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Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). Under these circumstances, the post-communist Bulgarian state failed to guarantee either property rights or contract compliance. Therefore the absence of state power created, among other things, the demand for private security services. | Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). Under these circumstances, the post-communist Bulgarian state failed to guarantee either property rights or contract compliance. Therefore the absence of state power created, among other things, the demand for private security services. | ||
[[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg| | [[File:Bulgarian Businessman Georgi Iliev.jpg|225px|thumb|left|Georgi Iliev, notorious businessman and former boss of Vasil Iliev Security, was assassinated in 2005.]] | ||
A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>). After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>). | A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the Communist party had invested a substantial amount of money establishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wrestlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for this perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sportsmen were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the state (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 341<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>). After the sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided to use their physical strength, together with their connections to former communist elites to fill the gap in the supply of security services. Businesses with security services – sourced through either private security companies or so-called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became 'violent entrepreneurs' – the so-called ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. The gangs were registered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 'problem solving services' ranged from violent 'persuasion' of private persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Appelius 2006: 169<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Volkov 1999: 750<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 1999. 'Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 51 (5): 741-754</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342-44<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>), to vandalism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>). | ||
[[ | A crucial element within the social networks of the former wrestlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former communist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former employees of the interior ministry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81<ref>Outhwaite, W. and Ray, L. 2005. Social Theory and Postcommunism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342f.<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>) The use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian version of [[blat]] (Ledeneva 2011: 720<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2011. 'Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles', East European Politics and Society, 25 (4): 720-736</ref>) – involving former state employees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks to the former employees specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics and economy, as well as their durable international networks, established during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and been the main initiators of the culture of 'violent entrepreneurship' (Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 343<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>). | ||
[[File:Mafia Biographies.jpg|250px|thumb|right|Photograph of biographies of famous Mafia figures at Petrol station.]] | |||
The racketeering business, however, was not the only source of income for the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. While the Bulgarian state officially boycotted Serbia in the Bosnian war (1992-1995), the criminal gangs ensured the supply to the Serbian regime of goods such as fuel (Appelius 2006: 170f.<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Carvajal and Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). In brief, the political and economic networks of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' facilitated their impunity and thereby paved the way for the continuous undermining of the state’s monopoly on the control of security (Bilefsky 2010<ref>Bilefksy, D. 2010. ‘A Crime Writer’s Pages Come to Life in His Death’, The New York Times, 31 January, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/world/europe/01bulgaria.html?_r=0</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 54-57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | The racketeering business, however, was not the only source of income for the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki''. While the Bulgarian state officially boycotted Serbia in the Bosnian war (1992-1995), the criminal gangs ensured the supply to the Serbian regime of goods such as fuel (Appelius 2006: 170f.<ref>Appelius, S. 2006. Bulgarien. Europas Ferner Osten. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag</ref>; Carvajal and Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). In brief, the political and economic networks of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' facilitated their impunity and thereby paved the way for the continuous undermining of the state’s monopoly on the control of security (Bilefsky 2010<ref>Bilefksy, D. 2010. ‘A Crime Writer’s Pages Come to Life in His Death’, The New York Times, 31 January, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/world/europe/01bulgaria.html?_r=0</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 54-57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | ||