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Difference between revisions of "Chernukha (Russia)"
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At the same time, if ''chernukha'' were employed as a means of administrative control, it would turn into a powerful political instrument of popular mobilization. One example of this might be the media campaign that began after President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in Spring 2012, and accelerated following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russian media experts have pointed out that the campaign of popular mobilization launched by the Kremlin to boost public support for its policies made heavy use of propaganda methods. These included undermining the reputations of the Kremlin’s political opponents by disseminating through the media fabricated stories aimed at creating a uniformly negative image both of the West and of the Russian opposition <ref>Gatov, V. 2015. ‘Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly’. London: Henry Jackson Society, pp.12-14. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Putin-Ivanovna-and-Ukrainians-on-the-Telly.pdf</ref><ref>Yakovlev, V. 2015. ‘''O propaganda''.’ Mulbabar, http://www.sguschenka.com/propaganda/</ref>. | At the same time, if ''chernukha'' were employed as a means of administrative control, it would turn into a powerful political instrument of popular mobilization. One example of this might be the media campaign that began after President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in Spring 2012, and accelerated following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russian media experts have pointed out that the campaign of popular mobilization launched by the Kremlin to boost public support for its policies made heavy use of propaganda methods. These included undermining the reputations of the Kremlin’s political opponents by disseminating through the media fabricated stories aimed at creating a uniformly negative image both of the West and of the Russian opposition <ref>Gatov, V. 2015. ‘Putin, Maria Ivanovna from Ivanovo and Ukrainians on the Telly’. London: Henry Jackson Society, pp.12-14. http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Putin-Ivanovna-and-Ukrainians-on-the-Telly.pdf</ref><ref>Yakovlev, V. 2015. ‘''O propaganda''.’ Mulbabar, http://www.sguschenka.com/propaganda/</ref>. | ||
It is not easy to analyse ''chernukha'' merely by tracing the sources of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some legislative norms and violates others, the producers of ''chernukha'' will in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they were framed. Even so, it is possible to research ''chernukha'' by means of in-depth | It is not easy to analyse ''chernukha'' merely by tracing the sources of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some legislative norms and violates others, the producers of ''chernukha'' will in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they were framed. Even so, it is possible to research ''chernukha'' by means of in-depth interviews with experts and political technologists. In addition, opinion polls held before and after a defamation campaign make it possible to assess what impact ''chernukha'' has had on the general public. Opinion polls with specifically tailored questions may help to identify the key stereotypes used in the production of ''chernukha'' and how they have changed over time. | ||
''Chernukha'' is closely intertwined with a number of informal practices such as ''krugovaya poruka'' (joint responsibility) and the use of ''kompromat'', both of which are integral to the workings of informal networks in contemporary Russia (see the relevant entries in this volume). | ''Chernukha'' is closely intertwined with a number of informal practices such as ''krugovaya poruka'' (joint responsibility) and the use of ''kompromat'', both of which are integral to the workings of informal networks in contemporary Russia (see the relevant entries in this volume). | ||