Difference between revisions of "Wasta (Middle East and North Africa)"

{{infobox

  | nameofpractice = Wāsṭa

  | location = Middle East and North Africa

  | imagemap = GreaterMiddleEast map.png

  | authorofpiece = James Redman

  | authorinstitution = University of Utah

}}

'''''Original Text: James Redman, University of Utah'''''

Unlike prototypical patron-client dealings, however, ''wāsṭa'' is not normally viewed as a hierarchical transaction; instead, procuring and using ''wāsṭa'' is part and parcel of the obligations that underwrite existing, or coveted, social bonds.  In other words, much like similar occurrences in other geographic and cultural settings, ''wāsṭa'' support is infused with sentiments that are in line with the notion that it is, "not a relationship for the sake of exchange but an exchange for the sake of a relationship" <ref>Ledeneva, Alena V. 2000. 'Continuity and Change of Blat Practices in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia', in S. Lovell, A. Ledeneva, and A. Rogachevskii (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia:  Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s. New York: St. Martin's Press: 181-204.</ref>. For this reason, ''wāsṭa'' favours tend to circulate within the economies of "good-faith"<ref>Bourdieu, Pierre.1990. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.</ref> that come with social closeness and familial trust; consequently, when ''wāsṭa'' is extended, it is usually without explicit requisites<ref>Wolf, Eric. 1966. ‘Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies.’, in M. Banton (ed.),The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies. New York: Frederick A. Praeger: 1-22.</ref> or deadlines for compensation.  Nonetheless, it should be recognized that there are those who are adept at manipulating this entire ''wāsṭa'' framework for their own agendas:  politicians swapping bureaucratic largess for votes, businessmen bartering parliamentary backing for contracts, or local elites dispensing aid to augment the retinues and bolster their individual reputations.

Not surprisingly, ''wāsṭa'' has attracted its fair share of critics who are quick to note that it carries many of the same connotations that come with nepotism<ref>Haladjian-Henriksen, Sylvia. 2006. 'Social Stratification Obstacles to Reducing Inequality and Alleviating Poverty:  The Case of Lebanon', in M. Petmesidou and C. Papatheodorou (eds), Poverty and Social Deprivation in the Mediterranean:  Trends, Policies, and Welfare Prospects in the New Millennium.  London: Zed Books: 308-319.</ref>, dependency<ref>Perthes, Volker. 1997. The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad. New York: St. Martin's Press.</ref> and corruption<ref>Kilani, S. and Sakijha, B. 2002. Wasta: The Declared Secret. Amman: Jordan Press Foundation Printing Press.</ref>.  On the one hand, it is true that ''wāsṭa'' can facilitate the necessary inroads required to press legitimate claims, such as those that are put before what are often overstaffed and opaque state bureaucracies<ref>Hertog, Steffen. 2010. 'The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems:  Societies of </ref>. Yet, at the other end of the spectrum, it is just as accurate to pinpoint ''wāsṭa'' as a mechanism by which those with insufficient credentials can outflank more qualified competitors, like with landing a job or winning a promotion.  Still, whether ''wāsṭa'' is used for so-called benevolent purposes<ref>Kilani, S. and Sakijha, B. 2002. Wasta: The Declared Secret. Amman: Jordan Press Foundation Printing Press.</ref>, such as navigating impenetrable government red tape, or utilised for more questionable motives, what is unmistakable is the power of ''wāsṭa'' brokerage to disproportionately shape the probabilities for betterment in a multitude of arenas.

==Notes==