Difference between revisions of "Fraktionszwang (Germany, Switzerland, Austria)"
| (2 intermediate revisions by one other user not shown) | |||
| Line 6: | Line 6: | ||
| imagemap = German_speaking.png | | imagemap = German_speaking.png | ||
| clusters = [[:Category: Domination|Domination]] – [[:Category: Control| Control]] – [[:Category: Co-optation| Co-optation]] | | clusters = [[:Category: Domination|Domination]] – [[:Category: Control| Control]] – [[:Category: Co-optation| Co-optation]] | ||
| categories = [[:Category: Germany|Germany]] – [[:Category: Switzerland| Switzerland]] – [[:Category: Austria| Austria]] – [[:Category: EU| EU]] – [[:Category: Europe| Europe]] – [[:Category: Parliament| Parliament]] – [[:Category: Political | | categories = [[:Category: Germany|Germany]] – [[:Category: Switzerland| Switzerland]] – [[:Category: Austria| Austria]] – [[:Category: EU| EU]] – [[:Category: Europe| Europe]] – [[:Category: Parliament| Parliament]] – [[:Category: Political party| Political party]] – [[:Category: Public service| Public service]] – [[:Category: Rule-bending| Rule-bending]] – [[:Category: Informal governance| Informal governance]] | ||
| authorofpiece = Christina Zimmermann | | authorofpiece = Christina Zimmermann | ||
| authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | | authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | ||
}} | }} | ||
<big>'''By Christina Zimmermann, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big> | <big>'''By Christina Zimmermann, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big> | ||
| Line 21: | Line 20: | ||
[[Category: Europe]] | [[Category: Europe]] | ||
[[Category: Parliament]] | [[Category: Parliament]] | ||
[[Category: Political | [[Category: Political party]] | ||
[[Category: Public service]] | [[Category: Public service]] | ||
[[Category: Rule-bending]] | [[Category: Rule-bending]] | ||
| Line 31: | Line 30: | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
|- | |- | ||
|style="font-size:1.1em;"| '' | |style="font-size:1.1em;"| ''Fraktionszwang'' (''Klubzwang'' in Austria) refers to coercing members of the parliament (MPs) by their parliamentary group to align their political decisions and official positions with that of the group. It is a compound of the words ''Fraktion'' or ''Klub'' (parliamentary group) and ''Zwang'' (coercion). | ||
Despite frequent public-interest clashes in political debates amongst politicians within their ''Fraktion'', the voting behaviour of MPs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland is mainly uniform (Arnett et al. 2016). This implies the existence of informal mechanisms within parliamentary groups, such as ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' (parliamentary group discipline), ''Fraktionssolidarität'' (parliamentary group solidarity) and ''Fraktionszwang''. The outcome of these three concepts – aligned voting and consensus – is similar, but the concepts differ fundamentally in terms of the degree of the MPs’ freedom of action, and their legitimacy and legality (Katsenelinboigen 1971). | Despite frequent public-interest clashes in political debates amongst politicians within their ''Fraktion'', the voting behaviour of MPs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland is mainly uniform (Arnett et al. 2016). This implies the existence of informal mechanisms within parliamentary groups, such as ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' (parliamentary group discipline), ''Fraktionssolidarität'' (parliamentary group solidarity) and ''Fraktionszwang''. The outcome of these three concepts – aligned voting and consensus – is similar, but the concepts differ fundamentally in terms of the degree of the MPs’ freedom of action, and their legitimacy and legality (Katsenelinboigen 1971). | ||
|} | |} | ||
| Line 39: | Line 38: | ||
However, there is indirect evidence that ''Fraktionszwang'' exists in these countries. First-hand accounts provided by the media, analysts, former employees of the parliament and MPs, indicate that ''Fraktionszwang'' contributes to the ''Fraktion''’s unity (Bülow 2010, Reyher 2010, Günther 2000: 332f). Another indicator of the existence of ''Fraktionszwang'' is the MPs' frequent public demand to extricate their votes from the ''Fraktion'' line (freigeben), or to turn them into ''Gewissensentscheidung'' (a vote of conscience) in order to be able to vote according their personal will without negative consequences (Spiegel 2017, Roßmann 2016, Prantl 2018). ''Fraktion''’s leaders can then either 'allow' deviating voting, as was the case with the same-sex marriage (§1353 BGB), or they 'rejec' the request for a vote of conscience, as was the case with the abortion law (§219 STGB) (Prantl 2018, Müller and Pfister 2011). | However, there is indirect evidence that ''Fraktionszwang'' exists in these countries. First-hand accounts provided by the media, analysts, former employees of the parliament and MPs, indicate that ''Fraktionszwang'' contributes to the ''Fraktion''’s unity (Bülow 2010, Reyher 2010, Günther 2000: 332f). Another indicator of the existence of ''Fraktionszwang'' is the MPs' frequent public demand to extricate their votes from the ''Fraktion'' line (freigeben), or to turn them into ''Gewissensentscheidung'' (a vote of conscience) in order to be able to vote according their personal will without negative consequences (Spiegel 2017, Roßmann 2016, Prantl 2018). ''Fraktion''’s leaders can then either 'allow' deviating voting, as was the case with the same-sex marriage (§1353 BGB), or they 'rejec' the request for a vote of conscience, as was the case with the abortion law (§219 STGB) (Prantl 2018, Müller and Pfister 2011). | ||
Usually ''Fraktionszwang'' happens in a subtle way and starts with the internally communicated position of the ''Fraktion'' regarding voting on a bill. ''Fraktion''’s statutes usually require that the ''Fraktion''’s leadership committee be notified if deviating voting is intended by an MP (Bülow 2010). In this case, ''Fraktionsdisziplin'', the persuasion with constructive subject-related discussions on different hierarchal levels follows. If disciplining in this form of convincing is ineffective, a coercive process that exceeds subject-related discussions begins. This process can impose on the free mandate, is difficult to prove and therefore enters the grey area between ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' and the illegal ''Fraktionszwang''. | Usually ''Fraktionszwang'' happens in a subtle way and starts with the internally communicated position of the ''Fraktion'' regarding voting on a bill. ''Fraktion''’s statutes usually require that the ''Fraktion''’s leadership committee be notified if deviating voting is intended by an MP (Bülow 2010). In this case, ''Fraktionsdisziplin'', the persuasion with constructive subject-related discussions on different hierarchal levels follows. If disciplining in this form of convincing is ineffective, a coercive process that exceeds subject-related discussions begins. This process can impose on the free mandate, is difficult to prove and therefore enters the grey area between ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' and the illegal ''Fraktionszwang''. | ||
[[File:Fraktionszwang_disziplin_solidarität.JPG|thumb|x300px|left|. Source: | [[File:Fraktionszwang_disziplin_solidarität.JPG|thumb|x300px|left|''Fraktionszwang, -disziplin, -solidarität''. Source: Author. © Christina Zimmermann.]] | ||
The threats with which an MP can be coerced can be divided into existential and non-existential ones. Non-existential threats entail the feeling of exclusion from group belonging and the daily political work. The methods include avoiding the MP and withdrawing favours; mobbing (Bülow 2010, Gutschker 2011); withdrawing information, e.g. by delaying forwarding documents; and restricting the public expression of the MP within the ''Fraktion'' by replacing them as public speakers or by prioritising topics outside of the domain of the defiant MP at ''Fraktion'' meetings (Lohse 2015). Defiant MPs are emotionally blackmailed, muzzled and lose important channels of influence, which hinders their daily political work (Kasten 1985, Lohse 2015). | The threats with which an MP can be coerced can be divided into existential and non-existential ones. Non-existential threats entail the feeling of exclusion from group belonging and the daily political work. The methods include avoiding the MP and withdrawing favours; mobbing (Bülow 2010, Gutschker 2011); withdrawing information, e.g. by delaying forwarding documents; and restricting the public expression of the MP within the ''Fraktion'' by replacing them as public speakers or by prioritising topics outside of the domain of the defiant MP at ''Fraktion'' meetings (Lohse 2015). Defiant MPs are emotionally blackmailed, muzzled and lose important channels of influence, which hinders their daily political work (Kasten 1985, Lohse 2015). | ||
| Line 50: | Line 49: | ||
The tension between the ''Fraktion''’s and MP's own will and the media attention the alleged ''Fraktionszwang'' attracts can lead to mental health problems and, eventually, to resignation from the post (Wolter 2019, Phoenix 2019). Younger MPs or those with caring duties or lack of alternative job opportunities are particularly vulnerable to ''Fraktionszwang'' (Bülow 2010). In contrast, elderly politicians in their final legislative terms pose a risk factor for their ''Fraktions'' since they are more likely to vote against the ''Fraktion''’s line (Schneider 2011). | The tension between the ''Fraktion''’s and MP's own will and the media attention the alleged ''Fraktionszwang'' attracts can lead to mental health problems and, eventually, to resignation from the post (Wolter 2019, Phoenix 2019). Younger MPs or those with caring duties or lack of alternative job opportunities are particularly vulnerable to ''Fraktionszwang'' (Bülow 2010). In contrast, elderly politicians in their final legislative terms pose a risk factor for their ''Fraktions'' since they are more likely to vote against the ''Fraktion''’s line (Schneider 2011). | ||
[[File: Fraktionszwang kol.jpg|thumb|x300px|left|]] | [[File: Fraktionszwang kol.jpg|thumb|x300px|left|''Fraktionszwang''. Source: Stuttmann-karrikaturen.de. © Klaus Stuttmann.]] | ||
Coercion is an inherent pragmatic feature of representative democracies that ensures clear majorities for a functioning decision-making process (Galka and Schuett-Wetschky 2007, Kasten 1985) but the voters view it critically if it is frequently employed. According to a Statista survey (2011), 50 percent of the Germans demand a more frequent suppression of ''Fraktionszwang'', and 31 percent demand its complete suppression. The voters expect the MPs to act on their behalf, but ''Fraktionszwang'' prevents them to follow their electoral promises and advertised attitudes. This can challenge the very idea of representative democracy. The media label the MPs who frequently vote in line with the ''Fraktion'' as ''Abnicker'' (ʻyes menʼ) and frequently glorify deviating MPs as democratic rebels. However, ''Fraktions'' with too diversified opinions are presented in the press as chaotic, paralysed and inefficient and the deviating MPs are called the ''Nestbeschmutzer'' (ʻtraitorsʼ) (Arnett et al. 2016, Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Fiedler 2017). | Coercion is an inherent pragmatic feature of representative democracies that ensures clear majorities for a functioning decision-making process (Galka and Schuett-Wetschky 2007, Kasten 1985) but the voters view it critically if it is frequently employed. According to a Statista survey (2011), 50 percent of the Germans demand a more frequent suppression of ''Fraktionszwang'', and 31 percent demand its complete suppression. The voters expect the MPs to act on their behalf, but ''Fraktionszwang'' prevents them to follow their electoral promises and advertised attitudes. This can challenge the very idea of representative democracy. The media label the MPs who frequently vote in line with the ''Fraktion'' as ''Abnicker'' (ʻyes menʼ) and frequently glorify deviating MPs as democratic rebels. However, ''Fraktions'' with too diversified opinions are presented in the press as chaotic, paralysed and inefficient and the deviating MPs are called the ''Nestbeschmutzer'' (ʻtraitorsʼ) (Arnett et al. 2016, Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Fiedler 2017). | ||
Latest revision as of 12:56, 29 November 2020
| Fraktionszwang 🇩🇪 | ||
|---|---|---|
 |
||
| Location: Germany, Austria and Switzerland | ||
| Definition: Coercive control of voting behaviour of the members of parliament by their parliamentary group | ||
| Keywords: Germany – Switzerland – Austria – EU – Europe – Parliament – Political party – Public service – Rule-bending – Informal governance | ||
| Clusters: Domination – Control – Co-optation | ||
| Author: Christina Zimmermann | ||
| Affiliation: Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | ||
By Christina Zimmermann, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK
| Fraktionszwang (Klubzwang in Austria) refers to coercing members of the parliament (MPs) by their parliamentary group to align their political decisions and official positions with that of the group. It is a compound of the words Fraktion or Klub (parliamentary group) and Zwang (coercion).
Despite frequent public-interest clashes in political debates amongst politicians within their Fraktion, the voting behaviour of MPs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland is mainly uniform (Arnett et al. 2016). This implies the existence of informal mechanisms within parliamentary groups, such as Fraktionsdisziplin (parliamentary group discipline), Fraktionssolidarität (parliamentary group solidarity) and Fraktionszwang. The outcome of these three concepts – aligned voting and consensus – is similar, but the concepts differ fundamentally in terms of the degree of the MPs’ freedom of action, and their legitimacy and legality (Katsenelinboigen 1971). |
Fraktionsdisziplin is the legally allowed means of persuasion, ideally in the form of constructive discussions. In the case of Fraktionssolidarität, an MP is convinced to follow the parliamentary group’s line out of solidarity (Isensee 2007, Kasten 1985, Ismayr 1997, also see diagram). By contrast, Fraktionszwang is illegal in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Becker 1984, Model et al. 2000, Schmidt 2016). MPs who argue, vote and act against their own conscience because of coercive circumstances, violate the freies Mandat (the ʻfree mandateʼ) (Isensee 2007, Patzelt 1998). The constitutional law stipulates that MPs must ʻbe representatives for all people, […] are not bound by orders or instructions and are responsible only to their own conscienceʼ (Article 38(1), GG). Fraktion leaders are not authorised to give instructions on how to vote and MPs are obliged to vote according to their own will (Kasten1985, Steffani 1981).
However, there is indirect evidence that Fraktionszwang exists in these countries. First-hand accounts provided by the media, analysts, former employees of the parliament and MPs, indicate that Fraktionszwang contributes to the Fraktion’s unity (Bülow 2010, Reyher 2010, Günther 2000: 332f). Another indicator of the existence of Fraktionszwang is the MPs' frequent public demand to extricate their votes from the Fraktion line (freigeben), or to turn them into Gewissensentscheidung (a vote of conscience) in order to be able to vote according their personal will without negative consequences (Spiegel 2017, Roßmann 2016, Prantl 2018). Fraktion’s leaders can then either 'allow' deviating voting, as was the case with the same-sex marriage (§1353 BGB), or they 'rejec' the request for a vote of conscience, as was the case with the abortion law (§219 STGB) (Prantl 2018, Müller and Pfister 2011). Usually Fraktionszwang happens in a subtle way and starts with the internally communicated position of the Fraktion regarding voting on a bill. Fraktion’s statutes usually require that the Fraktion’s leadership committee be notified if deviating voting is intended by an MP (Bülow 2010). In this case, Fraktionsdisziplin, the persuasion with constructive subject-related discussions on different hierarchal levels follows. If disciplining in this form of convincing is ineffective, a coercive process that exceeds subject-related discussions begins. This process can impose on the free mandate, is difficult to prove and therefore enters the grey area between Fraktionsdisziplin and the illegal Fraktionszwang.
The threats with which an MP can be coerced can be divided into existential and non-existential ones. Non-existential threats entail the feeling of exclusion from group belonging and the daily political work. The methods include avoiding the MP and withdrawing favours; mobbing (Bülow 2010, Gutschker 2011); withdrawing information, e.g. by delaying forwarding documents; and restricting the public expression of the MP within the Fraktion by replacing them as public speakers or by prioritising topics outside of the domain of the defiant MP at Fraktion meetings (Lohse 2015). Defiant MPs are emotionally blackmailed, muzzled and lose important channels of influence, which hinders their daily political work (Kasten 1985, Lohse 2015).
The existential threats refer to job and income security. Germany has a mixed member proportional representation electoral system. The minority of MPs are directly elected by their electoral district and the remaining MPs are party members that receive their seat from their 'Fraktion’s election list. The indirectly elected MPs secure their seat by a favourable position on the election list. Since it compiles the list, the Fraktion can exert control. Empirically, this threat can be observed in the way the directly elected MPs tend to more frequently depart from the party line (Neuhäuser et al. 2013, Sieberer 2010). MPs can also be excluded or recalled from positions within the Fraktion or committees and suffer income loss as a result. Finally, MPs can be expelled from the party or Fraktion if the Fraktion argues that they could not ideologically tolerate the member anymore (Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Kasten 1985). The expelled MPs do not lose their mandate but are isolated from the Fraktion and thereby lose influence.
Fraktionszwang is only legally verifiable if documented, for instance, in concrete voting requirements and sanctions for defying the Fraktion’s line, stipulated in its statute (Bundestag 2013). Court proceedings between governmental bodies (Organstreitverfahren) on this matter have not yet occurred in Germany (Becker 1984, Winkler 2013: 99ff.). Consequently, some jurists argue that actual Fraktionszwang does not exist in the legal sense (Patzelt 1998). The MPs, media and the common public normally do not use the narrow legal definition of the term Fraktionszwang and understand it as the violation of the free mandate with coercion. A prominent example of what was publicly, but not legally, classified as Fraktionszwang in Germany was a parliamentary vote in 2001 regarding Germany’s participation in the Afghanistan mission (ISAF) in 2002 (Schmid 2011). The then German chancellor Gerhard Schröder anticipated that the coalition would vote against Germany’s participation but he wanted Germany to take part. To control the vote, Schröder linked it with a vote of confidence that would have triggered new elections and a potential job loss for the MPs if it failed to pass (Gelman 2010).
The tension between the Fraktion’s and MP's own will and the media attention the alleged Fraktionszwang attracts can lead to mental health problems and, eventually, to resignation from the post (Wolter 2019, Phoenix 2019). Younger MPs or those with caring duties or lack of alternative job opportunities are particularly vulnerable to Fraktionszwang (Bülow 2010). In contrast, elderly politicians in their final legislative terms pose a risk factor for their Fraktions since they are more likely to vote against the Fraktion’s line (Schneider 2011).
Coercion is an inherent pragmatic feature of representative democracies that ensures clear majorities for a functioning decision-making process (Galka and Schuett-Wetschky 2007, Kasten 1985) but the voters view it critically if it is frequently employed. According to a Statista survey (2011), 50 percent of the Germans demand a more frequent suppression of Fraktionszwang, and 31 percent demand its complete suppression. The voters expect the MPs to act on their behalf, but Fraktionszwang prevents them to follow their electoral promises and advertised attitudes. This can challenge the very idea of representative democracy. The media label the MPs who frequently vote in line with the Fraktion as Abnicker (ʻyes menʼ) and frequently glorify deviating MPs as democratic rebels. However, Fraktions with too diversified opinions are presented in the press as chaotic, paralysed and inefficient and the deviating MPs are called the Nestbeschmutzer (ʻtraitorsʼ) (Arnett et al. 2016, Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Fiedler 2017).
Fraktionszwang is legal in many countries. The United States, the United Kingdom and many of its former colonies have institutionalised the practice of party discipline in the form of party whips, who officially secure majority votes by formal and informal cohesive methods (see dirt book in the UK, also see Bowler et al. 1999). Dǎngjì (黨紀) is the legally constituted and expected party discipline in China (Cai 2008). Depending on the political system and culture, the extent of disciplining varies. Party discipline is typical for representative democracies with direct mandates and first-past-the-post electoral systems (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999).
