Difference between revisions of "Political machineries (USA)"

Its discipline, efficiency and predictability notwithstanding, the term has largely negative connotations, since these features were enabled by gaining voter support by means of ‘patronage jobs, government contracts, and special favors to individual voters’ (ibid.) as well as to voter groups, while excluding non-supporters. Thus, on the most general level, political machineries built their power on a form of organisation that traded specific material rewards to loyal segments of the electorate in return for political support. As a result, political machineries violated the norms of a universalist discharge of duties associated with public roles, and substituted the ideological formation of political will for a system of smoothly interlocking economic exchanges: resources bought votes, votes bought offices, offices bought influence, influence bought resources, and resources bought votes.

Its discipline, efficiency and predictability notwithstanding, the term has largely negative connotations, since these features were enabled by gaining voter support by means of ‘patronage jobs, government contracts, and special favors to individual voters’ (ibid.) as well as to voter groups, while excluding non-supporters. Thus, on the most general level, political machineries built their power on a form of organisation that traded specific material rewards to loyal segments of the electorate in return for political support. As a result, political machineries violated the norms of a universalist discharge of duties associated with public roles, and substituted the ideological formation of political will for a system of smoothly interlocking economic exchanges: resources bought votes, votes bought offices, offices bought influence, influence bought resources, and resources bought votes.

However, the roots and sources of durability of contemporary clientelistic parties around the world often differ from those of their American counterparts. In Latin America and Asia, for example, they are often rural rather than urban, while immigration plays a less decisive role than traditional ethnic, regional, religious, occupational and clan loyalties. Often, too, such parties monopolise the national political landscape more effectively than local machineries in the USA could do. A possible explanation is that strong countervailing powers (the Republican Party, independent mass media, established capitalists), the pronounced federalism of US politics, and the concentration of immigrant populations in urban communities prevented the proliferation of political machineries on the national level.  

However, the roots and sources of durability of contemporary clientelistic parties around the world often differ from those of their American counterparts. In Latin America and Asia, for example, they are often rural rather than urban, while immigration plays a less decisive role than traditional ethnic, regional, religious, occupational and clan loyalties. Often, too, such parties monopolise the national political landscape more effectively than local machineries in the USA could do. A possible explanation is that strong countervailing powers (the Republican Party, independent mass media, established capitalists), the pronounced federalism of US politics, and the concentration of immigrant populations in urban communities prevented the proliferation of political machineries on the national level.