Difference between revisions of "GIP-Sandbox"

==The drivers of informality studies==

In embracing both the developing and developed world, informal stud- ies complements the global studies agenda with a bottom-up perspective that gives a voice to participants in liminal spaces and grey zones – often an undervalued source of policy solutions (Marinaro 2022). Informality studies enables the bridging and bonding of scholars with area studies expertise from all over the globe, thus creating a platform to explore deep structures of collective existence and critical analysis of contextual- ity (Geertz 1990).

In the last two decades, scholars of post-communist societies have made a remarkable contribution to the field of informality (see Polese 2023 for a review). The relationship between informality and the state has been scrutinised: from the connivance of the state and exploita- tion of informal refuse collectors, carers of the elderly and other ser- vice providers, to turning a blind eye to activities parallel to the state or not worth regulating (see [[Pfandsammeln]], 8.10 in this volume; Andare  in giro, 8.11 in this volume; [[Babushki]], 1.10 in this volume; Rivkin-Fish and Zdravomyslova introductions to Chapters 1 and 14 in this volume). Once a peripheral theme of informality, associated with area studies, post-communist regimes and underdeveloped economies, has become mainstream, as formalised policies aimed at better governance contin- ued to fail. The black box of informal institutions has been unpacked, and informal networks, channelling social values and peer pressure to con- form with them became part of the transformative policy agenda (North 1990; Ostrom 1998; Minbaeva et al. 2022). The disciplinary divide in studying informal institutions, networks and practices has been partially overcome by intense cross-discipline collaboration within large-scale pro- jects, application of network expertise, surveys and comparative research (Ledeneva 2010; Morris and Polese 2013; Ledeneva et al. 2018).

Several factors have created a demand for deeper understanding of informality as part of the global intellectual agenda (Harari 2018). The failure of global governance vis-à-vis nation states led to count- less crises – geopolitical, environmental, the COVID-19 pandemic, migration – and pushed for novel, non-bureaucratic ways to solve global problems. Critical reviews of hegemonic discourses – via decolonisation and woke culture – questioned the assumptions of the historical and social roles of formal institutions. The transformations of the twenty-first century – the crisis of liberal ideology, the omnipresence of the Internet, the emergence of a gig economy and AI-based services, the rise of social media and political polarisation – undermined the normative analyses that had previously sidelined informality as marginal and detrimental to the effectiveness of formal institutions and created a need to assess the role of the informal in the new context. A focus on resilience and the abil- ity to deal with uncertainty changed the angle on informality from tradi- tionally suspect or borderline corrupt, to the problem-solving potential in the context of the ‘new normal’ (Stuart et al. 2018). Here I elaborate on the three main factors driving researchers’ and practitioners’ interest in informality studies and the impact thereof.

Unregulated migration, the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme weather, political polarisation, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, energy shortages and wild fluctuations of major currencies are only the most recent crises that have put severe pressure on governments and created an unprecedented level of uncertainty that has become the salient characteristic of the contemporary world. Solutions grounded in economics, theory of probability and game theory, with their emphasis on human rational- ity, strong institutions (including international bodies like the United Nations [UN], North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], World Trade Organization [WTO] and International Monetary Fund [IMF]), bilateral and multilateral treaties and negotiations, preventive risk identification and mitigation strategies have mostly failed to address the new challenges. In order to make sense of realities that bypass traditional theo- retical frames and resist institutions of global governance and integrate them into policy, scholars in economics, management and political science turned to behavioural economics, experimental methods and nudge policy approaches (Ahn and Ostrom 2002; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Sunstein and Reisch 2017; Hodgeson 2021). In times of crisis, informal practices, associated with flexibility and intuition grounded in social norms and cultural values, affect the default mode of rules and procedures. It is essential to provide insights for studying alternative ways of dealing with uncertainty individually, collectively and at policy level.

