
			: Bridenthal, R. (ed). 2013. ''The Hidden History of Crime, Corruption, and States.'' Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Admin at 09:24, 22 May 2019

2019-05-22T09:24:56Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:24, 22 May 2019
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	The Spanish word ''coima'' originally denoted a concubine or prostitute, and probably had its roots in the Arabic word ''quwaima'', meaning a girl. The word ''coima'' arrived in South America under Spanish colonial rule when it was used to describe a rake-off—a share or small fine paid to the keepers of often illicit and clandestine gaming houses (Collins<ref>Collins Spanish-English Dictionary. Available online at http://collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english</ref>; Dictionary of the RSA<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Since colonial times ''coima'' has been used to denote the fastest and indeed sometimes the only way to ‘get things done’ (Soca 2012<ref>Soca, R. 2012. La fascinante historia de las palabras. Buenos Aires: Interzona Editora</ref>), often therefore fulfilling a practical and necessary function in day-to-day life. The practice of ''coima'' in the form of payments to low- and medium-ranking officials follows established informal rules and tariffs, which are part of what Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) dubbed ‘the folklore of public administration.’		The Spanish word ''coima'' originally denoted a concubine or prostitute, and probably had its roots in the Arabic word ''quwaima'', meaning a girl. The word ''coima'' arrived in South America under Spanish colonial rule when it was used to describe a rake-off—a share or small fine paid to the keepers of often illicit and clandestine gaming houses (Collins<ref>Collins Spanish-English Dictionary. Available online at http://collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english</ref>; Dictionary of the RSA<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Since colonial times ''coima'' has been used to denote the fastest and indeed sometimes the only way to ‘get things done’ (Soca 2012<ref>Soca, R. 2012. La fascinante historia de las palabras. Buenos Aires: Interzona Editora</ref>), often therefore fulfilling a practical and necessary function in day-to-day life. The practice of ''coima'' in the form of payments to low- and medium-ranking officials follows established informal rules and tariffs, which are part of what Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) dubbed ‘the folklore of public administration.’

	What might today be labelled ‘state capture’ by a bloated and opaque public administration was observed by the journalist Giuseppe Bevione in Argentina in 1910. He wrote then of ''coima'' as ‘The only way to get something out of the bureaucracy is by offering a tip. […] It opens all doors’ (Bevione 1910<ref>Bevione, G. 1910. ‘La Curée in Argentina,’ La Stampa: 237 (27 August)</ref>). A century later, in 2012, six out of ten Argentines interviewed said they had been asked or forced to pay ''coima'' at least once in the previous year in an administrative or institutional setting (Lodola and Seligson 2013<ref>Lodola, G. and Seligson, M. 2013. Cultura política de la democracia en Argentina y en las Américas, 2012. Hacia la igualdad de oportunidades. Buenos Aires: Torcuato Di Tella University and Vanderbilt University</ref>). According to Ruth Sautu and colleagues (2004: 93<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>) ''coima'' occurs only occasionally, usually in order to obtain or accelerate a one-off administrative transaction, such as the issue of a passport, or to avoid a fine for a minor legal transgression.. Again according to Sautu, citing Argentine opinion surveys and [[interviews]], one of the most typical instances of ''coima'' involves bribing a police officer over a traffic violation (Sautu et al. 2002<ref>Sautu, R. et al. 2002. ‘La Integración de Métodos Cualitativos y Cuantitativos para el Estudio de las Experiencias de Corrupción,’ Cinta de moebio: 13: 153-78</ref>).		What might today be labelled ‘state capture’ by a bloated and opaque public administration was observed by the journalist Giuseppe Bevione in Argentina in 1910. He wrote then of ''coima'' as ‘The only way to get something out of the bureaucracy is by offering a tip. […] It opens all doors’ (Bevione 1910<ref>Bevione, G. 1910. ‘La Curée in Argentina,’ La Stampa: 237 (27 August)</ref>). A century later, in 2012, six out of ten Argentines interviewed said they had been asked or forced to pay ''coima'' at least once in the previous year in an administrative or institutional setting (Lodola and Seligson 2013<ref>Lodola, G. and Seligson, M. 2013. Cultura política de la democracia en Argentina y en las Américas, 2012. Hacia la igualdad de oportunidades. Buenos Aires: Torcuato Di Tella University and Vanderbilt University</ref>). According to Ruth Sautu and colleagues (2004: 93<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>) ''coima'' occurs only occasionally, usually in order to obtain or accelerate a one-off administrative transaction, such as the issue of a passport, or to avoid a fine for a minor legal transgression.. Again according to Sautu, citing Argentine opinion surveys and interviews, one of the most typical instances of ''coima'' involves bribing a police officer over a traffic violation (Sautu et al. 2002<ref>Sautu, R. et al. 2002. ‘La Integración de Métodos Cualitativos y Cuantitativos para el Estudio de las Experiencias de Corrupción,’ Cinta de moebio: 13: 153-78</ref>).

	The size of ''coima'' is significant. Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) distinguishes between ''corrupción minorista'' and ''corrupción mayorista'', roughly equivalent to the difference between petty and large-scale corruption. ''Coima'' used to be distinguished from larger bribes (known as ''comisión'', ''retorno'' or ''soborno'') in that ''coima'' referred to an occasional, ‘petty’ transaction involving a ‘reasonable’ payment. Today, however, ''coima'' is increasingly used to describe any type of bribe, regardless of its frequency or size. For while the act or practice of ''coima'' may remain occasional, those affected by it are often part of a stable social fabric that upholds a consistent and habitual pattern of corrupt behaviour (Sautu 2004<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>). Over time, ''coima'' has come to play a crucial role of the working patterns of a greater regulatory system of social relations: while the a traffic offender resorts to ''coima'' to pay an occasional bribe to a police officer and thereby avoid a formal penalty, the officer on the receiving end engages in ''coima'' on a regular basis.		The size of ''coima'' is significant. Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) distinguishes between ''corrupción minorista'' and ''corrupción mayorista'', roughly equivalent to the difference between petty and large-scale corruption. ''Coima'' used to be distinguished from larger bribes (known as ''comisión'', ''retorno'' or ''soborno'') in that ''coima'' referred to an occasional, ‘petty’ transaction involving a ‘reasonable’ payment. Today, however, ''coima'' is increasingly used to describe any type of bribe, regardless of its frequency or size. For while the act or practice of ''coima'' may remain occasional, those affected by it are often part of a stable social fabric that upholds a consistent and habitual pattern of corrupt behaviour (Sautu 2004<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>). Over time, ''coima'' has come to play a crucial role of the working patterns of a greater regulatory system of social relations: while the a traffic offender resorts to ''coima'' to pay an occasional bribe to a police officer and thereby avoid a formal penalty, the officer on the receiving end engages in ''coima'' on a regular basis.

Admin at 09:10, 22 May 2019

2019-05-22T09:10:34Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:10, 22 May 2019
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	[[:Category:Argentina\|Argentina]] – [[:Category: South America\| South America]] – [[:Category: Latin America\| Latin America]] – [[:Category: Bribe\| Bribe]] – [[:Category: Euphemism\| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Favour\| Favour]]		[[:Category:Argentina\|Argentina]] – [[:Category: South America\| South America]] – [[:Category: Latin America\| Latin America]] – [[:Category: Bribe\| Bribe]] – [[:Category: Euphemism\| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Favour\| Favour]]
	\| authorofpiece =Cosimo Stahl		\| authorofpiece =Cosimo Stahl
	\| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK ~~and George Mason University, USA~~		\| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK
	\| authorwebsite =[https://www.baselgovernance.org/about-us/people/cosimo-stahl Profile page at BG]}}		\| authorwebsite =[https://www.baselgovernance.org/about-us/people/cosimo-stahl Profile page at BG]}}
	<big>'''By Cosimo Stahl, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK ~~and George Mason University, USA~~'''</big>		<big>'''By Cosimo Stahl, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big>
	[[Category:Redistribution]]		[[Category:Redistribution]]
	[[Category: Substantive ambivalence]]		[[Category: Substantive ambivalence]]

Editor2018 at 16:22, 16 May 2019

2019-05-16T16:22:32Z

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	{{infobox		{{infobox
	\| nameofpractice =Coima		\| nameofpractice =Coima
	\| flagemoji =🌎		\| flagemoji =🇦🇷
	\| definition =Euphemism for a bribe		\| definition =Euphemism for a bribe
	\| location =Argentina		\| location =Argentina

