5,669
edits
| Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
| categories = [[:Category: Russia|Russia]] – [[:Category: FSU| FSU]] – [[:Category: Army| Army]] – [[:Category: Military| Military]] – [[:Category: Public service| Public service]] – [[:Category: Hierarchy| Hierarchy]] – [[:Category: Euphemism| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Punishment| Punishment]] – [[:Category: Community| Community]] | | categories = [[:Category: Russia|Russia]] – [[:Category: FSU| FSU]] – [[:Category: Army| Army]] – [[:Category: Military| Military]] – [[:Category: Public service| Public service]] – [[:Category: Hierarchy| Hierarchy]] – [[:Category: Euphemism| Euphemism]] – [[:Category: Punishment| Punishment]] – [[:Category: Community| Community]] | ||
| authorofpiece = Kirill Melnikov | | authorofpiece = Kirill Melnikov | ||
| authorinstitution = Institute of Philosophy and Law, Ural | | authorinstitution = Institute of Philosophy and Law, Ural Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia | ||
| authorwebsite = | | authorwebsite = | ||
}} | }} | ||
<big>'''By Kirill Melnikov, Institute of Philosophy and Law, Ural | <big>'''By Kirill Melnikov, Institute of Philosophy and Law, Ural Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia'''</big> | ||
[[Category: Informal governance]] | [[Category: Informal governance]] | ||
[[Category: Lock-in effect]] | [[Category: Lock-in effect]] | ||
| Line 24: | Line 24: | ||
[[Category: Punishment]] | [[Category: Punishment]] | ||
[[Category: Community]] | [[Category: Community]] | ||
[[Category: Entry]] | |||
[[Category: 2020 entry]] | |||
[[Category: SSEES]] | [[Category: SSEES]] | ||
[[Category: Alumni]] | [[Category: Alumni]] | ||
| Line 32: | Line 34: | ||
[[File:Pokhorony_1.png.png|thumb|300px|left|link=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwUqx_QyiPw&t=5s|The ceremony of ''pokhorony okurka'' at the military school. Source: [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCku9SP33tns9X5Njns0heHg Omega].]] | [[File:Pokhorony_1.png.png|thumb|300px|left|link=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwUqx_QyiPw&t=5s|The ceremony of ''pokhorony okurka'' at the military school. Source: [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCku9SP33tns9X5Njns0heHg Omega].]] | ||
Tracing the origins of ''pokhorony okurka'' is complicated. The analysis of blogs and memoirs shows that it has been taking place at least since the 1980s, and practices of informal punishment were an exemption rather than the rule in the 1950s (Manolin 2004, | Tracing the origins of ''pokhorony okurka'' is complicated. The analysis of blogs and memoirs shows that it has been taking place at least since the 1980s, and practices of informal punishment were an exemption rather than the rule in the 1950s (Manolin 2004: 46-87, Zirtran, 2014). Most likely, the penetration of informal punishment into the Soviet army is associated with the general spread of the non-statutory relations (''neustavnye otnosheniia''). While some practices of non-statutory relations can be traced to the army of the Russian Empire (Tutolmin 2007), the proliferation of informal relations as a general trend began in the 1960s and is often seen as a result of several overlapping trends. | ||
In 1960s, veterans of the Second World War began retiring from commanding positions. During their tenure, they avoided hazing or punishment that could humiliate a soldier, because for war veterans, the question of mutual respect and a healthy atmosphere among soldiers was a matter of life and death. The veteran retirement coincided with a shortage of recruits caused by the losses of the USSR in the war. In order to compensate for demographic losses, the Politburo resorted to conscripting men with criminal backgrounds (Tutolmin 2007). This measure was introduced as a rehabilitation of former prisoners, but in fact, prison subculture saturated the army. The proliferation of informal disciplinary techniques was enhanced by the degradation of the system of sergeant education. After reducing conscription from three to two years in 1968, regimental schools for sergeants were abolished. As a result, any qualitative distinction between soldiers and sergeants was erased and posts for junior commanders began to be allotted to conscripts. The lack of competence of the new generation of sergeants and the continuous necessity to manage the army collective have brought to life informal ways of getting things done. | In 1960s, veterans of the Second World War began retiring from commanding positions. During their tenure, they avoided hazing or punishment that could humiliate a soldier, because for war veterans, the question of mutual respect and a healthy atmosphere among soldiers was a matter of life and death. The veteran retirement coincided with a shortage of recruits caused by the losses of the USSR in the war. In order to compensate for demographic losses, the Politburo resorted to conscripting men with criminal backgrounds (Tutolmin 2007). This measure was introduced as a rehabilitation of former prisoners, but in fact, prison subculture saturated the army. The proliferation of informal disciplinary techniques was enhanced by the degradation of the system of sergeant education. After reducing conscription from three to two years in 1968, regimental schools for sergeants were abolished. As a result, any qualitative distinction between soldiers and sergeants was erased and posts for junior commanders began to be allotted to conscripts. The lack of competence of the new generation of sergeants and the continuous necessity to manage the army collective have brought to life informal ways of getting things done. | ||
| Line 38: | Line 40: | ||
[[File:Pokhorony_3.png.png|thumb|300px|left|link=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxA2c4Ip1B0&t=1700s|Reflection of the practice of 'pokhorony okurka' in popular TV series 'Soldaty' (Soldiers). Source: [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCboOW_O3_4kRyetKDUQJdXQ Сериалы. РЕН ТВ].]] | [[File:Pokhorony_3.png.png|thumb|300px|left|link=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxA2c4Ip1B0&t=1700s|Reflection of the practice of 'pokhorony okurka' in popular TV series 'Soldaty' (Soldiers). Source: [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCboOW_O3_4kRyetKDUQJdXQ Сериалы. РЕН ТВ].]] | ||
Different forms of informal punishments have a long story in the Soviet and Russian army. What makes them so durable and why, despite the vast variety of formal penalty options ( | Different forms of informal punishments have a long story in the Soviet and Russian army. What makes them so durable and why, despite the vast variety of formal penalty options (Konsul’tant Plus 2007: 55), do informal punishments still thrive? | ||
The first reason is that applying informal punishment allows commanders to avoid responsibility. The formal penalty requires proof that a soldier had committed misconduct, as stated in the Disciplinary Bylaw (81). If misconduct lacks proof, the commander himself can become subject to investigation. Informal punishment allows superior officers to circumvent this hazardous procedure and to disguise punishment as a physical exercise. | The first reason is that applying informal punishment allows commanders to avoid responsibility. The formal penalty requires proof that a soldier had committed misconduct, as stated in the Disciplinary Bylaw (81). If misconduct lacks proof, the commander himself can become subject to investigation. Informal punishment allows superior officers to circumvent this hazardous procedure and to disguise punishment as a physical exercise. | ||
| Line 51: | Line 53: | ||
Informal punishment is a natural element of total institutions. As long as the army retains the basic features of total institutions, practices of informal punishment will persist. An all-volunteer military can significantly limit the scope of such practices since it disrupts the central feature of total institutions – the inability to choose where, when and how to work, to sleep and to relax. | Informal punishment is a natural element of total institutions. As long as the army retains the basic features of total institutions, practices of informal punishment will persist. An all-volunteer military can significantly limit the scope of such practices since it disrupts the central feature of total institutions – the inability to choose where, when and how to work, to sleep and to relax. | ||
==References== | |||
Bannikov, K. 2002. ''The anthropology of regimented societies. Relations of Dominance in Social Interactions among Russian Soldiers''. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Nauka | |||
Foucault, M. 1979. ''Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison''. New York: Vintage Books | |||
Goffman, E. 1961. ''Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates''. New York: Anchor Books | |||
Heckathorn, D. 1988. ‘Collective sanctions and the creation of prisoner's dilemma norms’. ''American Journal of Sociology'', 94: 535-562 | |||
Konsul’tant Plus. 2007. ‘Distsiplinarnyi ustav vooruzhennykh sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 10 November, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_72806/c401b0ba6064c7e607a9ea1b9aeb05e4d7e20fdf/ | |||
Ledeneva, A. 2006. ''How Russia really works: The informal practices that shaped post-Soviet politics and business''. Cornell University Press | |||
Manoilin, V. 2004. ''Bazirovanie VMF SSSR''. Saint Petersburg: Neva | |||
Soler, K. 2015. ‘The failures of mass punishment’, ''U.S. Patriot Tactical'', 17 June, https://blog.uspatriottactical.com/the-failures-of-mass-punishment/ | |||
Tutolmin, S. 2007. ‘Dedovshchina: retrospektiva’,'' Fond Imperskogo Vozrozhdeniia'', 22 October, http://www.fondiv.ru/articles/3/189/ | |||
Zirtran. 2014. ‘Pokhorony bychka v armii’, ''Pikabu.ru'', 26 March, https://pikabu.ru/story/pokhoronyi_byichka_v_armii_2111061 | |||