Of the hundred countries that could be identified as transitional by the twenty-first century, no more than twenty are on a path to a well- functioning democracy. Most of the countries do not appear to be con- solidating democratic institutions, while others have regressed into authoritarianism (Carothers 2002: 9–10). The sheer number of adjec- tives to describe these democracies as formal, façade, pseudo, weak, illiberal, sovereign, managed or virtual points to the problem with the key assumption of the transition paradigm: transition can be prompted at will by political elites, top-down, regardless of the country’s predisposi- tion for democracy and should be based on the creation of strong institu- tions, which will lead to flourishing economies, prosperous societies and effective states. The establishment and strengthening of such institutions became the core of the liberal reforms and democratisation efforts that swept the world from the 1980s to the 2000s, despite warnings of the effects of cultural and social norms on governance structures and empha- sis on the habitual behaviour and irrational decision-making in the con- text of peer pressure and community-driven interests. Organisational theory posits that agents’ actions and rationality reflect the norms per- vading their workplace, so the principal–agent models of the public sec- tor must integrate the collective action theory (Ahn and Ostrom 2002; Marquette and Peiffer 2015). The backsliding of democracies in many countries, including the new members of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe adopting the so-called ‘no-predisposition’ approach, gave way to comparative analyses that identified patterns of governance, fundamen- tal for understanding the grey zones of political regimes, exiting from, or returning to authoritarianism.  

These patterns are referred to as patronal politics in Eurasia (Hale 2014, 2019), subversive institutions, stubborn structures or informal institutions (Bunce 1999; Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 2006; Gel’man 2017; Magyar and Madlovich 2020), or informal governance (Christiansen and Piattoni 2003, Christiansen and Neuhold 2012, Ledeneva 2013; Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017). Thirty years after the fall of communism in Europe, scholars from dif- ferent disciplines have joined forces to develop more balanced perspectives and reflect upon the pathways of post-communist transitions (Douarin and Havrylyshyn 2021) and subsequent ‘democratic backsliding’ (Cianetti et al. 2020). New conceptual frameworks for dealing with the path dependence of post-communist regimes (Magyar and Madlovich 2020) and critial review of their legacies and lessons have benefited wider intellectual frameworks (Kubik and Linch 2013; Duncan and Schimpfössl 2019), and

facilitated new fields of study such as informal politics (Gill 2023: 410).  

=== Balancing out a historic, state-centric thinking ===

In most sources, the prerequisites for governance include the power to act and the authority to do so. Governing is usually associated with the formal institutions of a modern state. However, historically, the modern state and its institutions are relatively recent phenomena, bound to spe- cific factors facilitating their emergence and global dominance. The rele- vance of the West-centric concept of the state for countries run by Sharia law is questionable (Acemoglu et al. 2002) as it plays down the role of religion. The practical and ideological hegemony of state-led governance resulted in a loaded, if not stigmatised, understanding of non-Western, non-formalised processes of government, culminating in a rather naïve belief in the linear triumph of modernity over tradition. In this vein, the top-down perspective on informality, especially when associated with poverty, underdevelopment and the informal sector, has colonial roots (Hart 1973; Gerxhani 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002).

Normative and classic institutionalist perspectives view informality as subversive, bad and obsolete, if not outright corrupt and illegal, and thus something to cast aside or erase from modern societies dominated by strong institutions, representative democracy and top-down governance. However, in recent decades the impact of informality has increased not only in emerging countries but also in liberal democra- cies. Dichotomic, normative thinking fails to explain the persistence of informality, because it cannot capture the ambivalent nature of informal- ity: it creates issues while resolving problems. In later academic litera- ture, informality is predominantly viewed in association with corruption, poor governance and the draining of resources from the formal sector.

Scholars of informality face an intrinsic challenge. The unarticulated, or hidden, nature of informal practices makes their measurement problem- atic and their research dependent predominantly on qualitative methods. Data collection relies on the participants’ willingness and ability to artic- ulate practices for observers. Insiders’ biases may distort the outsiders’ interpretations, and vice versa. Controlling for positionality is essential. In addition, a researcher of informality, and an eager informality critic alike, may want to exercise caution in capturing, mapping or targeting informality, given the warning against ‘allowing the informal economic practices to be portrayed as a kind of democratic resistance’ (Misztal 2002; Hart 2009: 1). The following must-have research skills can enable one to see and assess the world through the lens of informality.

 

 

Is informality indeed a lens through which we observe human coopera- tion in particular times and spaces? Is it an umbrella concept embracing the variety of forms of human cooperation? Is it a pattern of cooperation that re-emerges in different contexts and is fundamentally repetitive? Do we even need a definition for it? To paraphrase Nietzsche, informality is a term that has history, rather than a definition. Without attempting to achieve consensus, and in the spirit of the social and cultural com- plexity in informality studies, it might still be useful to question the widespread assumptions about informality. Let us take issue with the ChatGPT-generated definition that does not distinguish between the con- cept and the practices it refers to:

 

Informality refers to behavior, relationships, or structures that operate outside of formal rules, norms, or procedures. In social or economic contexts, informality can refer to practices that are not regulated or recognized by the state or other formal institu- tions, such as informal labor markets or unregistered businesses. Informality can also refer to social behavior that is relaxed, casual, or unstructured, as opposed to formal, rigid, or traditional. The term can be used in a variety of contexts, including politics, eco- nomics, sociology, and culture, to describe phenomena that are not fully regulated or institutionalized.

Three assumptions come to the fore: (1) informal behaviour takes place outside formal rules, norms and procedures, rather than penetrating, exploiting and diverting them, (2) the definition relies on the formal– informal dichotomy rather than shades of grey in the interrelation of its poles and (3) it promotes the residual principle, what is not formal is informal, whereby the state is perceived to be the centre (independent variable) that shapes and regulates informal behaviour (dependent vari- able). On these three counts, the ChatGPT definition lacks sophistica- tion and does not go beyond a dichotomic, black-and-white, top-down account of informality.

 

Informality is a global phenomenon that is present in both developed and developing countries. It is estimated that more than half of the world’s workforce is employed in informal jobs, with the highest rates of informality in developing countries. In many developing countries, informal employment can account for as much as 80–90% of the work- force, particularly in rural areas and in the service sector. However, informality is not limited to developing countries and can also be found in developed countries, particularly in the form of undeclared work, self-employment, and irregular employment arrangements.

 

The operationalisation of informality as informal employment is some- what limited, especially from the perspective of urban studies and other angles as represented in this volume. Disaggregating informality into informal ways of problem-solving is the means by which it is operationalised in the GIP. In other words, researchers have operationalised the concept of informality in a context-sensitive way that suited their research needs best.

 

 

Tackling informality requires a cross-disciplinary perspective. The following discipline-based concepts are essential for understanding informality: informal institutions in political sciences, informal networks in sociology, informal practices in social anthropology, governmentality in social theory and informal governance in management studies, informal power in organisational theory, informal influence in social psychology

and trust in behavioural economics. The cross-disciplinary perspective allows us to reflect on the choice of conceptual tools used to understand and describe a range of informal problem-solving practices presented in this volume.

Most of these concepts are needed to explore a commonplace prac- tice of [[kabel]], the use of connections in Malaysia, 5.8 in this volume. To understand kabel one has to grasp its history, its political significance and ideological nature of bargaining powers, economic functions and the social skills and divisions that kabel produces. A cross-disciplinary analysis of kabel networks, practices, exchanges and relationships was necessary to conceptualise this everywhere-and-nowhere phenomenon. In turn, research on kabel is relevant for the study of social capital, con- sumption, labour markets, entrepreneurship, trust, mobility, migration, remittance economies and gender in Malaysia.

 

Bringing entries from different area studies and disciplines under one roof does not necessarily create cross-discipline or cross-area studies knowledge. What it does do, however, is create an informational platform for further collaboration between scholars with different back- grounds around specific research questions or problems, which produces a collective polymath effect.

 

The first two volumes of the encyclopaedia enabled such cross- discipline and cross-area studies endeavours, published in the UCL Press FRINGE series and as special issues of peer-reviewed journals (www.in-formality.com/wiki/index.php?title=Related_Publications). We anticipate that this collection will also inspire new projects and cooperation for the future volumes of this Encyclopaedia. The teaming method, a collaboration of people with different backgrounds and spe- cialisations in order to solve a specific problem, applied to informality studies can become a powerful tool for developing novel approaches to policy making.

