Pari pod masata (Bulgaria) - Revision history

Editor2018 at 08:01, 25 June 2021

2021-06-25T08:01:10Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:01, 25 June 2021
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	{{infobox \| nameofpractice = ''Pari pod masata'' \| flagemoji = 🇧🇬 \| definition = ~~''Pari pod masata'' is an informal transaction between citizens~~ and ~~public officials for preferential treatment.~~		{{infobox
	\| location = Bulgaria \| imagemap = Bulgaria map.png \| clusters = [[:Category: ~~economies~~ of favours\|~~economies~~ of favours]] – [[:Category: ~~redistribution~~\| ~~redistribution~~]] – [[:Category: ~~substantive ambivalence~~\| ~~substantive ambivalence~~]]		\| nameofpractice = Pari pod masata
	– [[:Category: ~~sociability of instrumentality~~\| ~~sociability of instrumentality~~]]		\| flagemoji = 🇧🇬
	\| ~~categories =~~ [[:Category: ~~redistribution~~\|~~redistribution~~]] – [[:Category: ~~public service~~\| ~~public service~~]] – [[:Category: ~~payment~~\| ~~payment~~]]– [[:Category: ~~healthcare~~\| ~~healthcare~~]] – [[:Category: ~~education~~\| ~~education~~]] – [[:Category: ~~bribe~~\| ~~bribe~~]]– [[:Category: ~~gift~~\| ~~gift~~]]– [[:Category: ~~favour~~\| ~~favour~~]] – [[:Category: ~~cash~~\| ~~cash~~]]		\| definition = Lit. "money under the table", gifting or tipping as gratuity for health and education services
			\| location = Bulgaria
	\| authorofpiece = Kristina Tsabala \| authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK \| authorwebsite		\| imagemap = Bulgaria map.png
	= }} <big>'''By Kristina Tsabala, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big> [[Category: Economies of favours]] [[Category: ~~redistribution~~]] [[Category: ~~substantive ambivalence~~]] [[Category: ~~sociability of instrumentality~~]]		\| clusters = [[:Category: Economies of favours\|Economies of favours]]
			\| categories = [[:Category: Bulgaria\|Bulgaria]] – [[:Category: Balkans\| Balkans]] – [[:Category: Europe\| Europe]] – [[:Category: EU\| EU]] – [[:Category: Healthcare\| Healthcare]] – [[:Category: Education\| Education]] – [[:Category: Gratuity\| Gratuity]] – [[:Category: Tip\| Tip]] – [[:Category: Gift\| Gift]] – [[:Category: Payment\| Payment]] – [[:Category: Money\| Money]] – [[:Category: Facilitation\| Facilitation]] – [[:Category: Public service\| Public service]]
			\| authorofpiece = Kristina Tsabala
			\| authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK
			\| authorwebsite =
			}}
			<big>'''By Kristina Tsabala, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big>
			[[Category: Economies of favours]]
			[[Category: Bulgaria]]
			[[Category: Balkans]]
			[[Category: Europe]]
			[[Category: EU]]
			[[Category: Healthcare]]
			[[Category: Education]]
			[[Category: Gratuity]]
			[[Category: Tip]]
			[[Category: Gift]]
			[[Category: Payment]]
			[[Category: Money]]
			[[Category: Facilitation]]
			[[Category: Public service]]
			[[Category: Entry]]
			[[Category: 2021 entry]]
	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"
	\|-		\|-
	\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| ''Pari pod masata'' is a colloquial term in Bulgarian that refers to informal payments to public officials. It literally translates as ‘money-under-the-table’, ‘money-under-the-counter’ or ‘under-the-counter-payments’. These informal payments made by citizens to public servants, consist of cash and/or commodities for favours in public sector (healthcare, administration, education and customs). The favour provided by the public servant takes the form of preferential treatments such as faster provision, ensured quality, or evasion of state regulations. On the one hand, it is related to the shadow economy because it is an unregulated transaction and represents administrative and civil misbehaviour. On the other hand, money-under-the-table is associated with tipping and gift giving because it is culturally accepted in Bulgaria to express gratitude materially to the servant for his/her time and attention (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller 2000: 309)<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T. & Miller, W. L. 2000. ‘If you pay, we'll operate immediatley’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 26: 305-311</ref>. The prominence of this practice has been shown in the annual report of the European Commission for 2019 where Bulgaria figured at the first place in the EU by size of informal payments in the healthcare sector (European Union 2019: 56)<ref>European Union. 2019. State of Health in the EU: Companion Report 2019. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.		\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| ''Pari pod masata'' is a colloquial term in Bulgarian that refers to informal payments to public officials. It literally translates as ‘money-under-the-table’, ‘money-under-the-counter’ or ‘under-the-counter-payments’. These informal payments made by citizens to public servants, consist of cash and/or commodities for favours in public sector (healthcare, administration, education and customs). The favour provided by the public servant takes the form of preferential treatments such as faster provision, ensured quality, or evasion of state regulations. On the one hand, it is related to the shadow economy because it is an unregulated transaction and represents administrative and civil misbehaviour. On the other hand, money-under-the-table is associated with tipping and gift giving because it is culturally accepted in Bulgaria to express gratitude materially to the servant for his/her time and attention (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller 2000: 309)<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T. & Miller, W. L. 2000. ‘If you pay, we'll operate immediatley’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 26: 305-311</ref>. The prominence of this practice has been shown in the annual report of the European Commission for 2019 where Bulgaria figured at the first place in the EU by size of informal payments in the healthcare sector (European Union 2019: 56)<ref>European Union. 2019. State of Health in the EU: Companion Report 2019. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
	</ref>. ''Pari pod masata'' is far from unique. Analogous practices can be found in Greece ([[fakelaki]]), Latvia ([[aploksne]]), Hungary ([[~~halapénz~~]]), Middle East and North Africa ([[baksheesh]]).		</ref>. ''Pari pod masata'' is far from unique. Analogous practices can be found in Greece ([[fakelaki]]), Latvia ([[aploksne]]), Hungary ([[hálapénz, paraszolvencia]]), Middle East and North Africa ([[baksheesh]]).
			\|}

			Although studies of informal payments started being reported only after 1989, films and literature have described ''Pari pod masata'' transactions during the socialist regime. Due to the shortage of commodities, gifts were a widespread practice that recognised the official’s personality outside of his/her job and aimed at establishing a personal relationship that would later lead to the use of informal networks, known in Bulgaria as [[vruzki]] (Chavdarova, 2018, p. 64-67)<ref>Chavdarova, T. 2018. ‘Vruzki’, in A. Ledeneva (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality . London: UCL PressL 64-7</ref>. The comedy Toplo (Warmth) of 1978 illustrates the hardships of installing a central heating system in a building in the city center of Sofia. In the scene when the residents of the building discuss what is necessary to hand in the inquiry for the installation to the council of Sofia, they state that they had filled the document forms and collected the ''Pari pod masata'' (Yanchev 1978)<ref>Yanchev, V. (director). 1978. Toplo [film]. Bulgaria.</ref>. This scene implies that if they do not provide the informal payment alongside the necessary documents, their inquiry would not be handed in to the competent officials.

	Although studies of informal payments started being reported only after 1989, films and literature have described ''Pari pod masata'' transactions during the socialist regime. Due to the shortage of commodities, gifts were a widespread practice that recognised the official’s personality outside of his/her job and aimed at establishing a personal relationship that would later lead to the use of informal networks, known in Bulgaria as [[vruzki]] (Chavdarova, 2018, p. 64-67)<ref>Chavdarova, T. 2018. ‘Vruzki’, in A. Ledeneva (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality . London: UCL PressL 64-7</ref>. The comedy Toplo (Warmth) of 1978 illustrates the hardships of installing a central heating system in a building in the city center of Sofia. In the scene when the residents of the building discuss what is necessary to hand in the inquiry for the installation to the council of Sofia, they state that they had filled the document forms and collected the ''Pari pod masata'' (Yanchev 1978)<ref>Yanchev, V. (director). 1978. Toplo [film]. Bulgaria.</ref>. This scene implies that if they do not provide the informal payment alongside the necessary documents, their inquiry would not be handed in to the competent officials.
	\|}
	The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.		The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.

Editor2018 at 18:53, 24 June 2021

2021-06-24T18:53:55Z

Admin at 18:38, 24 June 2021

2021-06-24T18:38:55Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:38, 24 June 2021
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	The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.		The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.

	The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420).<ref>Stepurko, T., Pavlova, M., Gryga, I., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal payments for health services - Corruption or Gratitude? A study on public attitudes, perceptions and opinions in six Central and Eastern European Countries’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 46: 419-31.</ref> The reform consisted of installing additional formal co-payments for the health services in the benefits package. Nevertheless, a study conducted on 1,003 people in July 2010 showed that 20% of the respondents had reported paying informally in cash in the past year and 45% of them giving gifts in-kind (Atanasova et al., 2013: 733).<ref>Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.</ref> This can be considered an improvement given that in 1997, 86% of the respondents thought that ‘it is impossible to obtain adequate health care without giving bribes’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002: 264).<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.</ref>		The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420)<ref>Stepurko, T., Pavlova, M., Gryga, I., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal payments for health services - Corruption or Gratitude? A study on public attitudes, perceptions and opinions in six Central and Eastern European Countries’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 46: 419-31</ref>. The reform consisted of installing additional formal co-payments for the health services in the benefits package. Nevertheless, a study conducted on 1,003 people in July 2010 showed that 20% of the respondents had reported paying informally in cash in the past year and 45% of them giving gifts in-kind (Atanasova et al., 2013: 733)<ref>Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9</ref>. This can be considered an improvement given that in 1997, 86% of the respondents thought that ‘it is impossible to obtain adequate health care without giving bribes’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002: 264)<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73</ref>.

	Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655).<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., & Miller, W. 1997. ‘”Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take” - in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts”. Europe-Asia studies, 50: 651-677</ref> Public servants resorting to extortion might abuse their power even further by establishing an informal ‘levy’ (red tape) or ‘toll’ (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 77).<ref>Blundo, G., and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2006. ‘Everyday Corruption in West Africa’, in G. Bludno, J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, N. Arifari, and M. Alou (eds.), Everyday Corruption in Africa: Citizens and Public Officials. Zed Books: 69-108</ref> This is most frequently reported in relation to custom officials who act as informal tax collectors over travelers’ possessions (PARITENI 2014).<ref>PARITENI. 2014. ‘Nov podkup izobretiha mitnichari’, 24 January, https://www.pariteni.bg/novini/novini/nov-podkup-izobretiha-mitnichari-181398</ref> A custom official can earn between 900 and 1,200 euros for a shift at the border with Serbia (24Chasa 2020).<ref>24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285</ref> They demand informal payments to allow people to access certain administrative and state entities without confiscating anything, regardless the legality of passengers’ belongings.		Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655)<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., & Miller, W. 1997. ‘”Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take” - in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts”. Europe-Asia studies, 50: 651-677</ref>. Public servants resorting to extortion might abuse their power even further by establishing an informal ‘levy’ (red tape) or ‘toll’ (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 77)<ref>Blundo, G., and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2006. ‘Everyday Corruption in West Africa’, in G. Bludno, J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, N. Arifari, and M. Alou (eds.), Everyday Corruption in Africa: Citizens and Public Officials. Zed Books: 69-108</ref>. This is most frequently reported in relation to custom officials who act as informal tax collectors over travelers’ possessions (PARITENI 2014)<ref>PARITENI. 2014. ‘Nov podkup izobretiha mitnichari’, 24 January, https://www.pariteni.bg/novini/novini/nov-podkup-izobretiha-mitnichari-181398</ref>. A custom official can earn between 900 and 1,200 euros for a shift at the border with Serbia (24Chasa 2020)<ref>24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285</ref>. They demand informal payments to allow people to access certain administrative and state entities without confiscating anything, regardless the legality of passengers’ belongings.

	In the healthcare sector, pari-pod-masta might be offered to the doctor by the patient or his relatives to receive a quicker provision or to ensure the good quality of the treatment. If the payment is given in advance (ex-ante), then it bears the resemblance of a bribe. However, the payment can also represent a gift when it is given at the end (ex-post) of the treatment, to show gratitude. This conceptual timeframe is important because it differentiates bribes from gifts. Nevertheless, an ex-post payment becomes ex-ante for a future exchange transforming the gift into bribe (Moldovan 2013: 386).<ref>Moldovan, A., & Van de Walle, S. 2013. ‘Gifts or Bribes? Attitudes on Informal payments in Romanian Health Care’, Public Integrity, 385-402</ref> Expensive gifts might create preferential relationships between the parties (Balabanova & McKee 2002: 251).<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.</ref> The Bulgarian Physicians’ Union differentiated officially ex-ante and ex-post payments, and the latter was described as ethical (Delcheva, Balabanova & Mckee, 1997: 91).<ref>Delcheva, E., Balabanova, D., and Mckee, M. 1997. ‘Under-the-counter payments for healthcare: Evidence from Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 89-100.</ref>		In the healthcare sector, pari-pod-masta might be offered to the doctor by the patient or his relatives to receive a quicker provision or to ensure the good quality of the treatment. If the payment is given in advance (ex-ante), then it bears the resemblance of a bribe. However, the payment can also represent a gift when it is given at the end (ex-post) of the treatment, to show gratitude. This conceptual timeframe is important because it differentiates bribes from gifts. Nevertheless, an ex-post payment becomes ex-ante for a future exchange transforming the gift into bribe (Moldovan 2013: 386)<ref>Moldovan, A., & Van de Walle, S. 2013. ‘Gifts or Bribes? Attitudes on Informal payments in Romanian Health Care’, Public Integrity, 385-402.</ref>. Expensive gifts might create preferential relationships between the parties (Balabanova & McKee 2002: 251)<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.</ref>. The Bulgarian Physicians’ Union differentiated officially ex-ante and ex-post payments, and the latter was described as ethical (Delcheva, Balabanova & Mckee, 1997: 91)<ref>Delcheva, E., Balabanova, D., and Mckee, M. 1997. ‘Under-the-counter payments for healthcare: Evidence from Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 89-100.</ref>.

	In the public education sector, pari-pod-masata takes the form of unreported donations for the educational institutions that lack state funding. It is a common practice for public schools in Bulgaria to require unofficial donations from the parents to improve infrastructures and facilities. These payments are destined for repairs, heating, events, presents, the purchase of extra materials and participation in extracurricular activities. These so-called donations are unregulated but sometimes mandatory.		In the public education sector, pari-pod-masata takes the form of unreported donations for the educational institutions that lack state funding. It is a common practice for public schools in Bulgaria to require unofficial donations from the parents to improve infrastructures and facilities. These payments are destined for repairs, heating, events, presents, the purchase of extra materials and participation in extracurricular activities. These so-called donations are unregulated but sometimes mandatory.

	In 2001, 34 % of the population considered informal payments as an unchangeable aspect of the country’s culture (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 2001: 140).<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., and Miller, W. 2001. A culture of corruption? Coping with government in post-communist Europe. Budapest: Central European University.</ref> Gift giving, in particular, was seen as legitimate because means to express gratitude and respect to the public servant. Media coverage of informal payments peaked at the turn of the century when major anti-corruption legislation was introduced, and the debates regarding informal payments entered the public discourse following international scandals. For instance, in 2002 Greece declared that it would not accept higher education diplomas issued from Bulgarian universities because of the widespread bribes in the sector. According to media investigations, in the 2000s an exam passing costed between 150 and 300 US dollars (Coalition 2000 & CSD, 2005, p. 14).<ref>Coalition 2000 and Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) 2005. Obrazovanie i antikoruptsiya. Sofia: CSD.</ref> Nowadays, informal payments remain widespread: The Global Corruption Barometer for 2019 reported that 12% of public service users had given a bribe in the past year (Transparency International, 2019)<ref>Transparency International. 2019. ‘Our Work in: Bulgaria’, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bulgaria</ref>. Unregulated donations, showing gratitude to teachers, doctors and officials is still considered a cultural phenomenon rather than immoral behaviour.		In 2001, 34 % of the population considered informal payments as an unchangeable aspect of the country’s culture (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 2001: 140)<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., and Miller, W. 2001. A culture of corruption? Coping with government in post-communist Europe. Budapest: Central European University.</ref>. Gift giving, in particular, was seen as legitimate because means to express gratitude and respect to the public servant. Media coverage of informal payments peaked at the turn of the century when major anti-corruption legislation was introduced, and the debates regarding informal payments entered the public discourse following international scandals. For instance, in 2002 Greece declared that it would not accept higher education diplomas issued from Bulgarian universities because of the widespread bribes in the sector. According to media investigations, in the 2000s an exam passing costed between 150 and 300 US dollars (Coalition 2000 & CSD, 2005, p. 14)<ref>Coalition 2000 and Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) 2005. Obrazovanie i antikoruptsiya. Sofia: CSD.</ref>. Nowadays, informal payments remain widespread: The Global Corruption Barometer for 2019 reported that 12% of public service users had given a bribe in the past year (Transparency International, 2019)<ref>Transparency International. 2019. ‘Our Work in: Bulgaria’, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bulgaria</ref>. Unregulated donations, showing gratitude to teachers, doctors and officials is still considered a cultural phenomenon rather than immoral behaviour.

	==References==		==References==

Admin at 18:34, 24 June 2021

2021-06-24T18:34:03Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:34, 24 June 2021
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	The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.		The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.

	The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420). The reform consisted of installing additional formal co-payments for the health services in the benefits package. Nevertheless, a study conducted on 1,003 people in July 2010 showed that 20% of the respondents had reported paying informally in cash in the past year and 45% of them giving gifts in-kind (Atanasova et al., 2013: 733). This can be considered an improvement given that in 1997, 86% of the respondents thought that ‘it is impossible to obtain adequate health care without giving bribes’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002: 264).		The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420).<ref>Stepurko, T., Pavlova, M., Gryga, I., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal payments for health services - Corruption or Gratitude? A study on public attitudes, perceptions and opinions in six Central and Eastern European Countries’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 46: 419-31.</ref> The reform consisted of installing additional formal co-payments for the health services in the benefits package. Nevertheless, a study conducted on 1,003 people in July 2010 showed that 20% of the respondents had reported paying informally in cash in the past year and 45% of them giving gifts in-kind (Atanasova et al., 2013: 733).<ref>Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.</ref> This can be considered an improvement given that in 1997, 86% of the respondents thought that ‘it is impossible to obtain adequate health care without giving bribes’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002: 264).<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.</ref>

	Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655).<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., & Miller, W. 1997. ‘”Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take” - in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts”. Europe-Asia studies, 50: 651-677</ref> Public servants resorting to extortion might abuse their power even further by establishing an informal ‘levy’ (red tape) or ‘toll’ (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 77).<ref>Blundo, G., and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2006. ‘Everyday Corruption in West Africa’, in G. Bludno, J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, N. Arifari, and M. Alou (eds.), Everyday Corruption in Africa: Citizens and Public Officials. Zed Books: 69-108</ref> This is most frequently reported in relation to custom officials who act as informal tax collectors over travelers’ possessions (PARITENI 2014).<ref>PARITENI. 2014. ‘Nov podkup izobretiha mitnichari’, 24 January, https://www.pariteni.bg/novini/novini/nov-podkup-izobretiha-mitnichari-181398</ref> A custom official can earn between 900 and 1,200 euros for a shift at the border with Serbia (24Chasa 2020).<ref>24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285</ref> They demand informal payments to allow people to access certain administrative and state entities without confiscating anything, regardless the legality of passengers’ belongings.		Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655).<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., & Miller, W. 1997. ‘”Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take” - in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts”. Europe-Asia studies, 50: 651-677</ref> Public servants resorting to extortion might abuse their power even further by establishing an informal ‘levy’ (red tape) or ‘toll’ (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 77).<ref>Blundo, G., and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2006. ‘Everyday Corruption in West Africa’, in G. Bludno, J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, N. Arifari, and M. Alou (eds.), Everyday Corruption in Africa: Citizens and Public Officials. Zed Books: 69-108</ref> This is most frequently reported in relation to custom officials who act as informal tax collectors over travelers’ possessions (PARITENI 2014).<ref>PARITENI. 2014. ‘Nov podkup izobretiha mitnichari’, 24 January, https://www.pariteni.bg/novini/novini/nov-podkup-izobretiha-mitnichari-181398</ref> A custom official can earn between 900 and 1,200 euros for a shift at the border with Serbia (24Chasa 2020).<ref>24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285</ref> They demand informal payments to allow people to access certain administrative and state entities without confiscating anything, regardless the legality of passengers’ belongings.

Editor2018 at 18:32, 24 June 2021

2021-06-24T18:32:44Z

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	\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| Pari-pod-masata is a colloquial term in Bulgarian that refers to informal payments to public officials. It literally translates as ‘money-under-the-table’, ‘money-under-the-counter’ or ‘under-the-counter-payments’. These informal payments made by citizens to public servants, consist of cash and/or commodities for favours in public sector (healthcare, administration, education and customs). The favour provided by the public servant takes the form of preferential treatments such as faster provision, ensured quality, or evasion of state regulations. On the one hand, it is related to the shadow economy because it is an unregulated transaction and represents administrative and civil misbehaviour. On the other hand, money-under-the-table is associated with tipping and gift giving because it is culturally accepted in Bulgaria to express gratitude materially to the servant for his/her time and attention (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller 2000: 309). The prominence of this practice has been shown in the annual report of the European Commission for 2019 where Bulgaria figured at the first place in the EU by size of informal payments in the healthcare sector (European Union 2019: 56). Pari-pod-masta is far from unique. Analogous practices can be found in Greece ([[fakelaki]]), Latvia ([[aploksne]]), Hungary ([[halapénz]]), Middle East and North Africa ([[baksheesh]]).		\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| Pari-pod-masata is a colloquial term in Bulgarian that refers to informal payments to public officials. It literally translates as ‘money-under-the-table’, ‘money-under-the-counter’ or ‘under-the-counter-payments’. These informal payments made by citizens to public servants, consist of cash and/or commodities for favours in public sector (healthcare, administration, education and customs). The favour provided by the public servant takes the form of preferential treatments such as faster provision, ensured quality, or evasion of state regulations. On the one hand, it is related to the shadow economy because it is an unregulated transaction and represents administrative and civil misbehaviour. On the other hand, money-under-the-table is associated with tipping and gift giving because it is culturally accepted in Bulgaria to express gratitude materially to the servant for his/her time and attention (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller 2000: 309)<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T. & Miller, W. L. 2000. ‘If you pay, we'll operate immediatley’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 26: 305-311</ref>. The prominence of this practice has been shown in the annual report of the European Commission for 2019 where Bulgaria figured at the first place in the EU by size of informal payments in the healthcare sector (European Union 2019: 56)<ref>European Union. 2019. State of Health in the EU: Companion Report 2019. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
			</ref>. Pari-pod-masta is far from unique. Analogous practices can be found in Greece ([[fakelaki]]), Latvia ([[aploksne]]), Hungary ([[halapénz]]), Middle East and North Africa ([[baksheesh]]).

	Although studies of informal payments started being reported only after 1989, films and literature have described pari pod masata transactions during the socialist regime. Due to the shortage of commodities, gifts were a widespread practice that recognised the official’s personality outside of his/her job and aimed at establishing a personal relationship that would later lead to the use of informal networks, known in Bulgaria as [[vruzki]] (Chavdarova, 2018, p. 64-67). The comedy Toplo (Warmth) of 1978 illustrates the hardships of installing a central heating system in a building in the city center of Sofia. In the scene when the residents of the building discuss what is necessary to hand in the inquiry for the installation to the council of Sofia, they state that they had filled the document forms and collected the pari pod masata (Yanchev 1978). This scene implies that if they do not provide the informal payment alongside the necessary documents, their inquiry would not be handed in to the competent officials.		Although studies of informal payments started being reported only after 1989, films and literature have described pari pod masata transactions during the socialist regime. Due to the shortage of commodities, gifts were a widespread practice that recognised the official’s personality outside of his/her job and aimed at establishing a personal relationship that would later lead to the use of informal networks, known in Bulgaria as [[vruzki]] (Chavdarova, 2018, p. 64-67)<ref>Chavdarova, T. 2018. ‘Vruzki’, in A. Ledeneva (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality . London: UCL PressL 64-7</ref>. The comedy Toplo (Warmth) of 1978 illustrates the hardships of installing a central heating system in a building in the city center of Sofia. In the scene when the residents of the building discuss what is necessary to hand in the inquiry for the installation to the council of Sofia, they state that they had filled the document forms and collected the pari pod masata (Yanchev 1978)<ref>Yanchev, V. (director). 1978. Toplo [film]. Bulgaria.</ref>. This scene implies that if they do not provide the informal payment alongside the necessary documents, their inquiry would not be handed in to the competent officials.
	\|}		\|}
	The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.		The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent.

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References

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	==References==		==References==

	~~# 24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285~~

	# Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.

	~~# Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.~~

	# Blundo, G., and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2006. ‘Everyday Corruption in West Africa’, in G. Bludno, J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, N. Arifari, and M. Alou (eds.), Everyday Corruption in Africa: Citizens and Public Officials. Zed Books: 69-108

	~~# Chavdarova, T. 2018. ‘Vruzki’, in A. Ledeneva (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality . London: UCL PressL 64-7~~

	~~# Coalition 2000 and Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) 2005. Obrazovanie i antikoruptsiya. Sofia: CSD.~~

	~~# Delcheva, E., Balabanova, D., and Mckee, M. 1997. ‘Under-the-counter payments for healthcare: Evidence from Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 89-100.~~

	~~# European Union. 2019. State of Health in the EU: Companion Report 2019. Luxembourg:Publications Office of the European Union.~~

	~~# Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., and Miller, W. 2001. A culture of corruption? Coping with government in post-communist Europe. Budapest: Central European University.~~

	# Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., & Miller, W. 1997. ‘”Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take” - in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts”. Europe-Asia studies, 50: 651-677

	~~# Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T. & Miller, W. L. 2000. ‘If you pay, we'll operate immediatley’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 26: 305-311~~

	~~# PARITENI. 2014. ‘Nov podkup izobretiha mitnichari’, 24 January, https://www.pariteni.bg/novini/novini/nov-podkup-izobretiha-mitnichari-181398~~

	~~# Moldovan, A., & Van de Walle, S. 2013. ‘Gifts or Bribes? Attitudes on Informal payments in Romanian Health Care’, Public Integrity, 385-402~~

	# Stepurko, T., Pavlova, M., Gryga, I., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal payments for health services - Corruption or Gratitude? A study on public attitudes, perceptions and opinions in six Central and Eastern European Countries’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 46: 419-31.

	~~# Transparency International. 2019. ‘Our Work in: Bulgaria’, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bulgaria~~

	~~# Yanchev, V. (director). 1978. Toplo [film]. Bulgaria.~~

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	The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420). The reform consisted of installing additional formal co-payments for the health services in the benefits package. Nevertheless, a study conducted on 1,003 people in July 2010 showed that 20% of the respondents had reported paying informally in cash in the past year and 45% of them giving gifts in-kind (Atanasova et al., 2013: 733). This can be considered an improvement given that in 1997, 86% of the respondents thought that ‘it is impossible to obtain adequate health care without giving bribes’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002: 264).		The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420). The reform consisted of installing additional formal co-payments for the health services in the benefits package. Nevertheless, a study conducted on 1,003 people in July 2010 showed that 20% of the respondents had reported paying informally in cash in the past year and 45% of them giving gifts in-kind (Atanasova et al., 2013: 733). This can be considered an improvement given that in 1997, 86% of the respondents thought that ‘it is impossible to obtain adequate health care without giving bribes’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002: 264).

	Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655). Public servants resorting to extortion might abuse their power even further by establishing an informal ‘levy’ (red tape) or ‘toll’ (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 77). This is most frequently reported in relation to custom officials who act as informal tax collectors over travelers’ possessions (PARITENI 2014). A custom official can earn between 900 and 1,200 euros for a shift at the border with Serbia (24Chasa 2020). They demand informal payments to allow people to access certain administrative and state entities without confiscating anything, regardless the legality of passengers’ belongings.		Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655).<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., & Miller, W. 1997. ‘”Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take” - in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts”. Europe-Asia studies, 50: 651-677</ref> Public servants resorting to extortion might abuse their power even further by establishing an informal ‘levy’ (red tape) or ‘toll’ (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 77).<ref>Blundo, G., and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2006. ‘Everyday Corruption in West Africa’, in G. Bludno, J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, N. Arifari, and M. Alou (eds.), Everyday Corruption in Africa: Citizens and Public Officials. Zed Books: 69-108</ref> This is most frequently reported in relation to custom officials who act as informal tax collectors over travelers’ possessions (PARITENI 2014).<ref>PARITENI. 2014. ‘Nov podkup izobretiha mitnichari’, 24 January, https://www.pariteni.bg/novini/novini/nov-podkup-izobretiha-mitnichari-181398</ref> A custom official can earn between 900 and 1,200 euros for a shift at the border with Serbia (24Chasa 2020).<ref>24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285</ref> They demand informal payments to allow people to access certain administrative and state entities without confiscating anything, regardless the legality of passengers’ belongings.

