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Difference between revisions of "Pork barreling (USA)"
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{{infobox | {{infobox | ||
| nameofpractice = pork barreling | |||
| location = United States of America | |||
| imagemap = USA map.png | |||
| imageflag = USA flag.png | |||
| authorofpiece = Andrew H. Sidman | |||
| authorinstitution =John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York}} | |||
'''''Original text by Andrew H. Sidman''''' | '''''Original text by Andrew H. Sidman''''' | ||
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In the United States, ‘pork barreling’ refers to a process whereby members of the legislative branch secure spending on projects and programmes, often called ‘distributive spending,’ for their constituents. Pork barreling is practised at all levels of government. At the federal level, the pork barrel is comprised of thousands of projects and programs, payments through which can be targeted to particular geographic areas, such as congressional districts. The term is likely derived from the large barrels of salted pork from which rations were distributed to slaves on plantations (Rawson 2007<ref>Rawson, H. 2007. ‘Why Do We Say… Pork Barrel,’ ''American Heritage'', April/May http://www.americanheritage.com/content/why-do-we-say-19</ref>) and its original use is meant to inspire the image of legislators rushing to secure as much spending as possible for their districts (Maxey 1919<ref>Maxey, C. 1919. ‘A Little History of Pork,’ ''National Municipal Review'', 8: 691-705</ref>). | |||
The concept of the pork barrel was born in the US Congress on 20 May 1826 with the passage of the first omnibus appropriations bill for the improvement of rivers and harbours (Maxey 1919<ref>Maxey, C. 1919. ‘A Little History of Pork,’ ''National Municipal Review'', 8: 691-705</ref>). That first omnibus bill included all of the river and harbour appropriations desired by members. With nearly every member receiving an appropriation, majority support was guaranteed for passage of the bill. The practice lends itself to universalism in that it enables most, if not all, legislators to secure benefits for their districts. Universalism is thought to be easier to achieve in pork barreling because of the legislature’s desire for sizable majority coalitions in these matters and the diffusion of the costs of individual programmes (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981<ref>Weingast, B., Shepsle, K., and Johnsen, C. 1981. ‘The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,’ ''Journal of Political Economy'', 89: 642-64</ref>). Despite the majoritarian nature of the US House of Representatives, universalism may also result from the majority party’s at least partially supporting the distributive desires of the minority party in order to avoid criticism from the minority (Balla ''et al''. 2002<ref>Balla, S., Lawrence, E., Maltzman, F. and Sigelman, L. 2002. ‘Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork,’ ''American Journal of Political Science'', 46: 515-25</ref>). | The concept of the pork barrel was born in the US Congress on 20 May 1826 with the passage of the first omnibus appropriations bill for the improvement of rivers and harbours (Maxey 1919<ref>Maxey, C. 1919. ‘A Little History of Pork,’ ''National Municipal Review'', 8: 691-705</ref>). That first omnibus bill included all of the river and harbour appropriations desired by members. With nearly every member receiving an appropriation, majority support was guaranteed for passage of the bill. The practice lends itself to universalism in that it enables most, if not all, legislators to secure benefits for their districts. Universalism is thought to be easier to achieve in pork barreling because of the legislature’s desire for sizable majority coalitions in these matters and the diffusion of the costs of individual programmes (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981<ref>Weingast, B., Shepsle, K., and Johnsen, C. 1981. ‘The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,’ ''Journal of Political Economy'', 89: 642-64</ref>). Despite the majoritarian nature of the US House of Representatives, universalism may also result from the majority party’s at least partially supporting the distributive desires of the minority party in order to avoid criticism from the minority (Balla ''et al''. 2002<ref>Balla, S., Lawrence, E., Maltzman, F. and Sigelman, L. 2002. ‘Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork,’ ''American Journal of Political Science'', 46: 515-25</ref>). | ||
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