 

 

An informality scholar contributes to the globalising of knowledge about informal problem-solving and creates datasets for context-sensitive comparisons, as well as feeds from wider frameworks of thought (see introductions to chapters in this volume; Kennedy 2014). The local wisdom and know-how embedded in informality are maintained and transmitted through informal practices. By criss-crossing evidence emanating from different corners of the world, this volume seeks to overcome the limitations of understanding local knowledge, unwritten rules and hidden practices in societies other than one’s own. We aim to reach out to other disciplines and area studies in order to generate networks for problem-solving. We facilitate public engagement with issues around informality. Specific ways in which knowledge, images, symbols and practices are shared locally or globally reveal some universal patterns, the fractals of informality. Looking at the case studies in the encyclopaedia, we can attempt so-called ‘context-sensitive comparisons’, thus facilitating the globalising of knowledge, yet without losing local context. Our organisation of material transcends the geographical principle and area studies divide to highlight the universal patterns of problem-solving in societies.

 

 

In the Western sociological literature, informality is conceptualised as the opposite of formality, following Erving Goffman’s conception of ‘role distance’ and frontstage–backstage dichotomy (Goffman 2002 [1959]). On stage, actors ought to perform according to their scripts; backstage, they can relax and use backstage language. Do these opposites help or impede our grasp of grey areas and blurred boundaries?

 

This encyclopaedia highlights how the space between the two ‘opposites’ is filled with tension, which makes them mutually inclusive. Many informal practices have ambivalent names and meanings, and/or are left deliberately unclear, or have multiple, context-bound meanings. In Chinese mandarin, for example, there is no word for dichotomy, and the words for East and West are not opposites. The language implies what the Chinese philosophical tradition has long argued: opposites always coexist (Marková 2002). The tension between the formal and informal constitutes the very terrain upon which the forces of interaction unfold. Although this statement may appear trivial, it has important, symmetri- cal, implications.

 

If studying the informal is not possible without the formal, the reverse should also be true. When researching formal institutions, net- works or practices, one should not lose sight of their informal underpin- nings, if only for their potential in problem-solving. For example, the role of informal networks in governance has become a prominent concern in the field of organisational behaviour in response to the ineffectiveness of international organisations in local settings, as well as a partial solution to the problem (Horak et al. 2020; Marková 2003; Minbaeva et al. 2023).

 

What is context in the analysis of formal–informal interaction is a ques- tion that calls for the gestalt principles of figure-ground and symmetry. If one focuses on formal institutions, informal institutions, networks and practices constitute the background, or context, within which the work- ings of formal institutions unfold against the interplay of historical, cul- tural, social and interpersonal factors. However, when the focus shifts to hidden, under-researched or unarticulated informal practices, that is, informality, formal frameworks (legal, bureaucratic, official) themselves can be perceived as contextual. Mastering the contexts and acquiring skills of context sensitivity can be achieved by comparative analysis of the complex interplay of the formal and informal in each of the compared cases and an assessment of the similarity/difference of all constituents in the formal–informal interaction.

 

For example, a comparative study of blat in Russia and guanxi in China not only highlighted similarities and differences in the functional- ity of seemingly parallel practices, in their formal frameworks and their transformations, but also pointed to the complex interplay between for- mal and informal (Ledeneva 2008). A comparative study of informal institutions, networks and practices in Russia and China led to the con- clusion that even when focusing on the informal its formal counterpart is part and parcel of the comparative analysis. The symmetry principle means that the reverse is also true.

 

 

Informal practices are ambivalent by nature; they provide solutions but also create problems, they produce competitive advantage for an individual at the expense of a larger group and they privilege members of a closed circle over strangers.

To identify universal patterns but preserve the context that helps differentiate the modes of human interaction and modalities of our perception of it has been a paradoxical yet effective tool in tackling ambivalence. In addition to the emotional ambivalence coined by Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler in the early twentieth century (Bleuler 1914), Robert K. Merton identified and developed the concept of sociological ambivalence, associated with clashing demands on professionals such as doctors and teachers, resulting in their oscillating behaviour. A doctor, for example, should be both compassionate and impartial in treating patients. The poles themselves are not the problem; it is the uncertainty of which one transpires in which context that creates the dilemma. The tension of ambivalence is resolved temporarily and situationally, thus producing a context-bound oscillation that differentiates ambivalence from ambiguity. Cases of non-resolution of the clashing constraints are those where the notions of ambivalence and ambiguity overlap. The challenge for informality scholars is to examine an informal practice through the lens of ambivalence and acquire the critical skills of a master of suspicion.