Entries in the online encyclopaedia linking to fraktionszwang
References
Arnett, G., Caponera, D., Pauly, M. and Gathmann, A. 2016. ‘Abweichler im Bundestag: Die größten Rebellen der Fraktionen’ Die Welt, 9 January, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article151296429/Abnicker-oder-Rebell-Wer-ist-was-im-Bundestag.html
Becker, M. 1984. ‘Die Abberufung eines Abgeordneten aus einem Parlamentsausschuß im Spannungsfeld zwischen Fraktionsdisziplin und freiem Mandat.‘ Zeitschrift Für Parlamentsfragen, 15(1), 24-31, 9 January, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24221868
Bundestag - Wissenschaftliche Dienste. 2013. ‘Fraktionsdisziplin und Abgeordnetenstatus gemäß Art. 38 Grundgesetz’, Bundestag, 18 November, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/412336/fcf895851c70aef1406a47195feee109/wd-3-042-13-pdf-data.pdf
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB. 2013. Gesetze-im-internet, 15 January, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/
Borst, M., Hildebrandt, T. 2014. ‘Streitgespräch: "Wir haben in Deutschland einen sehr disziplinierten Laden“‘, ZEIT ONLINE, 12 December, https://www.zeit.de/2014/17/streitgespraech-willemsen-lammert/seite-2
Bowler, S., Farrell, D.M. and Katz, R.S. 1999. Party discipline and parliamentary government. Ohio: The Ohio State University Press
Bülow, M. 2010. Wir Abnicker: Über Macht und Ohnmacht der Volksvertreter. Berlin: Econ
Cai, Y., 2008. ‘Power structure and regime resilience: contentious politics in China’, British Journal of Political Science, 38(3), pp.411-432
Fiedler, M. 2017. ‘Das Glück der Abweichler’. Tagesspiegel, 5 January, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/themen/agenda/rebellen-im-bundestag-das-glueck-der-abweichler/19981986.html
Forsyth, D. 2014. Group Dynamics. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Galka, S., Schuett-Wetschky, E. 2007. ‘Parlamentarismuskritik und Grundgesetz: Hat der Parlamentarische Rat Fraktionsdisziplin abgelehnt?‘,ZPol Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft,4:1095 – 1117
Gelman, V. 2010.‘Subversive institutions and informal control in modern Russia.’, Polity, 2: 6-24
Deutsches Grundgesetz. 1949. ‘German Government. Basic Law’. Bundesregierung, 1 January, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/basic-law-470510
Gutschker, T. 2011. ’Wenn ich deine Fresse schon sehe“: Böse Worte über Bosbach’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 January, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/wenn-ich-deine-fresse-schon-sehe-boese-worte-ueber-bosbach-11447541.html
Günther, K. 2000. ‘Zur Kritikbedürftigkeit von Werner Patzelts Maßstäben der Kritik an Volksvertretern und Volk‘, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 41: 327–334
Hogg, M. A., Williams, K. D. 2000. ‘From I to we: Social identity and the collective self’, Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4: 81–97
Isensee J. 2007. Fraktionsdisziplin und Amtsgewissen: Verfassungsrechtliche Garantie der Freiheit des Mandats im politischen Prozess‘, inW.J. Patzelt, M. Sebaldt, U. Kranenpohl (ed.) Res publica semper reformanda. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
Ismayr W. 1997. ‘Parteien in Bundestag und Bundesregierung‘, in O.W. Gabriel O.W., O. Niedermayer, R. Stöss (ed.) Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
Kasten, H. 1985. ‘Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Disziplinierung des Abgeordneten durch seine Fraktion: Fraktionsdisziplin, Fraktionszwang und Fraktionsausschluß‘, Zeitschrift Für Parlamentsfragen, 16(4): 475-484
Katsenelinboigen, A. 1971. Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union. Soviet Studies, 29, 1, 62-85
Kastenholz, K. and Reufels, B. (directors). 2019. Eine Frage des Gewissens - Von Sternstunden und Fraktionszwang. [film]. Bonn: phoenix
Lohse, E. 2015. ‘Kauder und die Abweichler: Kauders missratene Kampfansage’, Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 January, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/volker-kauders-droht-gegnern-der-griechenland-hilfspolitk-13743020.html
Model O.,Creifelds C., Zierl G. 2000. Staatsbürger-Taschenbuch. Alles Wissenswerte über Europa, Staat, Verwaltung, Recht und Wirtschaft mit zahlreichen Schaubildern. 30. Edition. Munich: CH Beck
Müller, P. and Pfister, R. 2011. ‘SPIEGEL-GESPRÄCH:„Den Laden zusammenhalten“-DER SPIEGEL 43/2011’, Spiegel, 4 January, https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-81136816.html
Neuhäuser, A., Mischler, M., Ruxton, G.D. et al. 2013. ‘Gründe für von der Fraktionsdisziplin abweichendes Abstimmungsverhalten bei Bundestagsabgeordneten.‘ AStA Wirtsch Sozialstat Arch 7: 91–99
Patzelt, W. 1998. ‘Wider das Gerede vom ‚Fraktionszwang‘! Funktionslogische Zusammenhänge, populäre Vermutungen und die Sicht der Abgeordneten.‘ Zeitschrift Für Parlamentsfragen, 29(2): 323-347
Prantl, H. 2018. ‘Fraktionszwang §219a: Gewissen ist nicht generalisierbar’, Süddeutsche, 19 December, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/219a-abtreibung-werbeverbot-bundestag-fraktionszwang-1.4216063
Roßmann, R. 2016. ‘Artikel 38 Grundgesetz: "Sach mal, spinnst du?"’, Süddeutsche, 9 January , https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/fraktionszwang-bundestag-grundgesetz-fraktionsdisziplin-1.4428672
Reyher, M. 2010. ‘Freiwilligkeit mit Druck und Drohungen’. abgeordnetenwatch.de, 5 January, https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/blog/2010-08-10/freiwilligkeit-mit-druck-und-drohungen-update
Schmidt, M. G. 2016. Das politische System Deutschlands: Institutionen, Willensbildung und Politikfelder. Munich: CH Beck
Schmid, S. 2011. ’Deutscher Bundestag - Afghanistan-Einsatz vor zehn Jahren beschlossen‘, Deutscher Bundestag, 10 December, https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/37148635_kw51_10_jahre_isaf-207270
Schneider, J. 2011. ‘Wie funktioniert Fraktionsdisziplin?‘, Tagesspiegel, 16 December, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ungezwungener-zwang-wie-funktioniert-fraktionsdisziplin/4682276.html
Sieberer, U. 2010. ‘Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag’, Electoral Studies, 29:484–496
Spiegel. 2017. ‘Wie war das noch mal mit dem Fraktionszwang?‘, Spiegel ,15 January, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ehe-fuer-alle-fraktionszwang-und-gewissensfrage-kompakt-erklaert-a-1154894.html
Statista. 2011. ‘Fraktionszwang im Bundestag’, Statista, 1 January, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/194543/umfrage/meinung-zum-fraktionszwang-bei-entscheidungen-im-bundestag/
Steffani, W. 1981. ‘Edmund Burke: Zur Vereinbarkeit von freiem Mandat und Fraktionsdisziplin‘, Zeitschrift Für Parlamentsfragen, 12(1): 109-122Wolter, K. 2019. “Was du da machst, ist grenzwertig“. Ein Beratungskonzept für Politiker/innen.‘ Organisationsberatung, Supervision, Coaching, 26: 529
Strafgesetzbuch – StGB. 2019. Gesetze-im-internet, 12 January, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html
Winkler, D. 2013. Staatsrecht. Munich: Beck