Mullahs (Afghanistan)

Mullahs 🇦🇫
Location: Afghanistan
Definition: Religious leaders without formal religious training, responsible for applying principles of Sunni Islam to everyday practice
Keywords: Afghanistan – Central Asia – South Asia – Pashtun – Intermediation – Informal governance – Public service – Religion
Author: Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili
Affiliation: Associate Professor, Director of the Center for Governance and Markets at the University of Pittsburgh
Website: https://gspia.pitt.edu/faculty-and-staff/jennifer-brick-murtazashvili

By Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Associate Professor, Director of the Center for Governance and Markets at the University of Pittsburgh

In Afghanistan, mullahs are village level-religious leaders. Sunni Islam, which is the focus of discussion of this entry, does not have a hierarchal leadership. In terms of status, however, mullahs have the lowest among religious leaders because they typically have the lowest level of education. This means they are distinct from other categories of religious leaders with more formal education and training such as imams, judges (qazi), and scholars (mawlawi). According to anthropologist Louis Dupree, in Afghanistan mullahs are “at the bottom of the hierarchy [who] function as part time religious leader. Technically, Islam has no organized clergy, and every man can be a mullah. Anyone can lead in prayer” (Dupree 1973, 107–8). Imams are the most formal religious leader and represent doctrinal interests rather than community interests. In some communities, there are also mawlawis, that possess more formal religious training. In the context of Sunni communities in Afghanistan, those who had official training lead prayers. A mullah is someone who does not have formal religious training, but who practices religious functions “regularly and professionally” (Dorronsoro 2005, 48). Unlike their more educated counterparts, the ulama, who are typically involved in developing and interpreting Islamic Law, mullahs are the individuals who are responsible for implementation of religious law and practice. Despite their lack of formal training, they are able to apply fundamental religious principles to everyday practice (Shahrani 2002).

Mullahs are ubiquitous throughout Afghanistan. In rural areas, residents will often describe the size of their village in terms of the number of mosques and mullahs that they have (e.g., “We have a large village: we have six mosques.”) Many communities have Shia and Sunni mosques that exist side-by-side in one community. These mosques have distinct spiritual leaders. In Afghanistan, mosques are the center of the community and religious life. Mosques often function as important community centers were residents meet to try to settle disputes or discuss issues of common concern.

In addition to their religious and spiritual functions, in Afghanistan mullahs play an important role in governance—especially in rural areas. They are usually not appointed by outsiders, rather they enjoy this role within the community because of their own personal reputation for piety and wisdom (Roy 1990, 32). Through honest works they can craft their own legitimacy.

Mullahs have a range of responsibilities that go beyond simply performing religious rites and leading services. They play a pivotal role in solving disputes, especially those that involve family or personal issues. They are particularly active in issues involving inheritance matters, divorce, and resolving controversies within and among families.

Mullahs have also played a key role in local politics, resolving disputes that arise within communities and between communities. The political significance of mullahs in community life has also made them the target of government policy over the centuries. Religious leaders were heavily persecuted under the rule of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which ran the government in Kabul from the Saur Revolution in 1978 until its collapse in 1992. Just as mullahs were persecuted by the communists, they were celebrated by the Taliban, which sought to elevate their role as the epicenter of village governance, replacing maliks, who previously held this position.

During the Taliban rule in Kabul (1992-1996), the government tasked mullahs with a wide range of goals, from implementing Taliban legal codes to collecting local taxes. This presented a challenge because Mullahs often had very low levels of formal training or they relied on almost syncretic forms of religious interpretation, which wove customary law with formal religious law. For example, customary law among Pashtuns, Pashunwali, often contradicts some aspects of Islamic jurisprudence. Mullahs gained very little from their rule at the community level because they were not prepared to take on such roles. Similarly, individuals in communities had little expectation that mullahs could handle these additional responsibilities.

After 2001, mullahs played an important, although less prominent role in society. They have worked alongside other informal community organizations, such as maliks (informal village representatives) and community councils (jirgas / shuras) providing advice to both. Mullahs are not usually the most powerful actors in communities. Community governance consists of three organizations that co-exist and divide power at the community level: maliks, mullahs, and jirgas / shuras. These organizations not only co-exist, but the authority of the three bodies ensures not only a separation of power at the community level, but also checks and balances on such authority, preventing one actor from becoming too powerful over the others (Murtazashvili 2016). This separation of power promotes the ability of mullahs to resolve disputes more successfully in communities, because these officials know they will be held accountable for their actions.

Another constraint on the authority of mullahs are social norms that make it acceptable to “venue shop,” or to choose to approach a mullah who they believe might be most inclined to rule in their favor. This means that mullahs are often brought into conflict with one another by citizens whose interests they are supposed to represent. Mullahs play an important role in communities, but residents often make light of mullahs and make light of their lack of education and often their lack of formal education (Barfield 2004). Citizens often make jokes on the fact that mullahs can be bought off with good meals, which is often seen as the key to getting an amenable result from their ruling (Murtazashvili 2016, 77).

References

Barfield, Thomas J. 2004. 'An Islamic State Is a State Run by Good Muslims: Religion as a Way of Life and Not an Ideology in Afghanistan', in Robert W. Hefner (ed.) Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, 213–39. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Dorronsoro, Gilles. 2005. Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press

Dupree, Louis. 1973. Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick. 2016. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roy, Olivier. 1990. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Shahrani, M. Nazif. 2002. 'Local Knowledge of Islam and Social Discourse in Afghanistan and Turkistan in the Modern Period'. in Robert L. Canfield (ed.) Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective, 161–88. New York: Cambridge University Press