Editor2018 at 11:29, 16 May 2019

2019-05-16T11:29:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:29, 16 May 2019
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	{{infobox		{{infobox
	\| nameofpractice = Coima		\| nameofpractice =Coima
	\| location = Argentina		\| flagemoji =🌎
	\| imagemap = Argentina map.png		\| definition =Euphemism for a bribe
	\| ~~imageflag~~ = Argentina ~~flag.png~~		\| location =Argentina
	\| authorofpiece = Cosimo Stahl		\| imagemap =Argentina map.png
	\| authorinstitution = School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London		\| clusters =
	}}		[[:Category:Redistribution\|Redistribution]] – [[:Category: Substantive ambivalence\| Substantive ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Sociability of instrumentality\| Sociability of instrumentality]] – [[:Category: Economies of favours\| Economies of favours]]
			\| categories =
	'''''~~Original text by~~ Cosimo Stahl'''''		[[:Category:Argentina\|Argentina]] – [[:Category: South America\| South America]] – [[:Category: Latin America\| Latin America]] – [[:Category: Bribe\| Bribe]] – [[:Category: Euphemism\| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Favour\| Favour]]
			\| authorofpiece =Cosimo Stahl
	~~<div~~ class="~~toccolours mw~~-~~collapsible mw~~-~~collapsed~~">		\| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK and George Mason University, USA
	''Coima'' is a colloquial term for a bribe. It is commonly used in the Southern Cone – the southernmost areas of Latin America – in particular in Argentina. It is defined as ‘gratification [or] gift with which to bribe an employer or an influential person’ or simply as ‘bribe or [the act of] bribery’ (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy [RSA]<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Also used, though to a lesser extent, are the verb ''coimear'' (to give or receive a bribe) and the nouns ''coimera'' (fondness for bribes) and ''coimero'' (one who gives a bribe). ‘Backhander’ may be ''coima''’s closest English translation, given its underlying informal, illicit and immoral nature.		\| authorwebsite =[https://www.baselgovernance.org/about-us/people/cosimo-stahl Profile page at BG]}}
			<big>'''By Cosimo Stahl, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK and George Mason University, USA'''</big>
	~~<div class="mw-collapsible-content">~~		[[Category:Redistribution]]
			[[Category: Substantive ambivalence]]
			[[Category: Sociability of instrumentality]]
			[[Category: Economies of favours]]
			[[Category:Argentina]]
			[[Category: South America]]
			[[Category: Latin America]]
			[[Category: Bribe]]
			[[Category: Euphemism]]
			[[Category: Favour]]
			[[Category:Entry]]
			[[Category: Volume 1]]
			[[Category: Alumni]]
			[[Category: SSEES]]
			{\| class="wikitable"
			\|-
			\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| ''Coima'' is a colloquial term for a bribe. It is commonly used in the Southern Cone – the southernmost areas of Latin America – in particular in Argentina. It is defined as ‘gratification [or] gift with which to bribe an employer or an influential person’ or simply as ‘bribe or [the act of] bribery’ (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy [RSA]<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Also used, though to a lesser extent, are the verb ''coimear'' (to give or receive a bribe) and the nouns ''coimera'' (fondness for bribes) and ''coimero'' (one who gives a bribe). ‘Backhander’ may be ''coima''’s closest English translation, given its underlying informal, illicit and immoral nature.S
			\|}
	The Spanish word ''coima'' originally denoted a concubine or prostitute, and probably had its roots in the Arabic word ''quwaima'', meaning a girl. The word ''coima'' arrived in South America under Spanish colonial rule when it was used to describe a rake-off—a share or small fine paid to the keepers of often illicit and clandestine gaming houses (Collins<ref>Collins Spanish-English Dictionary. Available online at http://collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english</ref>; Dictionary of the RSA<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Since colonial times ''coima'' has been used to denote the fastest and indeed sometimes the only way to ‘get things done’ (Soca 2012<ref>Soca, R. 2012. La fascinante historia de las palabras. Buenos Aires: Interzona Editora</ref>), often therefore fulfilling a practical and necessary function in day-to-day life. The practice of ''coima'' in the form of payments to low- and medium-ranking officials follows established informal rules and tariffs, which are part of what Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) dubbed ‘the folklore of public administration.’		The Spanish word ''coima'' originally denoted a concubine or prostitute, and probably had its roots in the Arabic word ''quwaima'', meaning a girl. The word ''coima'' arrived in South America under Spanish colonial rule when it was used to describe a rake-off—a share or small fine paid to the keepers of often illicit and clandestine gaming houses (Collins<ref>Collins Spanish-English Dictionary. Available online at http://collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english</ref>; Dictionary of the RSA<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Since colonial times ''coima'' has been used to denote the fastest and indeed sometimes the only way to ‘get things done’ (Soca 2012<ref>Soca, R. 2012. La fascinante historia de las palabras. Buenos Aires: Interzona Editora</ref>), often therefore fulfilling a practical and necessary function in day-to-day life. The practice of ''coima'' in the form of payments to low- and medium-ranking officials follows established informal rules and tariffs, which are part of what Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) dubbed ‘the folklore of public administration.’

