Mianzi (China)

Mianzi 🇨🇳
Location: China
Definition: Lit. ‘face’, a person’s reputation and its social implications and consequences
Keywords: China – East Asia – Personal connections – Sociability – Sociability of instrumentality – Reputation – Bureaucracy – Gender
Clusters: Substantive ambivalence – Instrumentality of sociability – Economies of favours
Author: Long Zhang
Affiliation: Department of Sociology, Nankai University of Tianjin, China

By Long Zhang, Department of Sociology, Nankai University of Tianjin, China

The Chinese word mianzi (面子) means literally ‘face’, and it refers to the recognition of an individual’s social status and prestige by others. Mianzi can be earned, saved, borrowed, and maneuvered (Hu 1944; Hwang 1987; Kinnison 2017). As demonstrated by Goffman’s (1972) research on face-work, concern for self-image (i.e. how one is perceived by others) is a commonplace worldwide. However, in the social-cultural context of China, there are especially prominent concerns related to the practice of mianzi. These concerns highlight aspects of personal relations and interactions largely ignored in non-Chinese societies (Qi 2011). For Chinese people, mianzi is perceived to be not really relevant in both close relations and among complete strangers (Hwang 1987). In close relations, such as with family members, an individual tends to be more relaxed and display a more ‘authentic’ version of him or herself. Among complete strangers, interactions are often superficial and short-lived and an individual is rarely worried about what strangers think of them. Rather, mianzi is most prominent in intermediary or mixed relations, or within the guanxi (关系) network. This network includes friends, colleagues, classmates, fellow villagers, neighbours, and so on.

In a guanxi network, the amount of mianzi reflects the individual’s social status and, to a certain extent, the person’s position in the network. Those who have more mianzi usually find it easier to utilise their guanxi to gain resources (Hwang 1987). If A makes a request to B, and B accepts, then we can say that B gives mianzi to A. Meanwhile, the fact that B has helped A means that B is owed social debt now, so A should provide mianzi to B in return. If A does not have enough mianzi to gain help from B, then A may need to ‘borrow’ mianzi from C, asking B to help A for the sake of C’s mianzi. In general, C should be a person who has close guanxi with A and has mianzi for B.

In order to increase one’s mianzi, some people may deliberately highlight their special guanxi with powerful figures, by inviting a powerful figure to give a speech at a wedding ritual, hanging a celebrity’s calligraphy or painting in a prominent place at home, etc. In addition, daily interactions between an individual and other people in the network also affect one’s mianzi. Such interactions may include whether gifts are exchanged in accordance with commonly recognized rules, whether one gives mianzi to another in certain situations, and so on.

Because mianzi can be maneuvered to a certain degree, variations exist to the extent to which a person’s mianzi is ‘valid’ (实) or ‘hollow’ (虚). If a person is wealthy or possesses a certain ability commensurate with one’s reputation, we can consider the person’s mianzi to be ‘valid’. In contrast, if a person produces an image of him or herself through subterfuge or posturing, then that person’s mianzi is hollow. According to this understanding, exaggerating a particular guanxi with a powerful figure is a specific strategy for establishing ‘hollow mianzi’. However, the distinction between ‘valid mianzi’ and ‘hollow mianzi’ is not absolute; for example, a businessman gaining hollow mianzi mainly through exaggerating his guanxi with a powerful official may still have more advantage in a competitive bidding, thus turn the hollow mianzi into a valid one.

The logogram for mianzi realised by the author. Source: Long Zhang. © Long Zhang.

Many Chinese people are concerned about protecting the mianzi of others, especially those of higher social status. Hurting someone’s mianzi may cause embarrassment or even anger to that person and could damage their interpersonal guanxi (Kipnis 1995). Common strategies to save other’s mianzi include avoiding public criticism preferring more euphemistic, general, and vague comments; avoiding outright refusal of requests and, instead, making a perfunctory effort even when the request cannot be really fulfilled; avoiding public confrontation with elders and superiors and, instead, behaving as submissively as possible (Hu 1944; Hwang 1987).

