Difference between revisions of "Chengzhongcun (China)"

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| definition = Rural villages encircled by rapidly expanding urban settlements

| definition = Rural villages encircled by rapidly expanding urban settlements

|style="font-size:1.1em;"| The Chinese term ''chéngzhōngcūn'' (城中村), literally ‘village within the city,’ also translated as ‘village in the city,’ ‘village amid the city’ or, more commonly, as ‘urban village’ (Tian 2008; Zheng et al. 2009; Song and Zenou 2012; Wu et al. 2014), refers to rural villages that have, as a result of the dramatically fast urbanization process of the last four decades, been encircled by expanding urban settlements. Turned into rural-urban hybrid settlements without the direct involvement of the state, urban villages have mushroomed around most large cities across China, becoming the preferential settlements for low-income internal migrants and the urban poor.

|style="font-size:1.1em;"| The Chinese term ''chéngzhōngcūn'' (城中村), literally ‘village within the city,’ also translated as ‘village in the city,’ ‘village amid the city’ or, more commonly, as ‘urban village’ (Tian 2008; Zheng et al. 2009; Song and Zenou 2012; Wu et al. 2014), refers to rural villages that have, as a result of the dramatically fast urbanization process of the last four decades, been encircled by expanding urban settlements. Turned into rural-urban hybrid settlements without the direct involvement of the state, urban villages have mushroomed around most large cities across China, becoming the preferential settlements for low-income internal migrants and the urban poor.

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Within Chinese extended metropolitan regions (McGee and Greenberg 1992), three types of urban villages can be distinguished according to their location (Wang ''et al''. 2009):  

Within Chinese extended metropolitan regions (McGee and Greenberg 1992), three types of urban villages can be distinguished according to their location (Wang ''et al''. 2009):  

The distance from the city core of each of these three types of urban village has determined the pace and time of their urbanization and development path: those closest to the central built-up area of the fastest developing cities have been swallowed up earlier and have been upgraded faster than those located at the rural-urban interface and in suburban areas.  

The distance from the city core of each of these three types of urban village has determined the pace and time of their urbanization and development path: those closest to the central built-up area of the fastest developing cities have been swallowed up earlier and have been upgraded faster than those located at the rural-urban interface and in suburban areas.  

As cities expanded, municipal authorities became interested in accumulating land resources by expropriating rural land at a low cost and selling it to developers at a high margin (Yeh and Li 1999; Hsing 2010). The rural land requisition process differed from city to city (Tian 2008). In megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai, local governments mostly used a top-down approach, which consisted in seizing all ''chéngzhōngcūn'' rural land (farmland and construction land), and proceeding to the complete demolition and reconstruction of urban villages. In the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and in Special Economic Zones (SEZ) such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where villagers’ collectives have greater power, local governments engaged in large-scale annexation of farmland only, thereby making land available for development while minimizing compensation for expropriated villagers. Therefore, rural collectives managed to keep their rural residential land (宅基地, ''zháijiīdì'') and, in some cases, the village’s spare land (留用地, ''liúyòngdì'') that could be used for collective purposes, public facilities and industrial and commercial uses (Wang 2017). While keeping their juridical status of rural villages, these rural knots have gradually been sewn into the urban fabric, being converted into ‘villages within the city.’ In other words, although they have been geographically integrated into sprawling metropolises and surrounded by modern districts and skyscrapers, ''chéngzhōngcūn''s retain the collective ownership of rural land as well as their original management model, being administered independently of the city governments.

As cities expanded, municipal authorities became interested in accumulating land resources by expropriating rural land at a low cost and selling it to developers at a high margin (Yeh and Li 1999; Hsing 2010). The rural land requisition process differed from city to city (Tian 2008). In megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai, local governments mostly used a top-down approach, which consisted in seizing all ''chéngzhōngcūn'' rural land (farmland and construction land), and proceeding to the complete demolition and reconstruction of urban villages. In the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and in Special Economic Zones (SEZ) such as Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where villagers’ collectives have greater power, local governments engaged in large-scale annexation of farmland only, thereby making land available for development while minimizing compensation for expropriated villagers. Therefore, rural collectives managed to keep their rural residential land (宅基地, ''zháijiīdì'') and, in some cases, the village’s spare land (留用地, ''liúyòngdì'') that could be used for collective purposes, public facilities and industrial and commercial uses (Wang 2017). While keeping their juridical status of rural villages, these rural knots have gradually been sewn into the urban fabric, being converted into ‘villages within the city.’ In other words, although they have been geographically integrated into sprawling metropolises and surrounded by modern districts and skyscrapers, ''chéngzhōngcūn''s retain the collective ownership of rural land as well as their original management model, being administered independently of the city governments.

Meanwhile, non-residential buildings such as factories and commercial facilities have also been developed in ''chéngzhōngcūn''s – especially those located in the PRD region – attracting foreign investment that has helped to create suitable industrial areas. Some of the so-called world factories (that is, labour-intensive manufacturing industries producing goods mostly for the world market) are actually located in ''chéngzhōngcūn''s (Lin 2006; Wang et al. 2009; Hao et al. 2012). Therefore, many migrants have found in urban villages not only a cheap place in which to settle but also a convenient place to work and live.

Meanwhile, non-residential buildings such as factories and commercial facilities have also been developed in ''chéngzhōngcūn''s – especially those located in the PRD region – attracting foreign investment that has helped to create suitable industrial areas. Some of the so-called world factories (that is, labour-intensive manufacturing industries producing goods mostly for the world market) are actually located in ''chéngzhōngcūn''s (Lin 2006; Wang et al. 2009; Hao et al. 2012). Therefore, many migrants have found in urban villages not only a cheap place in which to settle but also a convenient place to work and live.

Since ''chéngzhōngcūn''s’ economic and infrastructural development as well as local management and public services are independent of the urban planning framework, most urban villages are characterized by low-quality, chaotic living environments, high population density and spatial congestion. ''Chéngzhōngcūn''s’ public facilities are generally inadequate and poorly maintained, their narrow alleyways do not meet basic fire and transport regulations, and their public roadways are crisscrossed by haphazardly intertwined electricity and telecommunication wires, as well as by substandard water, gas and sewerage pipelines. Furthermore, the design and construction of buildings in urban villages do not meet the same development procedures, regulations and building standards imposed by the urban planning system (Hao, ''et al''. 2011; Hao ''et al''. 2012; Chen 2019). As a result, unauthorized floors and other constructions are built neglecting height safety codes and security distances at such high densities as to be designated ‘handshake’ (握手楼, ''wòshǒulóu'') or ‘kissing’ buildings (接吻楼, ''jiēwěnlóu'') (Zou and Jie 1996; Bach 2010). Because of the poor living environments and unhygienic conditions of urban villages, as well as their relatively high crime and prostitution rates (Dong and Cheng 2017; Z. Liu and Lo 2019), municipal governments see ''chéngzhōngcūn'' as a source of major problems for the development of modern cities. They would rather take control of these messy areas in order to ‘regenerate’ them and especially to recapture their incremental – though yet nominal and for now restricted to villages’ collectives – land value (Tian 2008; Liu ''et al''. 2012; Lin ''et al.'' 2015). Hence, local authorities have repeatedly tried to introduce and reinforce regulations in order to put an end to illicit activities and the rising informal housing market ([[小产权]], [[xiǎochǎnquán]]) set up in ''chéngzhōngcūn''s. However, the more the government tries to assert discipline in urban villages, the more indigenous villagers, who have rapidly learned entrepreneurial skills, find new tricks to circumvent the new regulations, to hold onto their land, and to maximize their profits. The result has been a more vigorous intervention by municipalities which have launched urban village renewal policies. In the last two decades, hundreds of ''chéngzhōngcūn''s across China have been the object of complete or partial redevelopment projects, provoking on-going negotiations over compensation between urban authorities, real-estate developers and indigenous villagers (Li and Li 2011; Lin ''et al''. 2015; Zhou 2017; Wu ''et al''. 2013; Wu ''et al.'' 2018).

Since ''chéngzhōngcūn''s’ economic and infrastructural development as well as local management and public services are independent of the urban planning framework, most urban villages are characterized by low-quality, chaotic living environments, high population density and spatial congestion. ''Chéngzhōngcūn''s’ public facilities are generally inadequate and poorly maintained, their narrow alleyways do not meet basic fire and transport regulations, and their public roadways are crisscrossed by haphazardly intertwined electricity and telecommunication wires, as well as by substandard water, gas and sewerage pipelines. Furthermore, the design and construction of buildings in urban villages do not meet the same development procedures, regulations and building standards imposed by the urban planning system (Hao, ''et al''. 2011; Hao ''et al''. 2012; Chen 2019). As a result, unauthorized floors and other constructions are built neglecting height safety codes and security distances at such high densities as to be designated ‘handshake’ (握手楼, ''wòshǒulóu'') or ‘kissing’ buildings (接吻楼, ''jiēwěnlóu'') (Zou and Jie 1996; Bach 2010). Because of the poor living environments and unhygienic conditions of urban villages, as well as their relatively high crime and prostitution rates (Dong and Cheng 2017; Z. Liu and Lo 2019), municipal governments see ''chéngzhōngcūn'' as a source of major problems for the development of modern cities. They would rather take control of these messy areas in order to ‘regenerate’ them and especially to recapture their incremental – though yet nominal and for now restricted to villages’ collectives – land value (Tian 2008; Liu ''et al''. 2012; Lin ''et al.'' 2015). Hence, local authorities have repeatedly tried to introduce and reinforce regulations in order to put an end to illicit activities and the rising informal housing market ([[小产权]], [[xiǎochǎnquán]]) set up in ''chéngzhōngcūn''s. However, the more the government tries to assert discipline in urban villages, the more indigenous villagers, who have rapidly learned entrepreneurial skills, find new tricks to circumvent the new regulations, to hold onto their land, and to maximize their profits. The result has been a more vigorous intervention by municipalities which have launched urban village renewal policies. In the last two decades, hundreds of ''chéngzhōngcūn''s across China have been the object of complete or partial redevelopment projects, provoking on-going negotiations over compensation between urban authorities, real-estate developers and indigenous villagers (Li and Li 2011; Lin ''et al''. 2015; Zhou 2017; Wu ''et al''. 2013; Wu ''et al.'' 2018).