	What might today be labelled ‘state capture’ by a bloated and opaque public administration was observed by the journalist Giuseppe Bevione in Argentina in 1910. He wrote then of ''coima'' as ‘The only way to get something out of the bureaucracy is by offering a tip. […] It opens all doors’ (Bevione 1910<ref>Bevione, G. 1910. ‘La Curée in Argentina,’ La Stampa: 237 (27 August)</ref>). A century later, in 2012, six out of ten Argentines interviewed said they had been asked or forced to pay ''coima'' at least once in the previous year in an administrative or institutional setting (Lodola and Seligson 2013<ref>Lodola, G. and Seligson, M. 2013. Cultura política de la democracia en Argentina y en las Américas, 2012. Hacia la igualdad de oportunidades. Buenos Aires: Torcuato Di Tella University and Vanderbilt University</ref>). According to Ruth Sautu and colleagues (2004: 93<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>) ''coima'' occurs only occasionally, usually in order to obtain or accelerate a one-off administrative transaction, such as the issue of a passport, or to avoid a fine for a minor legal transgression.. Again according to Sautu, citing Argentine opinion surveys and interviews, one of the most typical instances of ''coima'' involves bribing a police officer over a traffic violation (Sautu et al. 2002<ref>Sautu, R. et al. 2002. ‘La Integración de Métodos Cualitativos y Cuantitativos para el Estudio de las Experiencias de Corrupción,’ Cinta de moebio: 13: 153-78</ref>).		What might today be labelled ‘state capture’ by a bloated and opaque public administration was observed by the journalist Giuseppe Bevione in Argentina in 1910. He wrote then of ''coima'' as ‘The only way to get something out of the bureaucracy is by offering a tip. […] It opens all doors’ (Bevione 1910<ref>Bevione, G. 1910. ‘La Curée in Argentina,’ La Stampa: 237 (27 August)</ref>). A century later, in 2012, six out of ten Argentines interviewed said they had been asked or forced to pay ''coima'' at least once in the previous year in an administrative or institutional setting (Lodola and Seligson 2013<ref>Lodola, G. and Seligson, M. 2013. Cultura política de la democracia en Argentina y en las Américas, 2012. Hacia la igualdad de oportunidades. Buenos Aires: Torcuato Di Tella University and Vanderbilt University</ref>). According to Ruth Sautu and colleagues (2004: 93<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>) ''coima'' occurs only occasionally, usually in order to obtain or accelerate a one-off administrative transaction, such as the issue of a passport, or to avoid a fine for a minor legal transgression.. Again according to Sautu, citing Argentine opinion surveys and [[interviews]], one of the most typical instances of ''coima'' involves bribing a police officer over a traffic violation (Sautu et al. 2002<ref>Sautu, R. et al. 2002. ‘La Integración de Métodos Cualitativos y Cuantitativos para el Estudio de las Experiencias de Corrupción,’ Cinta de moebio: 13: 153-78</ref>).

	The size of ''coima'' is significant. Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) distinguishes between ''corrupción minorista'' and ''corrupción mayorista'', roughly equivalent to the difference between petty and large-scale corruption. ''Coima'' used to be distinguished from larger bribes (known as ''comisión'', ''retorno'' or ''soborno'') in that ''coima'' referred to an occasional, ‘petty’ transaction involving a ‘reasonable’ payment. Today, however, ''coima'' is increasingly used to describe any type of bribe, regardless of its frequency or size. For while the act or practice of ''coima'' may remain occasional, those affected by it are often part of a stable social fabric that upholds a consistent and habitual pattern of corrupt behaviour (Sautu 2004<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>). Over time, ''coima'' has come to play a crucial role of the working patterns of a greater regulatory system of social relations: while the a traffic offender resorts to ''coima'' to pay an occasional bribe to a police officer and thereby avoid a formal penalty, the officer on the receiving end engages in ''coima'' on a regular basis.		The size of ''coima'' is significant. Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) distinguishes between ''corrupción minorista'' and ''corrupción mayorista'', roughly equivalent to the difference between petty and large-scale corruption. ''Coima'' used to be distinguished from larger bribes (known as ''comisión'', ''retorno'' or ''soborno'') in that ''coima'' referred to an occasional, ‘petty’ transaction involving a ‘reasonable’ payment. Today, however, ''coima'' is increasingly used to describe any type of bribe, regardless of its frequency or size. For while the act or practice of ''coima'' may remain occasional, those affected by it are often part of a stable social fabric that upholds a consistent and habitual pattern of corrupt behaviour (Sautu 2004<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>). Over time, ''coima'' has come to play a crucial role of the working patterns of a greater regulatory system of social relations: while the a traffic offender resorts to ''coima'' to pay an occasional bribe to a police officer and thereby avoid a formal penalty, the officer on the receiving end engages in ''coima'' on a regular basis.
Line 26:		Line 43:

	''Coima'' has a coercive element because it is rooted in social bonds and societal relations, requiring an act of exchange between the giver and the recipient that resembles the act of exchanging gifts, favours and other forms of reciprocity while ultimately helping to form and strengthen social ties based on a sense of obligation. In the words of the Argentine writer Roberto Arlt, ‘We live in the ''coima'' empire, the realm of trickery, the land of villainy […] Coima is everywhere: invisible, certain, effective, precise. […] And those who do not engage in ''coima'', tolerate ''coima''’ (Arlt 1929<ref>Arlt, R. 1929. ‘Your majesty – la ''coima'',’ El Mundo (16 January)</ref>). Nearly a century later, Eric Calcagno wrote that Argentines had become indifferent towards the incidence of ''coima'' at almost any level, and that, as a result, corruption of almost any size had ceased to shock them. ''Coima'' and corruption was a ‘settled and accepted custom,’ as a result of which the country had entered an ‘advanced stage of decomposition’ where ''coima'' had become an institutionalised mode of social regulation and part of a larger ‘system’ (Calcagno 2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>).		''Coima'' has a coercive element because it is rooted in social bonds and societal relations, requiring an act of exchange between the giver and the recipient that resembles the act of exchanging gifts, favours and other forms of reciprocity while ultimately helping to form and strengthen social ties based on a sense of obligation. In the words of the Argentine writer Roberto Arlt, ‘We live in the ''coima'' empire, the realm of trickery, the land of villainy […] Coima is everywhere: invisible, certain, effective, precise. […] And those who do not engage in ''coima'', tolerate ''coima''’ (Arlt 1929<ref>Arlt, R. 1929. ‘Your majesty – la ''coima'',’ El Mundo (16 January)</ref>). Nearly a century later, Eric Calcagno wrote that Argentines had become indifferent towards the incidence of ''coima'' at almost any level, and that, as a result, corruption of almost any size had ceased to shock them. ''Coima'' and corruption was a ‘settled and accepted custom,’ as a result of which the country had entered an ‘advanced stage of decomposition’ where ''coima'' had become an institutionalised mode of social regulation and part of a larger ‘system’ (Calcagno 2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>).
	~~</div>~~
	~~</div>~~

	~~==Notes==~~
	~~<references />~~

	~~[[Category:Informal Practices]]~~		==References==
	~~[[Category:Argentina]]~~
	~~[[Category:America]]~~
	~~[[Category:Economies of favours]]~~
	~~[[Category:Gift]]~~
	~~[[Category:Favour]]~~
	~~[[Category:Entry]]~~

Admin at 14:49, 29 June 2018

2018-06-29T14:49:02Z

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	[[Category:Gift]]		[[Category:Gift]]
	[[Category:Favour]]		[[Category:Favour]]
			[[Category:Entry]]

Admin: Admin moved page Coima to Coima (Argentina) without leaving a redirect

2018-05-31T12:28:11Z

Admin moved page Coima to Coima (Argentina) without leaving a redirect

← Older revision	Revision as of 12:28, 31 May 2018
(No difference)

Admin at 20:54, 23 August 2016

2016-08-23T20:54:55Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:54, 23 August 2016
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	[[Category:Argentina]]		[[Category:Argentina]]
	[[Category:America]]		[[Category:America]]
	[[Category:~~Economy~~ of favours]]		[[Category:Economies of favours]]
	[[Category:Gift]]		[[Category:Gift]]
	[[Category:Favour]]		[[Category:Favour]]

Admin: Created page with "{{infobox | nameofpractice = Coima | location = Argentina | imagemap = Argentina map.png | imageflag = Argentina flag.png | authorofpiece = Cosimo Stahl | authorin..."

2016-08-23T20:53:45Z

Created page with "{{infobox | nameofpractice = Coima | location = Argentina | imagemap = Argentina map.png | imageflag = Argentina flag.png | authorofpiece = Cosimo Stahl | authorin..."

New page

{{infobox
| nameofpractice = Coima
| location = Argentina
| imagemap = Argentina map.png
| imageflag = Argentina flag.png
| authorofpiece = Cosimo Stahl
| authorinstitution = School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London
}}

'''''Original text by Cosimo Stahl'''''

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''Coima'' is a colloquial term for a bribe. It is commonly used in the Southern Cone – the southernmost areas of Latin America – in particular in Argentina. It is defined as ‘gratification [or] gift with which to bribe an employer or an influential person’ or simply as ‘bribe or [the act of] bribery’ (Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy [RSA]<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Also used, though to a lesser extent, are the verb ''coimear'' (to give or receive a bribe) and the nouns ''coimera'' (fondness for bribes) and ''coimero'' (one who gives a bribe). ‘Backhander’ may be ''coima''’s closest English translation, given its underlying informal, illicit and immoral nature.

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The Spanish word ''coima'' originally denoted a concubine or prostitute, and probably had its roots in the Arabic word ''quwaima'', meaning a girl. The word ''coima'' arrived in South America under Spanish colonial rule when it was used to describe a rake-off—a share or small fine paid to the keepers of often illicit and clandestine gaming houses (Collins<ref>Collins Spanish-English Dictionary. Available online at http://collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/spanish-english</ref>; Dictionary of the RSA<ref>Royal Spanish Academy (RSA). 1925-2016. Diccionario de la lengua Española. Multiple editions. Madrid: Espasa Calpe</ref>). Since colonial times ''coima'' has been used to denote the fastest and indeed sometimes the only way to ‘get things done’ (Soca 2012<ref>Soca, R. 2012. La fascinante historia de las palabras. Buenos Aires: Interzona Editora</ref>), often therefore fulfilling a practical and necessary function in day-to-day life. The practice of ''coima'' in the form of payments to low- and medium-ranking officials follows established informal rules and tariffs, which are part of what Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) dubbed ‘the folklore of public administration.’

What might today be labelled ‘state capture’ by a bloated and opaque public administration was observed by the journalist Giuseppe Bevione in Argentina in 1910. He wrote then of ''coima'' as ‘The only way to get something out of the bureaucracy is by offering a tip. […] It opens all doors’ (Bevione 1910<ref>Bevione, G. 1910. ‘La Curée in Argentina,’ La Stampa: 237 (27 August)</ref>). A century later, in 2012, six out of ten Argentines interviewed said they had been asked or forced to pay ''coima'' at least once in the previous year in an administrative or institutional setting (Lodola and Seligson 2013<ref>Lodola, G. and Seligson, M. 2013. Cultura política de la democracia en Argentina y en las Américas, 2012. Hacia la igualdad de oportunidades. Buenos Aires: Torcuato Di Tella University and Vanderbilt University</ref>). According to Ruth Sautu and colleagues (2004: 93<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>) ''coima'' occurs only occasionally, usually in order to obtain or accelerate a one-off administrative transaction, such as the issue of a passport, or to avoid a fine for a minor legal transgression.. Again according to Sautu, citing Argentine opinion surveys and interviews, one of the most typical instances of ''coima'' involves bribing a police officer over a traffic violation (Sautu et al. 2002<ref>Sautu, R. et al. 2002. ‘La Integración de Métodos Cualitativos y Cuantitativos para el Estudio de las Experiencias de Corrupción,’ Cinta de moebio: 13: 153-78</ref>).

The size of ''coima'' is significant. Calcagno (2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>) distinguishes between ''corrupción minorista'' and ''corrupción mayorista'', roughly equivalent to the difference between petty and large-scale corruption. ''Coima'' used to be distinguished from larger bribes (known as ''comisión'', ''retorno'' or ''soborno'') in that ''coima'' referred to an occasional, ‘petty’ transaction involving a ‘reasonable’ payment. Today, however, ''coima'' is increasingly used to describe any type of bribe, regardless of its frequency or size. For while the act or practice of ''coima'' may remain occasional, those affected by it are often part of a stable social fabric that upholds a consistent and habitual pattern of corrupt behaviour (Sautu 2004<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>). Over time, ''coima'' has come to play a crucial role of the working patterns of a greater regulatory system of social relations: while the a traffic offender resorts to ''coima'' to pay an occasional bribe to a police officer and thereby avoid a formal penalty, the officer on the receiving end engages in ''coima'' on a regular basis.

As José Sarrionandia pointed out, the embeddedness of ''coima'' in social relations extends far beyond state politics; the term bribe (''soborno'') only approximates to the true meaning of ''coima'' since it does not capture the common acceptance of and even enthusiasm for ''coima'' among society at large. Sarrionandia issued the following warning to any traveller to Argentina:
<blockquote>You may call it white-collar gangsterism or South American opportunism, but the reality is that coima is already furtively insinuated at customs. It can be seen in the inquisitive look of the customs officer who is about slowly to search the visitor’s luggage... The difficulties and inconveniences are summed up when a covetous offer presents itself. In two gambits [as in a poker game], an arrangement can be reached for everything (Sarrionandia 1964: 4<ref>Sarrionandia, J. 1964. ‘EL CIERVO en Argentina: COIMA,’ El Ciervo: 13 (127): 4 (1 August)</ref>).</blockquote>

For Sarrionandia, ''coima'' is rooted in anti-social attitudes generated by deep-seated distrust and mutual suspicion and enforced by complexly regulated yet inefficient public services in a precarious environment of economic shortage. In the context of asymmetrical relations of political, economic, social or institutional power that generate benefits for some but disadvantages for others, informal unwritten rules and punitive mechanisms uphold and perpetuate ''coima'' as an informal practice (Sautu 2004<ref>Sautu, R. (ed). 2004. Catálogo de Prácticas Corruptas. Corrupción, Confianza y Democracia. Buenos Aires: Lumiere</ref>). This is reflected in the Argentine expression ''pasar la factura'' (pass the bill on) which refers to the act of excluding those who refuse to pay a bribe from official administrative processes, such as issuing a passport. Another sanctioning mechanism is the deliberate delay of administrative procedures by public officials, or the threat to enforce the letter of the law by, for example, by health and safety inspectors.

''Coima'' has a coercive element because it is rooted in social bonds and societal relations, requiring an act of exchange between the giver and the recipient that resembles the act of exchanging gifts, favours and other forms of reciprocity while ultimately helping to form and strengthen social ties based on a sense of obligation. In the words of the Argentine writer Roberto Arlt, ‘We live in the ''coima'' empire, the realm of trickery, the land of villainy […] Coima is everywhere: invisible, certain, effective, precise. […] And those who do not engage in ''coima'', tolerate ''coima''’ (Arlt 1929<ref>Arlt, R. 1929. ‘Your majesty – la ''coima'',’ El Mundo (16 January)</ref>). Nearly a century later, Eric Calcagno wrote that Argentines had become indifferent towards the incidence of ''coima'' at almost any level, and that, as a result, corruption of almost any size had ceased to shock them. ''Coima'' and corruption was a ‘settled and accepted custom,’ as a result of which the country had entered an ‘advanced stage of decomposition’ where ''coima'' had become an institutionalised mode of social regulation and part of a larger ‘system’ (Calcagno 2000<ref>Calcagno, E. 2000. ‘Modelo neoliberal y “cometa” en Argentina,’ Le Monde Diplomatique (Edición Cono Sur): 17 (November)</ref>).
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==Notes==
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[[Category:Informal Practices]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:America]]
[[Category:Economy of favours]]
[[Category:Gift]]
[[Category:Favour]]