	In the healthcare sector, pari-pod-masta might be offered to the doctor by the patient or his relatives to receive a quicker provision or to ensure the good quality of the treatment. If the payment is given in advance (ex-ante), then it bears the resemblance of a bribe. However, the payment can also represent a gift when it is given at the end (ex-post) of the treatment, to show gratitude. This conceptual timeframe is important because it differentiates bribes from gifts. Nevertheless, an ex-post payment becomes ex-ante for a future exchange transforming the gift into bribe (Moldovan 2013: 386). Expensive gifts might create preferential relationships between the parties (Balabanova & McKee 2002: 251). The Bulgarian Physicians’ Union differentiated officially ex-ante and ex-post payments, and the latter was described as ethical (Delcheva, Balabanova & Mckee, 1997: 91).		In the healthcare sector, pari-pod-masta might be offered to the doctor by the patient or his relatives to receive a quicker provision or to ensure the good quality of the treatment. If the payment is given in advance (ex-ante), then it bears the resemblance of a bribe. However, the payment can also represent a gift when it is given at the end (ex-post) of the treatment, to show gratitude. This conceptual timeframe is important because it differentiates bribes from gifts. Nevertheless, an ex-post payment becomes ex-ante for a future exchange transforming the gift into bribe (Moldovan 2013: 386).<ref>Moldovan, A., & Van de Walle, S. 2013. ‘Gifts or Bribes? Attitudes on Informal payments in Romanian Health Care’, Public Integrity, 385-402</ref> Expensive gifts might create preferential relationships between the parties (Balabanova & McKee 2002: 251).<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.</ref> The Bulgarian Physicians’ Union differentiated officially ex-ante and ex-post payments, and the latter was described as ethical (Delcheva, Balabanova & Mckee, 1997: 91).<ref>Delcheva, E., Balabanova, D., and Mckee, M. 1997. ‘Under-the-counter payments for healthcare: Evidence from Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 89-100.</ref>

	In the public education sector, pari-pod-masata takes the form of unreported donations for the educational institutions that lack state funding. It is a common practice for public schools in Bulgaria to require unofficial donations from the parents to improve infrastructures and facilities. These payments are destined for repairs, heating, events, presents, the purchase of extra materials and participation in extracurricular activities. These so-called donations are unregulated but sometimes mandatory.		In the public education sector, pari-pod-masata takes the form of unreported donations for the educational institutions that lack state funding. It is a common practice for public schools in Bulgaria to require unofficial donations from the parents to improve infrastructures and facilities. These payments are destined for repairs, heating, events, presents, the purchase of extra materials and participation in extracurricular activities. These so-called donations are unregulated but sometimes mandatory.

	In 2001, 34 % of the population considered informal payments as an unchangeable aspect of the country’s culture (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 2001: 140). Gift giving, in particular, was seen as legitimate because means to express gratitude and respect to the public servant. Media coverage of informal payments peaked at the turn of the century when major anti-corruption legislation was introduced, and the debates regarding informal payments entered the public discourse following international scandals. For instance, in 2002 Greece declared that it would not accept higher education diplomas issued from Bulgarian universities because of the widespread bribes in the sector. According to media investigations, in the 2000s an exam passing costed between 150 and 300 US dollars (Coalition 2000 & CSD, 2005, p. 14). Nowadays, informal payments remain widespread: The Global Corruption Barometer for 2019 reported that 12% of public service users had given a bribe in the past year (Transparency International, 2019). Unregulated donations, showing gratitude to teachers, doctors and officials is still considered a cultural phenomenon rather than immoral behaviour.		In 2001, 34 % of the population considered informal payments as an unchangeable aspect of the country’s culture (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 2001: 140).<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., and Miller, W. 2001. A culture of corruption? Coping with government in post-communist Europe. Budapest: Central European University.</ref> Gift giving, in particular, was seen as legitimate because means to express gratitude and respect to the public servant. Media coverage of informal payments peaked at the turn of the century when major anti-corruption legislation was introduced, and the debates regarding informal payments entered the public discourse following international scandals. For instance, in 2002 Greece declared that it would not accept higher education diplomas issued from Bulgarian universities because of the widespread bribes in the sector. According to media investigations, in the 2000s an exam passing costed between 150 and 300 US dollars (Coalition 2000 & CSD, 2005, p. 14).<ref>Coalition 2000 and Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) 2005. Obrazovanie i antikoruptsiya. Sofia: CSD.</ref> Nowadays, informal payments remain widespread: The Global Corruption Barometer for 2019 reported that 12% of public service users had given a bribe in the past year (Transparency International, 2019)<ref>Transparency International. 2019. ‘Our Work in: Bulgaria’, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bulgaria</ref>. Unregulated donations, showing gratitude to teachers, doctors and officials is still considered a cultural phenomenon rather than immoral behaviour.

	==References==		==References==

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	# 24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285		# 24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285

	## Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.		# Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.

	# Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.		# Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.

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	# 24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285		# 24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285

	# Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.		## Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.

	# Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.		# Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.

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References

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:55, 24 June 2021
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	# 24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285		# 24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285

	#		# Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.
	#
	Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9.

	# Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.		# Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.