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Difference between revisions of "Amakudari (Japan)"
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| imagemap = Japan map.png | | imagemap = Japan map.png | ||
| clusters = | | clusters = | ||
| categories = [[:Category: Japan|Japan]] – [[:Category: Asia| Asia]] – [[:Category: Bureaucracy| Bureaucracy]] – [[:Category: Reciprocity| Reciprocity]] – [[:Category: | | categories = [[:Category: Japan|Japan]] – [[:Category: Asia| Asia]] – [[:Category: Bureaucracy| Bureaucracy]] – [[:Category: Reciprocity| Reciprocity]] – [[:Category: Favour| Favour]] – [[:Category: Public service| Public service]] – [[:Category: Revolving doors| Revolving doors]] – [[:Category: Employment| Employment]] | ||
| authorofpiece = Hayato Moriyama | | authorofpiece = Hayato Moriyama | ||
| authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | | authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | ||
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[[Category: Bureaucracy]] | [[Category: Bureaucracy]] | ||
[[Category: Reciprocity]] | [[Category: Reciprocity]] | ||
[[Category: | [[Category: Favour]] | ||
[[Category: Public service]] | [[Category: Public service]] | ||
[[Category: Revolving doors]] | [[Category: Revolving doors]] | ||
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Although the National Civil Service Law has banned securing private posts for civil service officers by the ministries in 2007, the number of ''amakudari'' placements between 2006 and 2008 totalled 1,872 according to a press release of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC 2009). ''Amakudari'' in the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), with coveted positions in the construction and real estate industries (Quah 2011: 452), increased from 180 to 218 between 2007 and 2008 (MIAC 2009). As evident from Table 1, ministries that hold authorities over private companies (such as the MLIT and Ministries of the Economy, Trade and Industry, and Finance) have significantly more positions than those without such supervising roles (like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). | Although the National Civil Service Law has banned securing private posts for civil service officers by the ministries in 2007, the number of ''amakudari'' placements between 2006 and 2008 totalled 1,872 according to a press release of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC 2009). ''Amakudari'' in the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), with coveted positions in the construction and real estate industries (Quah 2011: 452), increased from 180 to 218 between 2007 and 2008 (MIAC 2009). As evident from Table 1, ministries that hold authorities over private companies (such as the MLIT and Ministries of the Economy, Trade and Industry, and Finance) have significantly more positions than those without such supervising roles (like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). | ||
''Amakudari'' has analogous practices in other countries. In the US, the [[:Category: Revolving | ''Amakudari'' has analogous practices in other countries. In the US, the [[:Category: Revolving doors|revolving door]] phenomenon has three forms: the industry-to-government, the government-to-industry and the government-to-lobbyist movement (Revolving Door Working Group 2015: 7-8). In industry-to-government, ‘the appointment of corporate executives and business lobbyists to key posts in federal agencies establishes a pro-business bias in policy formulation and regulatory enforcement’ (Revolving Door Working Group 2015:7). In the movement of public officials to the private sector, experiences from the ex-officials help the new employers navigate governmental procurement and regulations (Revolving Door Working Group 2015: 8). Finally, in movement from the civil servants to lobbyists, former government connections are employed to advance the interests of corporate clients (Revolving Door Working Group 2015:8). In ''amakudari'', the government-to-industry is the only direction of employment exchange. The practice of revolving door in the US is more elaborate. The French analogue of ''amakudari'' is [[pantouflage]]: leaving the civil service for employment in the private sector, usually on secondment that allows a return to the position in the public sector (Alexandre-Bailly and Muratbekova-Touron 2018:239). Upon entrance to certain French universities, students are promised to become civil servants and to retire early in their careers in order to pursue senior position in the private sector (Colignon and Usui 2003: 5). | ||
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''Amakudari'' can trigger a number of other informal practices in the public sector. Civil servants lobby for their own future positions in private companies and organisations, and retired officials lobby for the promotions of senior bureaucrats. According to Quah (2011), strong ministry-to-business ties have resulted in bureaucratic corruption in the construction industry in the form of the illegal [[ | ''Amakudari'' can trigger a number of other informal practices in the public sector. Civil servants lobby for their own future positions in private companies and organisations, and retired officials lobby for the promotions of senior bureaucrats. According to Quah (2011), strong ministry-to-business ties have resulted in bureaucratic corruption in the construction industry in the form of the illegal [[dangou]] (secret bid-rigging) system. In ''watari'', an elaborate derivative form of ''amakudari'', retired bureaucrats move between different positions in private firms supervised by their former ministries (Cheung 2010: 140-141). | ||
The implications of ''amakudari'' are manifold. The practice 'has been criticised as one of the root causes of collusion in Japan’s ʻiron triangle’, a mutually supportive relationship among politicians (especially in the Liberal Democratic Party), public servants and private companies operating in Japan (Colignon and Usui 2003: 191). When ex-bureaucrats lobby for favours, younger officials oblige their esteemed former colleagues by providing information or steering toward company-friendly legislation because these junior officials will seek an ''amakudari'' position in the future (ibid.). This reciprocity makes ''amakudari'' an instance of [[jinmyaku]], the informal network of business contacts (Horak 2018: 94-96). | The implications of ''amakudari'' are manifold. The practice 'has been criticised as one of the root causes of collusion in Japan’s ʻiron triangle’, a mutually supportive relationship among politicians (especially in the Liberal Democratic Party), public servants and private companies operating in Japan (Colignon and Usui 2003: 191). When ex-bureaucrats lobby for favours, younger officials oblige their esteemed former colleagues by providing information or steering toward company-friendly legislation because these junior officials will seek an ''amakudari'' position in the future (ibid.). This reciprocity makes ''amakudari'' an instance of [[jinmyaku]], the informal network of business contacts (Horak 2018: 94-96). | ||