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|style="font-size:1.1em;"| In general, brokerage involves the flow of valued | |style="font-size:1.1em;"| In general, brokerage involves the flow of valued resources from one actor to another via an intermediary (Gould and Fernandez 1989<ref>Gould, R. and Fernandez, R.M. 1989. ‘Structures of Mediation: A Formal Approach to Brokerage in Transaction Networks’, Sociological Methodology 19: 89-126.</ref>; Stovel and Shaw 2012<ref>Stovel, K. and Shaw, L. 2012. ‘Brokerage’, Annual Review of Sociology 38: 139-58.</ref>). Any brokered relation requires at least three actors: a ‘giver’ and a ‘receiver’ who are the parties of the transaction, and the broker serves as the connection between them. | ||
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Brokerage is central to informal transactions in particular (Jancsics 2015<ref>Jancsics, David. 2015. ‘“A Friend Gave me a Phone Number”: Brokerage in Low-level Corruption’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 43: 68-87.</ref>). In many countries informal arrangements provide a low-cost and low-risk infrastructure for a whole range of activities, from everyday informal practices such as helping friends to build their house in a village to bribing public administrators. Under communism in Central and Eastern Europe, informal social networks served as a survival tool and means of ‘getting things done’ under the strict, over-centralised socialist bureaucratic system (Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 2004<ref>Lomnitz, L. and Sheinbaum, D. 2004. ‘Trust, Social Networks and the Informal Economy: A Comparative Analysis’, Review of Sociology 10: 2-26.</ref>; Ledeneva 1998<ref>Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours: [[Blat]], Networking and Informal Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>; Hankiss 2002: 248<ref>Hankiss, E. 2002. ‘Games of Corruption: East Central Europe, 1945-1999’, in D. Kotkin and A. </ref>; Heinzen 2007<ref>Heinzen, James. 2007. ‘The Art of the Bribe: Corruption and Everyday Practice in the Late Stalinist USSR’, Slavic Review 66: 389-412.</ref>). Following the collapse of old communist regimes in the 1990s, the capitalist market economies that emerged in the region brought new uncertainties, emerging inequality and high levels of unemployment. Accordingly, the use of informal networks has survived, adapted and even proliferated under post-communism (Sík and Wellman 1999<ref>Sík, E., Wellman, B., 1999. ‘Network Capital in Capitalist, Communist and Post-communist Countries’, in B. Wellman (ed.), Networks in the Global Village: Life in Contemporary Communities. Oxford: Westview Press.</ref>). Although mutual favours, once widespread in the socialist economy, have been partially replaced by monetary-based informal exchanges (Ledeneva 1998<ref>Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>), brokers still play an important role in these multi-player transactions in many countries (Szántó et al. 2013<ref>Szántó, Z., Tóth, I.J. and Varga, Sz. 2013. ‘The Social and Institutional Structure of Corruption: Some Typical Network Configurations of Corruption Transactions in Hungary’, in B. Vedres and M. Scotti (eds.), Networks in Social Policy Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>). | Brokerage is central to informal transactions in particular (Jancsics 2015<ref>Jancsics, David. 2015. ‘“A Friend Gave me a Phone Number”: Brokerage in Low-level Corruption’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 43: 68-87.</ref>). In many countries informal arrangements provide a low-cost and low-risk infrastructure for a whole range of activities, from everyday informal practices such as helping friends to build their house in a village to bribing public administrators. Under communism in Central and Eastern Europe, informal social networks served as a survival tool and means of ‘getting things done’ under the strict, over-centralised socialist bureaucratic system (Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 2004<ref>Lomnitz, L. and Sheinbaum, D. 2004. ‘Trust, Social Networks and the Informal Economy: A Comparative Analysis’, Review of Sociology 10: 2-26.</ref>; Ledeneva 1998<ref>Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours: [[Blat]], Networking and Informal Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>; Hankiss 2002: 248<ref>Hankiss, E. 2002. ‘Games of Corruption: East Central Europe, 1945-1999’, in D. Kotkin and A. </ref>; Heinzen 2007<ref>Heinzen, James. 2007. ‘The Art of the Bribe: Corruption and Everyday Practice in the Late Stalinist USSR’, Slavic Review 66: 389-412.</ref>). Following the collapse of old communist regimes in the 1990s, the capitalist market economies that emerged in the region brought new uncertainties, emerging inequality and high levels of unemployment. Accordingly, the use of informal networks has survived, adapted and even proliferated under post-communism (Sík and Wellman 1999<ref>Sík, E., Wellman, B., 1999. ‘Network Capital in Capitalist, Communist and Post-communist Countries’, in B. Wellman (ed.), Networks in the Global Village: Life in Contemporary Communities. Oxford: Westview Press.</ref>). Although mutual favours, once widespread in the socialist economy, have been partially replaced by monetary-based informal exchanges (Ledeneva 1998<ref>Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>), brokers still play an important role in these multi-player transactions in many countries (Szántó et al. 2013<ref>Szántó, Z., Tóth, I.J. and Varga, Sz. 2013. ‘The Social and Institutional Structure of Corruption: Some Typical Network Configurations of Corruption Transactions in Hungary’, in B. Vedres and M. Scotti (eds.), Networks in Social Policy Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>). | ||