According to Zhai’s (2013) research, defence of leaders’ mianzi constitutes a distinctive feature of the relationship between superiors and subordinates in the Chinese bureaucracy. For example, if a superior makes a mistake, that person rarely admits it voluntarily in order to save mianzi; moreover, even if the subordinates are aware that their superior has made a mistake, they often choose to cover up the mistake or justify the misconduct to assist their leader with saving mianzi. This phenomenon exists both in the traditional Chinese bureaucracy and among the Communist cadres, which shows considerable historical continuity.

This is true also the other way around. In Chinese bureaucracy, wise leaders also know the importance of maintaining the mianzi of their subordinates and avoid embarrassing their subordinates in public. The business magazine Forbes once reported how, in a large multinational company located in Shanghai, a U.S. superior severely criticized his Chinese subordinate in a meeting, which caused the Chinese subordinate to go silent and then leave the meeting. Based on this story, the Forbes reporter advised foreign managers to be fully aware of Chinese people’s sensitivity to public criticism: ‘when your Chinese employees lose face, you lose them’ (Vorhauser-Smith 2012).

In traditional Chinese culture, maintaining mianzi perpetuates unequal gender relations. According to the traditional principles of Confucianism, the expected relation of a couple in public is ‘husband sings and wife echoes’ (夫唱妇随), which means that a wife should show her deference and give her husband as much mianzi as possible in front of other people. According to Chan’s (2006) research, the perception that their mianzi has not been preserved constitutes an important reason why some Chinese husbands feel dissatisfied with their wives and even commit domestic violence.

The mianzi practice also perpetuates gender inequality in that having a son is traditionally viewed as generating mianzi for all family members, while having a daughter does not add anything to their mianzi. Given this perception, giving birth to a boy represents more than mere security; it is linked to the status and prestige of the family members in the community and network (Li & Shang 2012). Some young mothers may even feel that giving birth to a son affects their mianzi in the entire kinship network and community. This link of a child’s gender with the parents’ mianzi has led to intentional gender selection and lower survival rates of girls.

However, the mianzi brought by raising son is a double-edged sword. When a young man prepares to get married, his parents are often obliged to prepare a substantial caili (see Caili (China) for more) and even to buy a wedding apartment, for which the parents may accumulate huge debt. The amount of caili and the quality of the wedding apartment will affect the mianzi of the bridegroom’s family in the previous community and in the newly established network with the bride’s family (Wang et al. 2020). If, despite the heavy financial burden for this, the bridegroom’s parents do not gain enough return from their son, their life actually become much harder with their overly investment in gaining a hollow mianzi. As one Chinese proverb goes, people may ‘suffer in life because dying to gain mianzi (死要面子活受罪).

References

Chan, K. L. 2006. ‘The Chinese Concept of Face and Violence against Women’, International Social Work, 49(1): 65–73

Goffman, E. 1972. ‘On Face-work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction’, In E. Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-face Behaviour. London: The Penguin Press: 5–46

Hwang, K. 1987. ‘Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game’, American Journal of Sociology, 92 (4): 944–974

Hu, H.C. 1944. ‘The Chinese Concepts of “Face”’, American Anthropologist, 46 (1): 45–64

Kinnison, Li Qing. 2017. ‘Power, Integrity, and Mask – An Attempt to Disentangle the Chinese Face Concept’, Journal of Pragmatics, 114: 32-48

Kipnis, A. B. 1995. ‘Face: An Adaptable Discourse of Social Surfaces’, Positions, 3 (1): 119–148

Li, W. D., Shang W. J. ‘Nanhai Pianhao Zuowei Yizhong Shengyu Wenhua de Shengchan yu Zaishengchan’, Funv Yanjiu Luncong, 110 (2): 36-43

Qi, X. 2011. ‘Face: A Chinese Concept in a Global Sociology’, Journal of Sociology, 47 (3): 279–296

Vorhauser-Smith, Sylvia. 2012. ‘When Your Chinese Employees Lose Face, You Lose Them’, Forbes 29 May, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sylviavorhausersmith/2012/05/29/when-your-chinese-employees-lose-face-you-lose-them-2/?sh=2e26f92964ba.

Wang, S. N., Jia Y. J., Tian G. 2020. ‘Yi Caili: Lun Nongcun Caili Xingcheng Jizhi Zhong de Daode Qianruxing–Jiyu Gansu L Xian de Anli Fenxi’,

Shehui, 40 (1): 1-24

Zhai, X. W. 2013. Renqing, Mianzi yu Quanli de Zaishengchan. Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe