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Difference between revisions of "Jirga / Shura (Afghanistan)"
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A notable ''Loya Jirga'' took place in June 2002. The Bonn agreement of 2001 intended to re-install the Afghan government after the US military intervened in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks. Signed by twenty-three Afghan officials and a UN representative, the Bonn agreement nominated Hamid Karzai, later long-term president of Afghanistan (2004 to 2014), as chair of the interim administration. His role was to be, amongst other things, to set up an emergency ''Loya jirga'' to ʻdecide on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair electionsʼ (United Nations Peacemaker 2001: I.4). In the 2002 ''jirga'', 1,600 delegates representing various Afghan ethnic groups confirmed Karzai’s interim nominations for cabinet posts and his own nomination as Head of the Transitional Government. | A notable ''Loya Jirga'' took place in June 2002. The Bonn agreement of 2001 intended to re-install the Afghan government after the US military intervened in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks. Signed by twenty-three Afghan officials and a UN representative, the Bonn agreement nominated Hamid Karzai, later long-term president of Afghanistan (2004 to 2014), as chair of the interim administration. His role was to be, amongst other things, to set up an emergency ''Loya jirga'' to ʻdecide on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair electionsʼ (United Nations Peacemaker 2001: I.4). In the 2002 ''jirga'', 1,600 delegates representing various Afghan ethnic groups confirmed Karzai’s interim nominations for cabinet posts and his own nomination as Head of the Transitional Government. | ||
The oldest record of a ''jirga'' dates to 977, when one of the first Afghan heads of state in the Ghazni province was chosen. The tradition of the ''jirga'' practice is an important foundation of its surviving popularity. When asked about the justice delivered through ''jirga'' and ''shura'', Afghans consistently give higher ratings to ''jirga''s and ''shuras'' than the state courts and consider them fair and trustworthy, effective, timely and prompt (Asia Foundation 2007: 159–60, 2009: 91, 2010: 134, 2011: 152, 2013: 86). The Afghanistan Human Development Report (2007:91) estimates that ''jirga''s and ''shuras'' settle more than 80% of judicial cases in Afghanistan. In a context where the rule of law is impeded by the lack of institutional checks and balances, ''jirga'' and ''shura'' are ʻmeeting an urgent needʼ as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism (''ibid''.). | The oldest record of a ''jirga'' dates to 977, when one of the first Afghan heads of state in the Ghazni province was chosen. The tradition of the ''jirga'' practice is an important foundation of its surviving popularity. When asked about the justice delivered through ''jirga'' and ''shura'', Afghans consistently give higher ratings to ''jirga''s and ''shuras'' than the state courts and consider them fair and trustworthy, effective, timely and prompt (Asia Foundation 2007: 159–60, Rennie et al. 2009: 91, Ayoubi et al. 2010: 134, Rennie et al. 2011: 152, Shawe 2013: 86). The Afghanistan Human Development Report (2007:91) estimates that ''jirga''s and ''shuras'' settle more than 80% of judicial cases in Afghanistan. In a context where the rule of law is impeded by the lack of institutional checks and balances, ''jirga'' and ''shura'' are ʻmeeting an urgent needʼ as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism (''ibid''.). | ||
''Jirgas'' have been critiqued for their violation of human rights. Women lack inclusion and representation in ''jirgas'' and settlement practices. Disputes are often settled with ''baad'': a woman of the offender’s family is given to the victim’s family for marriage. Another criticism of ''jirgas'' and ''shuras'' is that their members can be influenced or bribed. Research into the 2002 ''Loya jirga'' which resulted in Hamid Karzai being nominated head of state suggested that there were irregularities in the methods of selection of the delegates, procedural difficulties and concealed dealings that might have influenced the outcome of the ''Loya jirga'' (Saikal 2002: 48). He adds that Zalmay Khalilzad, who was envoy to Afghanistan under the US President George W. Bush, allegedly cajoled the former Afghan King Mohammed Zahir Shaw to entice him to withdraw his candidacy, securing an easier win for Karzai. Despite the potential foreign influence, Saikal considers this ''Loya jirga'' to have been a first step towards a democratic process nonetheless, as it was the first time a ''Loya jirga'' provided indirect popular legitimacy to a leader. | ''Jirgas'' have been critiqued for their violation of human rights. Women lack inclusion and representation in ''jirgas'' and settlement practices. Disputes are often settled with ''baad'': a woman of the offender’s family is given to the victim’s family for marriage. Another criticism of ''jirgas'' and ''shuras'' is that their members can be influenced or bribed. Research into the 2002 ''Loya jirga'' which resulted in Hamid Karzai being nominated head of state suggested that there were irregularities in the methods of selection of the delegates, procedural difficulties and concealed dealings that might have influenced the outcome of the ''Loya jirga'' (Saikal 2002: 48). He adds that Zalmay Khalilzad, who was envoy to Afghanistan under the US President George W. Bush, allegedly cajoled the former Afghan King Mohammed Zahir Shaw to entice him to withdraw his candidacy, securing an easier win for Karzai. Despite the potential foreign influence, Saikal considers this ''Loya jirga'' to have been a first step towards a democratic process nonetheless, as it was the first time a ''Loya jirga'' provided indirect popular legitimacy to a leader. | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
Asia Foundation. 2007. Afghanistan in | Asia Foundation. 2007. ''Afghanistan in 2007: A Survey of the Afghan People''. Kabul: The Asia Foundation | ||
Ayoubi N., Haqbeen F. R. and Tariq M. O. 2010. ''Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People''. Kabul: The Asia Foundation | |||
Ayoubi N., Haqbeen F. R. and Tariq M. O. 2011. ''Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People''. Kabul: The Asia Foundation | |||
Braithwaite, J. and Wardak, A. 2013. Crime and War in Afghanistan Part II: A Jeffersonian Alternative?, ''British Journal Of Criminology'', 53(2): 197-214 | |||
Gang, R. 2011. ''Community-Based Dispute Resolution Services in Kabul City''. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/1107E-CBDR-Processes-in-Kabul-City-CS-2011-web.pdf | |||
Rashid, A. 2002. ‘Signs of Internal Chaos Dog Afghanistan's Government --- Fighting Among Warlords Escalates as Preparations Begin for Loya ''jirga'',’ ''Wall Street Journal'', 22 Feb: A.12 | |||
Rennie, R., Sen P. and Sharma, S. 2009. ''Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People''. Kabul: The Asia Foundation | |||
Saikal, A. 2002. ‘Afghanistan after the Loya ''jirga'',’ ''Survival'', 44(3):47-56 | |||
Shawe, K. 2013. ''Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People''. Kabul: The Asia Foundation | |||
United Nations Peacemaker. 2001. ''Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions'', https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_011205_AgreementProvisionalArrangementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf | United Nations Peacemaker. 2001. ''Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions'', https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AF_011205_AgreementProvisionalArrangementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf | ||