Difference between revisions of "Cash-for-access (United Kingdom)"

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 Despite the relatively recent emergence of the term itself, cash for access as a practice can be seen as a historically embedded phenomenon within parliamentary life. Historical accounts of individuals able to buy access to office-holders stretch back to at least the early twentieth century.  For example, Winston Churchill used his parliamentary connections to secure access to senior office-holders for Burmah Oil in 1923 (Jones 1991: 164)<ref>Jones, Geoffrey. 1991. Competitiveness and the State: Government and Business in Twentieth-Century Britain. Manchester University Press.</ref>. It is not always parliamentarians who receive the money that is exchanged in cash for access cases – they can involve any individual that has connections to an office-holder, who seeks to provide access for personal profit. For example, the 1998 ‘Lobbygate’ case involved the parliamentary aid Dereck Draper offering access to ministers to ‘those who could make their case’ (Theaker 2004: 77)<ref>Theaker, Alison. 2004. The Public Relations Handbook. Routledge.</ref>. Other high profile cases that have been exposed by the media include the 2010 cash for access scandal involving the Duchess of York; the 2012 cash for access scandal involving MP Peter Cruddas; and the 2015 scandal involving MPs Malcom Rifkind and Jack Straw – both former foreign secretaries.
-The perception of cash for access cases has changed dramatically since the early 1990s. A series of high profile scandals in both the Major and Blair governments has made the general public increasingly critical of ambivalent parliamentary practice (Farrell, McAllister and Studlar 1998: 80-94). Whilst the majority of these scandals were not cash for access cases, ambivalent practices in general have become associated with a deviant parliamentary culture rife with ‘sleaze’ (Flinders 2015: 244). Consequently, cash for access has become associated with a wider set of practices that are perceived as degrading British politics and undermining the transparency of political conduct.
+The perception of cash for access cases has changed dramatically since the early 1990s. A series of high profile scandals in both the Major and Blair governments has made the general public increasingly critical of ambivalent parliamentary practice (Farrell, McAllister and Studlar 1998: 80-94)<ref>Farrell, David M., Ian McAllister, and Donley T. Studlar. 1998. ‘Sex, Money and Politics: Sleaze and the Conservative Party in the 1997 Election’. British Elections & Parties Review 8 (1): 80–94. doi:10.1080/13689889808413006.</ref>. Whilst the majority of these scandals were not cash for access cases, ambivalent practices in general have become associated with a deviant parliamentary culture rife with ‘sleaze’ (Flinders 2015: 244)<ref>Flinders, Matthew. 2015. ‘The General Rejection? Political Disengagement, Disaffected Democrats and “Doing Politics” Differently’. Parliamentary Affairs 68 (suppl 1): 241–54. doi:10.1093/pa/gsv038.</ref>. Consequently, cash for access has become associated with a wider set of practices that are perceived as degrading British politics and undermining the transparency of political conduct.
-One institutional mechanism that may have increased the number of cash for access cases over time is the role of the party system in British politics. Since 1950, only three MPs have entered the House of Commons without any party political affiliation (Flinders and Matthews 2012: 337). Because political parties act as the vehicle into parliament, any decline in grassroots political party membership is likely to affect the ability of parties to remain competitive. Traditionally, political parties have relied on a broad membership base to mobilise and generate donations. As the links between political parties and wider society has fragmented in the post-war era, traditional support in the form of public donations or support from worker organisations has declined, resulting in a funding gap for political parties (Abbott and Williams 2014). As a consequence, private donors are increasingly filling this funding gap.  Often the large sums donated by individual donors or businesses are conditional on access to office-holders. In the words of Tony Blair’s former Director of Policy Geoff Mulgan: ‘It is fairly obvious that if you are a funder you are more likely to have a meeting with advisers, a meeting with ministers, a meeting on occasion with the Prime Minister’ (Friedman 2013: 141).
+One institutional mechanism that may have increased the number of cash for access cases over time is the role of the party system in British politics. Since 1950, only three MPs have entered the House of Commons without any party political affiliation (Flinders and Matthews 2012: 337)<ref>Flinders, Matthew, and Felicity Matthews,. 2012. ‘Party Patronage in the United Kingdom: A Pendulum of Public Appointments’. In Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies, edited by Petr Kopecký, Peter Mair, and Maria Spirova, 335–55. Oxford: OUP Oxford.</ref>. Because political parties act as the vehicle into parliament, any decline in grassroots political party membership is likely to affect the ability of parties to remain competitive. Traditionally, political parties have relied on a broad membership base to mobilise and generate donations. As the links between political parties and wider society has fragmented in the post-war era, traditional support in the form of public donations or support from worker organisations has declined, resulting in a funding gap for political parties (Abbott and Williams 2014)<ref>Abbott, Brian, and Steve Williams. 2014. ‘Widening the ‘representation Gap’? The Implications of the “lobbying Act” for Worker Representation in the UK’. Industrial Relations Journal 45 (6): 507–23. doi:10.1111/irj.12076.</ref>. As a consequence, private donors are increasingly filling this funding gap.  Often the large sums donated by individual donors or businesses are conditional on access to office-holders. In the words of Tony Blair’s former Director of Policy Geoff Mulgan: ‘It is fairly obvious that if you are a funder you are more likely to have a meeting with advisers, a meeting with ministers, a meeting on occasion with the Prime Minister’ (Friedman 2013: 141)<ref>Friedman, Bobby. 2013. Democracy Ltd: How Money and Donations Have Corrupted British Politics. Oneworld Publications.</ref>.
 As a consequence of the shift in political party funding, cash for access cases are likely to increase. Whilst the general public is increasingly sceptical of current parliamentary practice, political life in the UK remains relatively free from corruption and cash for access should not always be perceived as corrupt practice. The increased occurrence of cash for access is best understood not as the degradation of politics but rather as a reaction to institutional change (Richards, Smith, and Hay 2014: 21).  One mechanism that could be used to reduce the reliance of political parties on private donors is expansion of the Short Money state funding for political parties. This would allow the state to further regulate political party funding. However, given that the general public opposes state funding for political parties and there remains a reluctance on the part of politicians to extend what are already seen as generous state subsidies, the cash for access dilemma is likely to be perpetuated (Johnston and Pattie 2014: 23).