Ukloneniye ot Prizyva (Russia)

Ukloneniye ot Prizyva
Location: Russia
Definition: Informal and semi-legal strategies for avoiding compulsory military service. It often includes the use of personal networks, bureaucratic loopholes, bribery, and falsified documents.
Keywords: Russia – FSU – Informal governance – Favour – Personal connections – Network
Clusters: Camouflage – Gaming the system – Informal governance – Survival – System made me do it – Semi-closed lock-in – Control – Economies of favours
Author: Bora C. Savasci
Affiliation: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London

By Bora C. Savasci, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London

The Russian term ukloneniye ot prizyva (Уклонение от призыва, ‘draft evasion’) denotes the often informal and semi-legal strategies for avoiding compulsory military service. It refers to the diverse set of practices used to avoid or defer military conscription in Russia and in cases, Ukraine. The phenomenon includes manipulation of medical documents and exceptions, bribery, exploitation of bureaucratic loopholes, strategic relocation, falsified documents, and reliance on personal networks. While it appears in formal legal language, in practice it captures a broader field of informal and socially embedded strategies through which citizens navigate compulsory military service.

Russian digital military summon. Source: Bora C. Savasci. © Bora C. Savasci.

Ukloneniye ot prizyva has its roots in the Soviet system. Hazing practices known as dedovshchina (a system of violent abuse and hierarchy among conscripts), combined with corruption and arbitrary treatment created strong incentives for avoidance of military service and fostered an informal economy around deferments and medical exemptions (Coffey, 2022; Herspring, 2005). When the USSR collapsed, most of the newly independent states inherited not only the legal requirement of conscription but also the informal strategies by which citizens navigated or resisted it. The weakened administrative cohesion of the newly formed states in the 1990s expanded the scope of informal methods of evading military conscription (Lehrke, 2013; Hyppölä, 2025).

In contemporary Russia, this practice is embedded within regional and socio-economic inequalities. In cities such as Moscow and St Petersburg, men are more likely to have access to private medical professionals, influential networks, and greater financial means to secure deferments. Historically, these regions have shown lower mobilisation rates relative to their populations, reflecting entrenched patterns on informal military service evasion. By contrast, peripheral regions, such as Tuva, Buryatia, and other parts of the Far East, exhibit fewer opportunities for evasion of military service and have been disproportionately affected during periods of intensified mobilisation (Savina & Bonch-Osmolovskaya, 2022). The asymmetry reflects broader patterns of inequality in the post-Soviet space, where access to informal mechanisms is itself a privilege.

In the wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian state initiated a series of significant reforms aimed at closing informal loopholes. A unified digital conscription registry was established, along with electronic summons and new penalties for men who received call-up notices. Punishments include restrictions on travel, property transactions, and access to loans (Stanovaya, 2023). Despite these measures, methods of draft dodging have also adapted. Some individuals relocate internally before their digital records are updated, whereas others obtain assistance in manipulating medical records through informal mechanisms. Individuals also work with people who specialise in navigating the increasingly complex regulatory environment. Digitalisation has not eradicated informality but has merely changed the terrain on which it operates, producing new forms of evasion alongside older ones.

Ukraine represents a similar yet distinct scenario. Prior to the full-scale invasion, draft evasion in Ukraine reflected dissatisfaction with corruption in recruitment offices and fear of deployment to the Donbas conflict that started in 2014. After February 2022, mobilisation intensified dramatically. The Ukrainian state reduced the conscription age, toughened penalties for draft dodging, introduced new digital monitoring procedures, and implemented a travel restriction on “battle-aged” civilian men (Norosky & Carpenter, 2024). However, draft dodging has persisted, driven by fear of frontline combat, trauma, institutional mistrust and corruption, and socioeconomic pressures. Thousands of cases have been opened under Article 336 of the Criminal Code, which makes it a criminal offense to evade conscription for military service during mobilisation punishable by 3-5 years. Despite this, enforcement varies from region to region (Shevko, 2025). Investigations detail the networks offering forged medical certificates, illegal border crossings, and internal relocation strategies, often facilitated by criminal intermediaries.

Motivations for this practice include fears of violence and the legacy of dedovshchina, as well as the risk of death, injury and poor conditions at the front. Institutional distrust also plays a major role, as conscription systems are perceived as corrupt and mismanaged. Socio-economic inequality shapes the practice, as those with means can access informal networks and mechanisms such as fake medical evaluations or illegal border crossings, whereas poorer individuals rely on riskier strategies or face conscription with fewer alternatives. Such disparity is further exacerbated by wartime conditions, which create a moral economy in which citizens weigh survival, obligation, and ethics.

Ukloneniye ot prizyva challenges state legitimacy in both countries. In Russia, widespread evasion of conscription undermines the state’s appeals to patriotic unity and reveals deep ambivalence towards military service. The Kremlin’s responses to it indicates an attempt to reassert authority over a system long mediated by informal mechanisms. In Ukraine, public opinion is more divided. Although conscription is widely represented as fundamental to the country’s defence, abusive behaviour by recruitment officers together with selective enforcement of summonses (Mirovalev, 2025) have generated rifts and conflicts. Both cases indicate how informality endures even within intensified security environments and how citizens negotiate coercive demands in conditions of war.

Practiced throughout Russia and Ukraine, ukloneniye ot prizyva varies across regions, reflecting social, economic, and institutional differences. In Russia it is most pronounced in large metropolitan cities where the density of informal networks is much greater than those in outlying regions. In Ukraine, however, evasion of military service spans across both urban and rural areas; it is shaped strongly by conflict dynamics, internal migration, and the role of criminal networks in facilitating mobility between borders. This reflects the scale and reach of wartime mobilisation in Ukraine, which have reduced the protective effect that coming from a metropolitan area carries compared to Russia, and diminished regional and class-based protections, pushing evasion of conscription into more mobile and network driven forms. The practice has conceptual analogues in other states with conscription, but the post-Soviet legacy of dedovshchina, corruption, and administrative fragmentation gives it a distinctive character.

The persistence of this practice illustrates the limits of formal state power, as well as the embeddedness of informal governance in post-Soviet societies. It reinforces socio-economic inequality, as those with more resources are better positioned to evade their obligations. It complicates wartime mobilisation, affects the effectiveness of the military, and transforms public perceptions of the state. The moral questions it raised whether draft dodging and evasion of military service constitutes cowardice, self-preservation, or justified resistance against unjust institutions have shaped political discourse in both countries. Ultimately, ukloneniye ot prizyva shows how informal practices act not merely as a deviation from formal rules but as a structural component of how governance, obligation, and survival are negotiated.