Looking for paradoxes that are resolved by informal practices in particular contexts and clustering similar contexts has become a major conceptual tool to capture, map and measure informal practices that escape articulation in official discourse but represent the know-how of what works in the vernacular (Ledeneva 2018: 1).

 

 

The previous two volumes of The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality revealed the significance of the ambivalence of informal practices, net- works and institutions (Ledeneva et al. 2018). Four types of ambivalence relevant to informality studies were distinguished: substantive, func- tional, normative and motivational. These four types, associated with doublethink, double standards, double deed and double incentives, can also be traced in this volume.

 

The blurred boundaries between sociable and instrumental in relationships means that it is not possible to disentangle a relationship from the (ab)use of that relationship. Being neither or both is possible. The substantive ambivalence of informal exchanges rules out any single cat- egorisation of the way in which gifts, favours, transfers and transactions are given, taken or exchanged. The ambivalent nature of relationships – seen as social by participants, but as instrumental by observers – points to the fact that a clear-cut categorisation is not possible. Relationships are both social and instrumental. Positionality is crucial in defining the interested or disinterested nature of informal exchanges and draws attention to timing, obligation of the recipient, domination of the donor, logic of antagonism or alliance, personalisation or anonymity, as well as the interconnectedness of public and private contexts in navigating the complexity of social exchanges.

 

The same pattern can be seen in double standards at play, whereby the comfort of belonging, inclusion and sharing an identity seamlessly leads to the exclusion of others – the normative ambivalence. Kinship and local communities reward members with a safety net and support, but also restrict individual rights. Social networks in so-called open access societies are declared open yet are filled with hidden social filters. The double standards applied to ‘us’ and ‘them’, to insiders and outsiders, differ considerably depending on the context, but a com- mon pattern is the ambivalent nature of belonging; enabling but also constraining (Barsukova and Denisova-Schmidt 2022; Staiger’s intro- duction, Bliznakovski’s entry 12.3 and others in Chapter 12 in this volume).

 

Informality tends to be stigmatised as dysfunctional, yet it is a powerful resource, if one focuses on ‘what works’, rather than on what should work. A master of functional ambivalence explores the enabling power of constraints. Paradoxically, practices subversive of formal con- straints, such as geographical borders, regulations circumstances (such as food shortages), are also supportive of them and help them reproduce. Bending the rules also implies complying with and reinforcing them. The coping strategies described in the entries are often conceptualised as a ‘weapons of the weak’, channelling resistance to existing constraints, thereby subverting but also supporting them (Scott 1985). Participants commonly justify their strategies of gaining advantage or [[gaming the system]] as a forced choice, a necessity, a need, rather than as seeking an unfair advantage (see Lipovetsky’s introduction and other entries in Chapter 7, for example Peluso 7.7). Outsiders, however, are likely to interpret this as bending the rules.

 

Finally, motivational ambivalence resides in the grey zones of informal power connecting the public and the private domains. Blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private calls into question the adequacy of the public–private dichotomy for grasping symbiotic patterns and complex constellations in present-day societies, which  is not exercised exclusively top-down or bottom-up. Practices of infor- mal power such as co-optation, co-dependence and informal control, as depicted in the 3C model of informal governance, are often diffuse (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017). These may be exercised through collective action, provision of access to material resources (privileges, allowances or loans) or symbolic resources (such as access to decision makers). In most cases, informal power is exercised in non-violent and more nuanced forms of indirect pressure, resulting in compliance and even self-censorship (Gerlach et al. 2019).

The third volume goes beyond these four types of ambivalence and highlights emotional ambivalence and points to the centrality of gender, age, sexuality, ethnicity, class and status. In line with the previ- ous volumes, this collection challenges the widespread assumption that informality is driven by a purely pragmatic approach to solving problems and is associated with poverty, underdevelopment, the Global South, oppressive regimes or the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. By embracing informal practices that support people throughout their entire lives, the third volume offers nuances of gender and age, ethnicity and migration, beliefs and spirituality, care and emo- tions, and everything that makes us human. Equipped with the skills of operationalising informality, exercising cross-disciplinarity, globalising knowledge, superseding dichotomies, implementing context-sensitive comparisons and mastering ambivalence, the patient and informed hitchhiker is now ready to face the uncertainty of the journey through this book.