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'''''Original Text: Jonathan Webb''''' | |||
In the United Kingdom, ‘cash for access’ denotes the exchange of money between two or more parties, with the donor seeking to gain access to an office-holder and the recipient facilitating access in exchange for money. The term is most frequently associated with cash given to MPs, parliamentary aides or ministers who agree to use their connections with office-holders to secure meetings in exchange for money. The term cash for access emerged in the wake of the 1998 ‘Lobbygate’ scandal involving Tony Blair’s political advisor, Derek Draper. Whilst the term appears to have been created shortly after the scandal, with its first use occurring in 1998, it has now entered common political parlance to describe the exchange of money for access to office-holders. Despite its contemporary origins in the British media, cash for access is closely associated with the linguistic term ‘open door’ (OED 2015). Often individuals embroiled in cash for access cases use terminology that suggests a particular sum of money can ‘open the door’ or ‘open doors’ to the office-holder in question (BBC 2010). | In the United Kingdom, ‘cash for access’ denotes the exchange of money between two or more parties, with the donor seeking to gain access to an office-holder and the recipient facilitating access in exchange for money. The term is most frequently associated with cash given to MPs, parliamentary aides or ministers who agree to use their connections with office-holders to secure meetings in exchange for money. The term cash for access emerged in the wake of the 1998 ‘Lobbygate’ scandal involving Tony Blair’s political advisor, Derek Draper. Whilst the term appears to have been created shortly after the scandal, with its first use occurring in 1998, it has now entered common political parlance to describe the exchange of money for access to office-holders. Despite its contemporary origins in the British media, cash for access is closely associated with the linguistic term ‘open door’ (OED 2015). Often individuals embroiled in cash for access cases use terminology that suggests a particular sum of money can ‘open the door’ or ‘open doors’ to the office-holder in question (BBC 2010). | ||
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One institutional mechanism that may have increased the number of cash for access cases over time is the role of the party system in British politics. Since 1950, only three MPs have entered the House of Commons without any party political affiliation (Flinders and Matthews 2012: 337). Because political parties act as the vehicle into parliament, any decline in grassroots political party membership is likely to affect the ability of parties to remain competitive. Traditionally, political parties have relied on a broad membership base to mobilise and generate donations. As the links between political parties and wider society has fragmented in the post-war era, traditional support in the form of public donations or support from worker organisations has declined, resulting in a funding gap for political parties (Abbott and Williams 2014). As a consequence, private donors are increasingly filling this funding gap. Often the large sums donated by individual donors or businesses are conditional on access to office-holders. In the words of Tony Blair’s former Director of Policy Geoff Mulgan: ‘It is fairly obvious that if you are a funder you are more likely to have a meeting with advisers, a meeting with ministers, a meeting on occasion with the Prime Minister’ (Friedman 2013: 141). | One institutional mechanism that may have increased the number of cash for access cases over time is the role of the party system in British politics. Since 1950, only three MPs have entered the House of Commons without any party political affiliation (Flinders and Matthews 2012: 337). Because political parties act as the vehicle into parliament, any decline in grassroots political party membership is likely to affect the ability of parties to remain competitive. Traditionally, political parties have relied on a broad membership base to mobilise and generate donations. As the links between political parties and wider society has fragmented in the post-war era, traditional support in the form of public donations or support from worker organisations has declined, resulting in a funding gap for political parties (Abbott and Williams 2014). As a consequence, private donors are increasingly filling this funding gap. Often the large sums donated by individual donors or businesses are conditional on access to office-holders. In the words of Tony Blair’s former Director of Policy Geoff Mulgan: ‘It is fairly obvious that if you are a funder you are more likely to have a meeting with advisers, a meeting with ministers, a meeting on occasion with the Prime Minister’ (Friedman 2013: 141). | ||
As a consequence of the shift in political party funding, cash for access cases are likely to increase. Whilst the general public is increasingly sceptical of current parliamentary practice, political life in the UK remains relatively free from corruption and cash for access should not always be perceived as corrupt practice. The increased occurrence of cash for access is best understood not as the degradation of politics but rather as a reaction to institutional change (Richards, Smith, and Hay 2014: 21). One mechanism that could be used to reduce the reliance of political parties on private donors is expansion of the Short Money state funding for political parties. This would allow the state to further regulate political party funding. However, given that the general public opposes state funding for political parties and there remains a reluctance on the part of politicians to extend what are already seen as generous state subsidies, the cash for access dilemma is likely to be perpetuated (Johnston and Pattie 2014: 23). | As a consequence of the shift in political party funding, cash for access cases are likely to increase. Whilst the general public is increasingly sceptical of current parliamentary practice, political life in the UK remains relatively free from corruption and cash for access should not always be perceived as corrupt practice. The increased occurrence of cash for access is best understood not as the degradation of politics but rather as a reaction to institutional change (Richards, Smith, and Hay 2014: 21). One mechanism that could be used to reduce the reliance of political parties on private donors is expansion of the Short Money state funding for political parties. This would allow the state to further regulate political party funding. However, given that the general public opposes state funding for political parties and there remains a reluctance on the part of politicians to extend what are already seen as generous state subsidies, the cash for access dilemma is likely to be perpetuated (Johnston and Pattie 2014: 23). | ||
==Notes== | |||
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[[Category:United Kingdom]] | |||