Krysha (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) - Revision history

Editor2018 at 10:52, 11 May 2020

2020-05-11T10:52:25Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:52, 11 May 2020
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	\| authorofpiece =Yulia Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor		\| authorofpiece =Yulia Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor
	\| authorinstitution =Department of Political Science and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, USA		\| authorinstitution =Department of Political Science and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, USA
	\| authorwebsite =[https://www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/yuliya-zabyelina Profile page at CUNY], [https://www.linkedin.com/in/anna-buzhor-2a9142127 Profile page at LinkedIn]}}		\| authorwebsite =[https://www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/yuliya-zabyelina Profile page at CUNY], [https://www.linkedin.com/in/anna-buzhor-2a9142127 Profile page on LinkedIn]}}
	<big>'''By Yulia Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor, Department of Political Science and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, USA'''</big>		<big>'''By Yulia Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor, Department of Political Science and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, USA'''</big>
	[[Category:Market]]		[[Category:Market]]

Admin at 14:56, 23 May 2019

2019-05-23T14:56:02Z

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	\| definition =Lit. ‘roof’, individuals or organisations providing a range of services, predominantly illicit, ranging from protection and patronage to enforcement of contracts and settlement of disputes		\| definition =Lit. ‘roof’, individuals or organisations providing a range of services, predominantly illicit, ranging from protection and patronage to enforcement of contracts and settlement of disputes
	\| location =Russia, Ukraine, Belarus		\| location =Russia, Ukraine, Belarus
	\| imagemap =Russia~~, Ukraine, Belarus~~ map.png		\| imagemap =Russia map.png
	\| clusters =		\| clusters =
	[[:Category:Market\|Market]] – [[:Category: Functional ambivalence\| Functional ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Gaming the system\| Gaming the system]] – [[:Category: Camouflage\| Camouflage]] – [[:Category: Intermediation\| Intermediation]]		[[:Category:Market\|Market]] – [[:Category: Functional ambivalence\| Functional ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Gaming the system\| Gaming the system]] – [[:Category: Camouflage\| Camouflage]] – [[:Category: Intermediation\| Intermediation]]

Editor2018 at 12:54, 17 May 2019

2019-05-17T12:54:28Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:54, 17 May 2019
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	{{infobox		{{infobox
	\| nameofpractice = Krysha		\| nameofpractice =Krysha
	\| location = ~~Post-Soviet States~~		\| flagemoji =🇷🇺 🇺🇦 🇧🇾
	\| imagemap = ~~FSU~~ map.png		\| definition =Lit. ‘roof’, individuals or organisations providing a range of services, predominantly illicit, ranging from protection and patronage to enforcement of contracts and settlement of disputes
	\| authorofpiece = ~~Yuliya~~ Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor		\| location =Russia, Ukraine, Belarus
	\| authorinstitution = John Jay College of Criminal Justice and City University of New York (~~CUNY~~)		\| imagemap =Russia, Ukraine, Belarus map.png
	}}		\| clusters =
			[[:Category:Market\|Market]] – [[:Category: Functional ambivalence\| Functional ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Gaming the system\| Gaming the system]] – [[:Category: Camouflage\| Camouflage]] – [[:Category: Intermediation\| Intermediation]]
			\| categories =
			[[:Category:Russia\|Russia]] – [[:Category: Ukraine\| Ukraine]] – [[:Category: Belarus\| Belarus]] – [[:Category: FSU\| FSU]] – [[:Category: Euphemism\| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Patronage\| Patronage]] – [[:Category: Protection\| Protection]] – [[:Category: Triangle\| Triangle]]
			\| authorofpiece =Yulia Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor
			\| authorinstitution =Department of Political Science and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, USA
			\| authorwebsite =[https://www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/yuliya-zabyelina Profile page at CUNY], [https://www.linkedin.com/in/anna-buzhor-2a9142127 Profile page at LinkedIn]}}
			<big>'''By Yulia Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor, Department of Political Science and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, USA'''</big>
			[[Category:Market]]
			[[Category: Functional ambivalence]]
			[[Category: Gaming the system]]
			[[Category: Camouflage]]
			[[Category: Intermediation]]
			[[Category:Russia]]
			[[Category: Ukraine]]
			[[Category: Belarus]]
			[[Category: FSU]]
			[[Category: Euphemism]]
			[[Category: Patronage]]
			[[Category: Protection]]
			[[Category: Triangle]]
			[[Category:Entry]]
			[[Category: Volume 2]]
			{\| class="wikitable"
			\|-
			\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\|Originating from criminal and law enforcement jargon, the term ''krysha'' (from the Russian ''крышa'' / ''krysha''), literally meaning ‘roof,’ is now broadly used to refer to individuals or organisations that provide a range of services, predominantly illicit and informal, ranging from protection and patronage, to the enforcement of contracts and settlement of disputes. The term has become popular in Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian languages. In Russian, it has a number of different forms; ''крышевание'' / ''kryshevaniye'' (noun) meaning protection racket, ''крышевать'' / ''kryshevat’'' (verb) meaning to provide protection or patronage, and ''крышующий'' / ''kryshuyushchiy'' (participle) meaning an individual or a group that provides protection or patronage. In Ukrainian and Belorussian, the terms ''кришування'' / ''kryshuvannya'' and ''крышаваньне'' / ''kryšavańnie'' correspond to the Russian ''kryshevaniye'' and relates to the same phenomenon. No single English word can fully incorporate the multiple meanings and forms of ''krysha'', but the term ‘protection racket’, roughly conveys the general meaning.
			\|}

	~~'''''Original text by Yuliya Zabyellina and Anna Buzhor'''''~~

	~~<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">~~
	Originating from criminal and law enforcement jargon, the term ''krysha'' (from the Russian ''крышa'' / ''krysha''), literally meaning ‘roof,’ is now broadly used to refer to individuals or organisations that provide a range of services, predominantly illicit and informal, ranging from protection and patronage, to the enforcement of contracts and settlement of disputes. The term has become popular in Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian languages. In Russian, it has a number of different forms; ''крышевание'' / ''kryshevaniye'' (noun) meaning protection racket, ''крышевать'' / ''kryshevat’'' (verb) meaning to provide protection or patronage, and ''крышующий'' / ''kryshuyushchiy'' (participle) meaning an individual or a group that provides protection or patronage. In Ukrainian and Belorussian, the terms ''кришування'' / ''kryshuvannya'' and ''крышаваньне'' / ''kryšavańnie'' correspond to the Russian ''kryshevaniye'' and relates to the same phenomenon. No single English word can fully incorporate the multiple meanings and forms of ''krysha'', but the term ‘protection racket’, roughly conveys the general meaning.

	~~<div class="mw-collapsible-content">~~
	The term ''krysha'' became widely used in post-Soviet republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union when a series of sweeping political and socio-economic reforms, mainly concerned with the privatisation of state property, created a conducive environment for the empowerment of criminal organisations. Therefore, the earliest and most common usage of ''krysha'' relates to extortion by criminal organisations and gangs through the threat of violence or of actual violence. ‘In many cases, the business will have to pay from 10 to 60 percent of its pre-tax income for protection regardless of who provides it. … If the criminals find a business particularly attractive, they will demand an ownership share of it’ (CSIS 1997, p. 29<ref>CSIS 1997. Russian Organized Crime. Global Organized Crime Project, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, DC.</ref>).		The term ''krysha'' became widely used in post-Soviet republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union when a series of sweeping political and socio-economic reforms, mainly concerned with the privatisation of state property, created a conducive environment for the empowerment of criminal organisations. Therefore, the earliest and most common usage of ''krysha'' relates to extortion by criminal organisations and gangs through the threat of violence or of actual violence. ‘In many cases, the business will have to pay from 10 to 60 percent of its pre-tax income for protection regardless of who provides it. … If the criminals find a business particularly attractive, they will demand an ownership share of it’ (CSIS 1997, p. 29<ref>CSIS 1997. Russian Organized Crime. Global Organized Crime Project, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, DC.</ref>).

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	Although Russian organised crime groups have been known to run ''krysha'', public officials have also sought to offer such protective services and extract the same kind of informal payments as criminal organisations. Law enforcement agencies have been reported to operate a ''de facto'' protection racket for criminal organisations (Volkov 2002a<ref>Vokov, V. 2002.a Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</ref>). Dishonest public servants would need neither violence nor threat of violence to establish ''krysha'' but will manipulate the law and bureaucratic procedures. Such abuses of public office undermine the competitive market system, especially in the case of small and medium-size businesses, making them dependent on informal arrangements between state officials and criminal organisations. McCarthy (2011, p. 64<ref>McCarthy, D.M.P. 2011. An Economic History of Organized Crime: A National and Transnational Approach. London and New York: Routledge.</ref>) argues that the involvement of public servants in protection rackets makes ''krysha'' in Russia strikingly different from analogous informal practices in other national contexts, such as ''pizzo'' (extortion money) levied by mafia organisations in Italy. Therefore, the effectiveness of a criminal ''krysha'' often depends on the power it has, relative to other protective ‘roofs’, including those provided by state institutions (Volkov 2002a<ref>Vokov, V. 2002.a Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</ref>). ‘Less powerful criminal groups would seek to align themselves with more powerful criminal groups, who in turn … obtain their own ''krysha'' from corrupt government officials’ (von Lampe 2015, p. 275<ref>von Lampe, K. 2015. Organized Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures, and Extra-Legal Governance. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage </ref>).		Although Russian organised crime groups have been known to run ''krysha'', public officials have also sought to offer such protective services and extract the same kind of informal payments as criminal organisations. Law enforcement agencies have been reported to operate a ''de facto'' protection racket for criminal organisations (Volkov 2002a<ref>Vokov, V. 2002.a Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</ref>). Dishonest public servants would need neither violence nor threat of violence to establish ''krysha'' but will manipulate the law and bureaucratic procedures. Such abuses of public office undermine the competitive market system, especially in the case of small and medium-size businesses, making them dependent on informal arrangements between state officials and criminal organisations. McCarthy (2011, p. 64<ref>McCarthy, D.M.P. 2011. An Economic History of Organized Crime: A National and Transnational Approach. London and New York: Routledge.</ref>) argues that the involvement of public servants in protection rackets makes ''krysha'' in Russia strikingly different from analogous informal practices in other national contexts, such as ''pizzo'' (extortion money) levied by mafia organisations in Italy. Therefore, the effectiveness of a criminal ''krysha'' often depends on the power it has, relative to other protective ‘roofs’, including those provided by state institutions (Volkov 2002a<ref>Vokov, V. 2002.a Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</ref>). ‘Less powerful criminal groups would seek to align themselves with more powerful criminal groups, who in turn … obtain their own ''krysha'' from corrupt government officials’ (von Lampe 2015, p. 275<ref>von Lampe, K. 2015. Organized Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures, and Extra-Legal Governance. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage </ref>).

	Private security companies are another major player in the market of private protection. They are often run by criminal organisations that partially or fully legalise protection services (Volkov 2002b<ref>Volkov, V. 2002.b Silovoye predprinimatel’stvo (Силовое предпринимательство: экономико-социологический анализ). St. Petersburg: Letniy Sad.</ref>; Taylor 2011<ref>Taylor, B. 2011. State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>). Russian private security companies may thus engage in extralegal activities, such as ‘sophisticated intelligence-gathering ... and the informal use of blackmail files (''kompromat''), including copies of bank statements, currency transfers, business and real estate transactions and other official documents as well as general correspondence, personal information and unofficial transcripts of telephone conversations of a compromising nature’ (Ledeneva 2004, p. 138<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2004. ~~‘Blat~~ Lessons: Networks, Institutions, Unwritten Rules’, in: W. Slater and A. Wilson (eds.), The Legacy of the Soviet Union. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 122-144.</ref>). These informal practices go far beyond the services that security companies are licensed to perform and clearly reflect the risks and uncertainties of doing business in Russia.		Private security companies are another major player in the market of private protection. They are often run by criminal organisations that partially or fully legalise protection services (Volkov 2002b<ref>Volkov, V. 2002.b Silovoye predprinimatel’stvo (Силовое предпринимательство: экономико-социологический анализ). St. Petersburg: Letniy Sad.</ref>; Taylor 2011<ref>Taylor, B. 2011. State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>). Russian private security companies may thus engage in extralegal activities, such as ‘sophisticated intelligence-gathering ... and the informal use of blackmail files (''[[kompromat]]''), including copies of bank statements, currency transfers, business and real estate transactions and other official documents as well as general correspondence, personal information and unofficial transcripts of telephone conversations of a compromising nature’ (Ledeneva 2004, p. 138<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2004. ‘[[Blat]] Lessons: Networks, Institutions, Unwritten Rules’, in: W. Slater and A. Wilson (eds.), The Legacy of the Soviet Union. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 122-144.</ref>). These informal practices go far beyond the services that security companies are licensed to perform and clearly reflect the risks and uncertainties of doing business in Russia.

	Moreover, since the police and the military personnel were largely underfunded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they actively sought a share of the legal market in private protection (Cox 2001<ref>Cox, D. 2001. Close Protection: The Politics of Guarding Russia’s Rulers. Westport, CT: Praeger.</ref>). While in some cases, criminal organisations would run private security firms, Taylor (2011<ref>Taylor, B. 2011. State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>) notes that the police may often control the legal market in private security: ‘for example, the head of the municipal militia in St. Petersburg in the early 2000s reportedly oversaw roofing operations in the city, partially by controlling licenses for private security companies’ (p.164).		Moreover, since the police and the military personnel were largely underfunded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they actively sought a share of the legal market in private protection (Cox 2001<ref>Cox, D. 2001. Close Protection: The Politics of Guarding Russia’s Rulers. Westport, CT: Praeger.</ref>). While in some cases, criminal organisations would run private security firms, Taylor (2011<ref>Taylor, B. 2011. State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>) notes that the police may often control the legal market in private security: ‘for example, the head of the municipal militia in St. Petersburg in the early 2000s reportedly oversaw roofing operations in the city, partially by controlling licenses for private security companies’ (p.164).

	Summing up, the types of ''krysha'' distinguished in post-Soviet societies are: criminal ''krysha'' provided by organised crime, semi-legal (or ‘combined’) ''krysha'' provided by criminal organisations and public officials working hand in hand, and government ''krysha'', involving public officials of various state institutions. Having emerged more than two decades ago, ''krysha'' practices remain a characteristic feature of the business culture in post-Soviet countries. Despite the efforts of post-Soviet governments to tackle these informal practices, foreign investors have continuously raised concerns about the troublesome reputation these states have when it comes to anti-competitive behaviour, extortion, and bribery.		Summing up, the types of ''krysha'' distinguished in post-Soviet societies are: criminal ''krysha'' provided by organised crime, semi-legal (or ‘combined’) ''krysha'' provided by criminal organisations and public officials working hand in hand, and government ''krysha'', involving public officials of various state institutions. Having emerged more than two decades ago, ''krysha'' practices remain a characteristic feature of the business culture in post-Soviet countries. Despite the efforts of post-Soviet governments to tackle these informal practices, foreign investors have continuously raised concerns about the troublesome reputation these states have when it comes to anti-competitive behaviour, extortion, and bribery.
	~~</div>~~
	~~</div>~~

	~~==Notes==~~
	~~<references />~~

	~~[[Category:Russia]]~~		==References==
	~~[[Category:Ukraine]]~~
	~~[[Category:Belarus]]~~
	~~[[Category:FSU]]~~
	~~[[Category:Gaming the system]]~~
	~~[[Category:Intermediation]]~~
	~~[[Category:Entry]]~~

Admin at 18:03, 11 February 2019

2019-02-11T18:03:04Z

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	<references />		<references />

	[[Category:~~Informal Practices~~]]		[[Category:Russia]]
	[[Category:~~Asia~~]]		[[Category:Ukraine]]
			[[Category:Belarus]]
	[[Category:FSU]]		[[Category:FSU]]
	[[Category:Gaming the system]]		[[Category:Gaming the system]]
	[[Category:Intermediation]]		[[Category:Intermediation]]
	[[Category:Entry]]		[[Category:Entry]]

Admin at 15:28, 29 June 2018

2018-06-29T15:28:19Z

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	[[Category:Gaming the system]]		[[Category:Gaming the system]]
	[[Category:Intermediation]]		[[Category:Intermediation]]
			[[Category:Entry]]

Admin: Admin moved page Krysha to Krysha (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) without leaving a redirect

2018-06-01T11:08:03Z

Admin moved page Krysha to Krysha (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) without leaving a redirect

← Older revision	Revision as of 11:08, 1 June 2018
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Admin: Created page with "{{infobox | nameofpractice = Krysha | location = Post-Soviet States | imagemap = FSU map.png | authorofpiece = Yuliya Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor | authorinstitution =..."

2016-09-08T18:04:58Z

Created page with "{{infobox | nameofpractice = Krysha | location = Post-Soviet States | imagemap = FSU map.png | authorofpiece = Yuliya Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor | authorinstitution =..."

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{{infobox
| nameofpractice = Krysha
| location = Post-Soviet States
| imagemap = FSU map.png
| authorofpiece = Yuliya Zabyelina and Anna Buzhor
| authorinstitution = John Jay College of Criminal Justice and City University of New York (CUNY)
}}

'''''Original text by Yuliya Zabyellina and Anna Buzhor'''''

<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
Originating from criminal and law enforcement jargon, the term ''krysha'' (from the Russian ''крышa'' / ''krysha''), literally meaning ‘roof,’ is now broadly used to refer to individuals or organisations that provide a range of services, predominantly illicit and informal, ranging from protection and patronage, to the enforcement of contracts and settlement of disputes. The term has become popular in Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian languages. In Russian, it has a number of different forms; ''крышевание'' / ''kryshevaniye'' (noun) meaning protection racket, ''крышевать'' / ''kryshevat’'' (verb) meaning to provide protection or patronage, and ''крышующий'' / ''kryshuyushchiy'' (participle) meaning an individual or a group that provides protection or patronage. In Ukrainian and Belorussian, the terms ''кришування'' / ''kryshuvannya'' and ''крышаваньне'' / ''kryšavańnie'' correspond to the Russian ''kryshevaniye'' and relates to the same phenomenon. No single English word can fully incorporate the multiple meanings and forms of ''krysha'', but the term ‘protection racket’, roughly conveys the general meaning.

<div class="mw-collapsible-content">
The term ''krysha'' became widely used in post-Soviet republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union when a series of sweeping political and socio-economic reforms, mainly concerned with the privatisation of state property, created a conducive environment for the empowerment of criminal organisations. Therefore, the earliest and most common usage of ''krysha'' relates to extortion by criminal organisations and gangs through the threat of violence or of actual violence. ‘In many cases, the business will have to pay from 10 to 60 percent of its pre-tax income for protection regardless of who provides it. … If the criminals find a business particularly attractive, they will demand an ownership share of it’ (CSIS 1997, p. 29<ref>CSIS 1997. Russian Organized Crime. Global Organized Crime Project, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Washington, DC.</ref>).

Although extortion rackets are often indistinguishable in practice from protection rackets since, for the former, there will always be an implied threat that the racketeers themselves may attack the business if it fails or refuses to pay, ''krysha'' may turn into a mutually beneficial arrangement between organised crime and business owners. In such a case, a criminal organisation will not only promise not to attack the business, but would also defend it from other racketeers, corrupt law enforcement, debt collection, and will assist with customs clearance and help it to compete with actual or potential enemies and competitors. A threat of violence or actual violence as a means of collecting money or property from businesses is therefore not an inherent feature of ''krysha'' (Siegel 2012<ref>Siegel, D. 2012. ‘Vory v Zakone: Russian Organized Crime’, in: D. Siegel and H. van der Bunt (eds.), Traditional Organized Crime in the Modern World: Responses to Socioeconomic Change, New York and London: Springer: 27-49.</ref>). Galeotti (2005<ref>Galeotti, M. 2005. ‘The Russian ‘Mafiya’: Consolidation and Globalisation’, in: M. Galeotti (ed.), Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime New York and London: Routledge : 54-70.</ref>) writes that ‘[a] ‘good’ ''krysha'' provided by the more entrepreneurial gangs will not only protect you from other criminals, it will also provide a range of other services, from debt recovery (handled far more quickly and efficiently than Russia’s corrupt and inefficient courts) to an inside track on whom to bribe within the local authorities to get things done. This explains why an estimated 70-80 per cent of firms pay an average of 10-20 per cent of their profits for this ‘roof’’ (p. 57).

Although Russian organised crime groups have been known to run ''krysha'', public officials have also sought to offer such protective services and extract the same kind of informal payments as criminal organisations. Law enforcement agencies have been reported to operate a ''de facto'' protection racket for criminal organisations (Volkov 2002a<ref>Vokov, V. 2002.a Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</ref>). Dishonest public servants would need neither violence nor threat of violence to establish ''krysha'' but will manipulate the law and bureaucratic procedures. Such abuses of public office undermine the competitive market system, especially in the case of small and medium-size businesses, making them dependent on informal arrangements between state officials and criminal organisations. McCarthy (2011, p. 64<ref>McCarthy, D.M.P. 2011. An Economic History of Organized Crime: A National and Transnational Approach. London and New York: Routledge.</ref>) argues that the involvement of public servants in protection rackets makes ''krysha'' in Russia strikingly different from analogous informal practices in other national contexts, such as ''pizzo'' (extortion money) levied by mafia organisations in Italy. Therefore, the effectiveness of a criminal ''krysha'' often depends on the power it has, relative to other protective ‘roofs’, including those provided by state institutions (Volkov 2002a<ref>Vokov, V. 2002.a Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.</ref>). ‘Less powerful criminal groups would seek to align themselves with more powerful criminal groups, who in turn … obtain their own ''krysha'' from corrupt government officials’ (von Lampe 2015, p. 275<ref>von Lampe, K. 2015. Organized Crime: Analyzing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures, and Extra-Legal Governance. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage </ref>).

Private security companies are another major player in the market of private protection. They are often run by criminal organisations that partially or fully legalise protection services (Volkov 2002b<ref>Volkov, V. 2002.b Silovoye predprinimatel’stvo (Силовое предпринимательство: экономико-социологический анализ). St. Petersburg: Letniy Sad.</ref>; Taylor 2011<ref>Taylor, B. 2011. State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>). Russian private security companies may thus engage in extralegal activities, such as ‘sophisticated intelligence-gathering ... and the informal use of blackmail files (''kompromat''), including copies of bank statements, currency transfers, business and real estate transactions and other official documents as well as general correspondence, personal information and unofficial transcripts of telephone conversations of a compromising nature’ (Ledeneva 2004, p. 138<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2004. ‘Blat Lessons: Networks, Institutions, Unwritten Rules’, in: W. Slater and A. Wilson (eds.), The Legacy of the Soviet Union. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 122-144.</ref>). These informal practices go far beyond the services that security companies are licensed to perform and clearly reflect the risks and uncertainties of doing business in Russia.

Moreover, since the police and the military personnel were largely underfunded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they actively sought a share of the legal market in private protection (Cox 2001<ref>Cox, D. 2001. Close Protection: The Politics of Guarding Russia’s Rulers. Westport, CT: Praeger.</ref>). While in some cases, criminal organisations would run private security firms, Taylor (2011<ref>Taylor, B. 2011. State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>) notes that the police may often control the legal market in private security: ‘for example, the head of the municipal militia in St. Petersburg in the early 2000s reportedly oversaw roofing operations in the city, partially by controlling licenses for private security companies’ (p.164).

Summing up, the types of ''krysha'' distinguished in post-Soviet societies are: criminal ''krysha'' provided by organised crime, semi-legal (or ‘combined’) ''krysha'' provided by criminal organisations and public officials working hand in hand, and government ''krysha'', involving public officials of various state institutions. Having emerged more than two decades ago, ''krysha'' practices remain a characteristic feature of the business culture in post-Soviet countries. Despite the efforts of post-Soviet governments to tackle these informal practices, foreign investors have continuously raised concerns about the troublesome reputation these states have when it comes to anti-competitive behaviour, extortion, and bribery.
</div>
</div>

==Notes==
<references />

[[Category:Informal Practices]]
[[Category:Asia]]
[[Category:FSU]]
[[Category:Gaming the system]]
[[Category:Intermediation]]