Silovi Grupirovki (Bulgaria) - Revision history

Editor2018 at 14:00, 11 January 2023

2023-01-11T14:00:12Z

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	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"
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	\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| The Bulgarian term ''Silovi Grupirovki''(Силови Групировки) can be literally translated as violent groups. The term, which is widely known in Bulgaria, can also be understood as a pun; in Bulgarian ''sila'' means both power and violence (Langenscheidt 2005: 180<ref>Langenscheidts Universal-Wörterbuch Bulgarisch. 2005. Bulgarisch-Deutsch. Deutsch-Bulgarisch. Berlin und München: Langendscheidt KG</ref>). The term is also commonly translated in English as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ and is used to describe a form of organised crime that developed in Bulgaria during the transition period of the 1990s (CSD 2009: 3<ref>Center for the Study of Democracy. 2009. Crime without Punishment: Countering Corruption and Organized Crime in Bulgaria (Report Summary), Sofia, URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2655</ref>).		\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| The Bulgarian term ''Silovi Grupirovki'' (Силови Групировки) can be literally translated as violent groups. The term, which is widely known in Bulgaria, can also be understood as a pun; in Bulgarian ''sila'' means both power and violence (Langenscheidt 2005: 180<ref>Langenscheidts Universal-Wörterbuch Bulgarisch. 2005. Bulgarisch-Deutsch. Deutsch-Bulgarisch. Berlin und München: Langendscheidt KG</ref>). The term is also commonly translated in English as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ and is used to describe a form of organised crime that developed in Bulgaria during the transition period of the 1990s (CSD 2009: 3<ref>Center for the Study of Democracy. 2009. Crime without Punishment: Countering Corruption and Organized Crime in Bulgaria (Report Summary), Sofia, URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2655</ref>).
	\|}		\|}

Editor2018 at 13:59, 11 January 2023

2023-01-11T13:59:41Z

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Editor2018: Editor2018 moved page Silovye Gruppirovki (Bulgaria) to Silovi Grupirovki (Bulgaria)

2023-01-11T13:56:57Z

Editor2018 moved page Silovye Gruppirovki (Bulgaria) to Silovi Grupirovki (Bulgaria)

← Older revision	Revision as of 13:56, 11 January 2023
(No difference)

Editor2018 at 14:22, 29 June 2020

2020-06-29T14:22:37Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:22, 29 June 2020
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	The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).		The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).

	The noticeable success of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' resulted from the specific social and political circumstances prevalent in post-communist Bulgaria. Firstly, the collapse of the centralised Bulgarian communist system in 1989 left immense [[resources]], which had to be transformed from state assets to private property (Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –		The noticeable success of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' resulted from the specific social and political circumstances prevalent in post-communist Bulgaria. Firstly, the collapse of the centralised Bulgarian communist system in 1989 left immense resources, which had to be transformed from state assets to private property (Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –
	Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). During the period of the chaotic privatisation process in Bulgaria, Communist elites, who were fully cognisant of the extent and value of the resources, sought to accumulate wealth by buying and selling them (Ganev 2007: 186<ref>Ganev, V. I. 2007. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –		Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). During the period of the chaotic privatisation process in Bulgaria, Communist elites, who were fully cognisant of the extent and value of the resources, sought to accumulate wealth by buying and selling them (Ganev 2007: 186<ref>Ganev, V. I. 2007. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –
	Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). This personal accumulation of wealth was facilitated by the ‘gradual loss of statehood’ during the transition period – characterised by legal chaos, lack of institutional and judicial regulation, as well as widespread insecurity (Bulanova 2008: 66<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –		Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). This personal accumulation of wealth was facilitated by the ‘gradual loss of statehood’ during the transition period – characterised by legal chaos, lack of institutional and judicial regulation, as well as widespread insecurity (Bulanova 2008: 66<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –

Editor2018 at 10:43, 11 May 2020

2020-05-11T10:43:32Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:43, 11 May 2020
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	\| authorofpiece =Igor Mitchnik		\| authorofpiece =Igor Mitchnik
	\| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK		\| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK
	\| authorwebsite =[https://uk.linkedin.com/in/igor-mitchnik-aa456168 Profile page at LinkedIn]}}		\| authorwebsite =[https://uk.linkedin.com/in/igor-mitchnik-aa456168 Profile page on LinkedIn]}}
	<big>'''By Igor Mitchnik, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big>		<big>'''By Igor Mitchnik, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big>
	[[Category:Solidarity]]		[[Category:Solidarity]]
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	The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).		The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).

	The noticeable success of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' resulted from the specific social and political circumstances prevalent in post-communist Bulgaria. Firstly, the collapse of the centralised Bulgarian communist system in 1989 left immense resources, which had to be transformed from state assets to private property (Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –		The noticeable success of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' resulted from the specific social and political circumstances prevalent in post-communist Bulgaria. Firstly, the collapse of the centralised Bulgarian communist system in 1989 left immense [[resources]], which had to be transformed from state assets to private property (Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –
	Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). During the period of the chaotic privatisation process in Bulgaria, Communist elites, who were fully cognisant of the extent and value of the resources, sought to accumulate wealth by buying and selling them (Ganev 2007: 186<ref>Ganev, V. I. 2007. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –		Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). During the period of the chaotic privatisation process in Bulgaria, Communist elites, who were fully cognisant of the extent and value of the resources, sought to accumulate wealth by buying and selling them (Ganev 2007: 186<ref>Ganev, V. I. 2007. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –
	Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). This personal accumulation of wealth was facilitated by the ‘gradual loss of statehood’ during the transition period – characterised by legal chaos, lack of institutional and judicial regulation, as well as widespread insecurity (Bulanova 2008: 66<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –		Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). This personal accumulation of wealth was facilitated by the ‘gradual loss of statehood’ during the transition period – characterised by legal chaos, lack of institutional and judicial regulation, as well as widespread insecurity (Bulanova 2008: 66<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels –

Editor2018 at 18:42, 17 May 2019

2019-05-17T18:42:07Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:42, 17 May 2019
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	[[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg\|225px\|thumb\|left\|Georgi Iliev, notorious businessman and former boss of Vasil Iliev Security, was assassinated in 2005.]]		[[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg\|225px\|thumb\|left\|Georgi Iliev, notorious businessman and former boss of Vasil Iliev Security, was assassinated in 2005.]]

	A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>). After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>).		A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).

			After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>).

	A crucial element within the social networks of the former wrestlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former communist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former employees of the interior ministry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342f.<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>) The use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian version of [[blat]] (Ledeneva 2011: 720<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2011. 'Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles', East European Politics and Society, 25 (4): 720-736</ref>) – involving former state employees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks to the former employees specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics and economy, as well as their durable international networks, established during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and been the main initiators of the culture of 'violent entrepreneurship' (Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 343<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).		A crucial element within the social networks of the former wrestlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former communist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former employees of the interior ministry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342f.<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>) The use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian version of [[blat]] (Ledeneva 2011: 720<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2011. 'Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles', East European Politics and Society, 25 (4): 720-736</ref>) – involving former state employees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks to the former employees specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics and economy, as well as their durable international networks, established during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and been the main initiators of the culture of 'violent entrepreneurship' (Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 343<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).

Editor2018 at 18:41, 17 May 2019

2019-05-17T18:41:42Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:41, 17 May 2019
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	[[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg\|225px\|thumb\|left\|Georgi Iliev, notorious businessman and former boss of Vasil Iliev Security, was assassinated in 2005.]]		[[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg\|225px\|thumb\|left\|Georgi Iliev, notorious businessman and former boss of Vasil Iliev Security, was assassinated in 2005.]]

	A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).		A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>). After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>).

	After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>).

	A crucial element within the social networks of the former wrestlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former communist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former employees of the interior ministry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342f.<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>) The use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian version of [[blat]] (Ledeneva 2011: 720<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2011. 'Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles', East European Politics and Society, 25 (4): 720-736</ref>) – involving former state employees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks to the former employees specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics and economy, as well as their durable international networks, established during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and been the main initiators of the culture of 'violent entrepreneurship' (Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 343<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).		A crucial element within the social networks of the former wrestlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former communist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former employees of the interior ministry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342f.<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>) The use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian version of [[blat]] (Ledeneva 2011: 720<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2011. 'Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles', East European Politics and Society, 25 (4): 720-736</ref>) – involving former state employees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks to the former employees specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics and economy, as well as their durable international networks, established during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and been the main initiators of the culture of 'violent entrepreneurship' (Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 343<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).

Editor2018 at 18:41, 17 May 2019

2019-05-17T18:41:20Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:41, 17 May 2019
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	[[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg\|225px\|thumb\|left\|Georgi Iliev, notorious businessman and former boss of Vasil Iliev Security, was assassinated in 2005.]]		[[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg\|225px\|thumb\|left\|Georgi Iliev, notorious businessman and former boss of Vasil Iliev Security, was assassinated in 2005.]]

	A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>). After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>).		A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).

			After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>).

	A crucial element within the social networks of the former wrestlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former communist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former employees of the interior ministry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342f.<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>) The use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian version of [[blat]] (Ledeneva 2011: 720<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2011. 'Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles', East European Politics and Society, 25 (4): 720-736</ref>) – involving former state employees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks to the former employees specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics and economy, as well as their durable international networks, established during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and been the main initiators of the culture of 'violent entrepreneurship' (Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 343<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).		A crucial element within the social networks of the former wrestlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former communist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former employees of the interior ministry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342f.<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>) The use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian version of [[blat]] (Ledeneva 2011: 720<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2011. 'Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles', East European Politics and Society, 25 (4): 720-736</ref>) – involving former state employees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks to the former employees specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics and economy, as well as their durable international networks, established during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and been the main initiators of the culture of 'violent entrepreneurship' (Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 343<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>).

Editor2018 at 10:25, 17 May 2019

2019-05-17T10:25:50Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:25, 17 May 2019
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	{{infobox		{{infobox
	\| nameofpractice = Silovye Gruppirovki		\| nameofpractice =Silovye Gruppirovki
	\| location = Bulgaria		\| flagemoji = 🇧🇬
	\| imagemap = Bulgaria map.png		\| definition =Violent groups involved in violent entrepreneurship or organised crime
	\| ~~imageflag~~ = Bulgaria ~~flag.png~~		\| location =Bulgaria
	\| authorofpiece = Igor Mitchnik		\| imagemap =Bulgaria map.png
	\| authorinstitution = School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London		\| clusters =
	}}		[[:Category:Solidarity\|Solidarity]] – [[:Category: Normative ambivalence\| Normative ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Conformity\| Conformity]] – [[:Category: Lock-in effect\| Lock-in effect]] – [[:Category: Semi-closed lock-in\| Semi-closed lock-in]]
			\| categories =
			[[:Category:Bulgaria\|Bulgaria]] – [[:Category: Balkans\| Balkans]] – [[:Category: Europe\| Europe]] – [[:Category: EU\| EU]] – [[:Category: Violence\| Violence]] – [[:Category: Intimidation\| Intimidation]] – [[:Category: Gang\| Gang]] – [[:Category: Organised crime\| Organised crime]]
			\| authorofpiece =Igor Mitchnik
			\| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK
			\| authorwebsite =[https://uk.linkedin.com/in/igor-mitchnik-aa456168 Profile page at LinkedIn]}}
			<big>'''By Igor Mitchnik, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big>
			[[Category:Solidarity]]
			[[Category: Normative ambivalence]]
			[[Category: Conformity]]
			[[Category: Lock-in effect]]
			[[Category: Semi-closed lock-in]]
			[[Category:Bulgaria]]
			[[Category: Balkans]]
			[[Category: Europe]]
			[[Category: EU]]
			[[Category: Violence]]
			[[Category: Intimidation]]
			[[Category: Gang]]
			[[Category: Organised crime]]
			[[Category:Entry]]
			[[Category: Volume 1]]
			[[Category: Alumni]]
			[[Category: SSEES]]
			{\| class="wikitable"
			\|-
			\|style="font-size:1.1em;"\| The Bulgarian term ''silovye gruppirovki'' can be literally translated as violent groups. The term, which is widely known in Bulgaria, can also be understood as a pun; in Bulgarian ''sila'' means both power and violence (Langenscheidt 2005: 180<ref>Langenscheidts Universal-Wörterbuch Bulgarisch. 2005. Bulgarisch-Deutsch. Deutsch-Bulgarisch. Berlin und München: Langendscheidt KG</ref>). The term is also commonly translated in English as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ and is used to describe a form of organised crime that developed in Bulgaria during the transition period of the 1990s (CSD 2009: 3<ref>Center for the Study of Democracy. 2009. Crime without Punishment: Countering Corruption and Organized Crime in Bulgaria (Report Summary), Sofia, URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2655</ref>).
			\|}

	~~'''''Original text by Igor Mitchnik'''''~~

	~~<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">~~
	The Bulgarian term ''silovye gruppirovki'' can be literally translated as violent groups. The term, which is widely known in Bulgaria, can also be understood as a pun; in Bulgarian ''sila'' means both power and violence (Langenscheidt 2005: 180<ref>Langenscheidts Universal-Wörterbuch Bulgarisch. 2005. Bulgarisch-Deutsch. Deutsch-Bulgarisch. Berlin und München: Langendscheidt KG</ref>). The term is also commonly translated in English as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ and is used to describe a form of organised crime that developed in Bulgaria during the transition period of the 1990s (CSD 2009: 3<ref>Center for the Study of Democracy. 2009. Crime without Punishment: Countering Corruption and Organized Crime in Bulgaria (Report Summary), Sofia, URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2655</ref>).

	~~<div class="mw-collapsible-content">~~
	The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).		The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).

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	According to Bulgarian police sources, the majority of security and insurance companies are no longer involved in extortion or racketeering. Exceptions however are found within the agriculture sector in the Bulgarian provinces and in low-grade nightclubs where a culture of ‘protection’ is still evident (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015: 53f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>) Actors involved in the shadow economy are found to be implicated in violent ‘debt collection’ in the aforementioned sectors. Since the end of the 1990s, the re-establishment of state power and the increasing re-enforcement of the rule of law by the Bulgarian state have succeeded in marginalising the ''Silovye Gruppirovki''. Yet analysts of the security sector agree that informal contacts between the political class and the heads of private security and insurance companies, which replaced the ''Silovye Gruppirovki'', still persist (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).		According to Bulgarian police sources, the majority of security and insurance companies are no longer involved in extortion or racketeering. Exceptions however are found within the agriculture sector in the Bulgarian provinces and in low-grade nightclubs where a culture of ‘protection’ is still evident (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015: 53f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>) Actors involved in the shadow economy are found to be implicated in violent ‘debt collection’ in the aforementioned sectors. Since the end of the 1990s, the re-establishment of state power and the increasing re-enforcement of the rule of law by the Bulgarian state have succeeded in marginalising the ''Silovye Gruppirovki''. Yet analysts of the security sector agree that informal contacts between the political class and the heads of private security and insurance companies, which replaced the ''Silovye Gruppirovki'', still persist (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>).
	~~</div>~~
	~~</div>~~

	==~~Notes~~==		==References==
	<references />		<references />

	~~[[Category:Informal Practices]]~~
	~~[[Category:Bulgaria]]~~
	~~[[Category:Entry]]~~

Admin at 13:05, 3 July 2018

2018-07-03T13:05:45Z

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	[[Category:Informal Practices]]		[[Category:Informal Practices]]
	[[Category:Bulgaria]]		[[Category:Bulgaria]]
			[[Category:Entry]]