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[[:Category:Market|Market]] – [[:Category: Functional ambivalence| Functional ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Gaming the system| Gaming the system]] – [[:Category: Camouflage| Camouflage]] – [[:Category: Creating facades| Creating facades]] | [[:Category:Market|Market]] – [[:Category: Functional ambivalence| Functional ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Gaming the system| Gaming the system]] – [[:Category: Camouflage| Camouflage]] – [[:Category: Creating facades| Creating facades]] | ||
| categories = | | categories = | ||
[[:Category:Global|Global]] – [[:Category: Corporate informality| Corporate informality]] – [[:Category: Accounting| Accounting]] – [[:Category: Tax | [[:Category:Global|Global]] – [[:Category: Corporate informality| Corporate informality]] – [[:Category: Accounting| Accounting]] – [[:Category: Tax avoidance| Tax avoidance]] | ||
| authorofpiece =David Leung | | authorofpiece =David Leung | ||
| authorinstitution =Queen Margaret Business School, Queen Margaret University, UK | | authorinstitution =Queen Margaret Business School, Queen Margaret University, UK | ||
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[[Category: Corporate informality]] | [[Category: Corporate informality]] | ||
[[Category: Accounting]] | [[Category: Accounting]] | ||
[[Category: Tax | [[Category: Tax avoidance]] | ||
[[Category:Entry]] | [[Category:Entry]] | ||
[[Category: Volume 2]] | [[Category: Volume 2]] | ||
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As the 2008 banking crisis showed, however, such regulatory measures have had little or no impact on window dressing. As Arthur Levitt (1998<ref>Levitt, A. 1998. The Numbers Game, Speech at the New York University Center for Law and Business, New York, 28 September.</ref>) observed during his tenure as Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the culture of the financial community and the structure of the capitalist system seem to ''demand'' that all listed corporations engage in earnings management. Participants in this market play a self-serving game of ‘nods and winks’: as used-car salesmen spin stories to sell vehicles, corporate accountants concoct ‘bullshit’ to satisfy the needs of investors and analysts (Macintosh 2006<ref>Macintosh, N. 2006. ‘Commentary: The FASB and Accounting for Economic Reality; Accounting – Truth, Lies, or “Bullshit”? A Philosophical Investigation,’ Accounting and the Public Interest, 6: 22-36.</ref>, 2009<ref>Macintosh, N. 2009. ‘Accounting and the Truth of Earnings Reports: Philosophical Considerations,’ European Accounting Review, 18(1): 141-175.</ref>) while auditors, who have long deserted their duties (House of Lords 2011<ref>House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs. 2011. Auditors: Market concentration and their role. London: The Stationery Office.</ref>), continue to be ‘lick-arses’ for corporate management (Sikka 2009<ref>Sikka, P. 2009. ‘Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors,’ Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34: 868-873.</ref>). | As the 2008 banking crisis showed, however, such regulatory measures have had little or no impact on window dressing. As Arthur Levitt (1998<ref>Levitt, A. 1998. The Numbers Game, Speech at the New York University Center for Law and Business, New York, 28 September.</ref>) observed during his tenure as Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the culture of the financial community and the structure of the capitalist system seem to ''demand'' that all listed corporations engage in earnings management. Participants in this market play a self-serving game of ‘nods and winks’: as used-car salesmen spin stories to sell vehicles, corporate accountants concoct ‘bullshit’ to satisfy the needs of investors and analysts (Macintosh 2006<ref>Macintosh, N. 2006. ‘Commentary: The FASB and Accounting for Economic Reality; Accounting – Truth, Lies, or “Bullshit”? A Philosophical Investigation,’ Accounting and the Public Interest, 6: 22-36.</ref>, 2009<ref>Macintosh, N. 2009. ‘Accounting and the Truth of Earnings Reports: Philosophical Considerations,’ European Accounting Review, 18(1): 141-175.</ref>) while auditors, who have long deserted their duties (House of Lords 2011<ref>House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs. 2011. Auditors: Market concentration and their role. London: The Stationery Office.</ref>), continue to be ‘lick-arses’ for corporate management (Sikka 2009<ref>Sikka, P. 2009. ‘Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors,’ Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34: 868-873.</ref>). | ||
==References | ==References== | ||
<references /> | |||
==Further reading== | |||
# Berenson, A. 2003. The Number: How America’s Balance Sheet Lies Rocked the World’s Financial Markets. London: Pocket Books | # Berenson, A. 2003. The Number: How America’s Balance Sheet Lies Rocked the World’s Financial Markets. London: Pocket Books | ||
# Chryssides, G. and Kaler, J. (eds). 1993. An Introduction to Business Ethics, Chapter 7. London: Chapman & Hall | # Chryssides, G. and Kaler, J. (eds). 1993. An Introduction to Business Ethics, Chapter 7. London: Chapman & Hall | ||
# MacKenzie, D. 2003. ‘A philosophical investigation into Enron’, London Review of Books, 26 May, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2003/may/26/londonreviewofbooks1 | # MacKenzie, D. 2003. ‘A philosophical investigation into Enron’, London Review of Books, 26 May, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2003/may/26/londonreviewofbooks1 | ||
# Smith, T. 1992. Accounting for Growth: Stripping the Camouflage from Company Accounts. London: Century Business | # Smith, T. 1992. Accounting for Growth: Stripping the Camouflage from Company Accounts. London: Century Business | ||