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Difference between revisions of "Boda-boda (Uganda)"
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Despite initial government efforts to stimulate the sector, the Kampala City Council soon began to fear that the sector was running out of control, dominating the roads without any regulatory oversight, generating huge numbers of traffic accidents. Around 60 per cent of the people admitted to the city’s main hospital with fractures are there due to boda-boda related accidents. In 2014 alone, 3,124 people died on the spot as a result of boda-boda accidents, while 12,754 were seriously injured (Kidimu 2015)<ref>Kidimu, G. 2015. Deadly rides in Kampala, The New Vision, 31 October. Available at: http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/675112-deadly-rides-in-kampala.html. Accessed 24 November 2015.</ref>. It is therefore little surprise that boda-boda drivers are often considered to be an out-of-control group of ‘hooligans’. Very few are registered as operators with the Transport Licensing Board, and many do not even possess driving licenses. They also pay nothing by way of tax. These problems led to repeated efforts in the 2000s to introduce regulations in the form of mandatory driving licences, Passenger Service Vehicle permits, helmets (for driver and passenger) and third party insurance, as well as controls on numbers. There were also repeated attempts to impose a basic local tax on drivers. | Despite initial government efforts to stimulate the sector, the Kampala City Council soon began to fear that the sector was running out of control, dominating the roads without any regulatory oversight, generating huge numbers of traffic accidents. Around 60 per cent of the people admitted to the city’s main hospital with fractures are there due to boda-boda related accidents. In 2014 alone, 3,124 people died on the spot as a result of boda-boda accidents, while 12,754 were seriously injured (Kidimu 2015)<ref>Kidimu, G. 2015. Deadly rides in Kampala, The New Vision, 31 October. Available at: http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/675112-deadly-rides-in-kampala.html. Accessed 24 November 2015.</ref>. It is therefore little surprise that boda-boda drivers are often considered to be an out-of-control group of ‘hooligans’. Very few are registered as operators with the Transport Licensing Board, and many do not even possess driving licenses. They also pay nothing by way of tax. These problems led to repeated efforts in the 2000s to introduce regulations in the form of mandatory driving licences, Passenger Service Vehicle permits, helmets (for driver and passenger) and third party insurance, as well as controls on numbers. There were also repeated attempts to impose a basic local tax on drivers. | ||
These efforts overwhelmingly failed, often due to interventions by central government politicians who would make announcements saying that these new regulatory systems were not compulsory or that the tax was inappropriate (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012; Goodfellow 2015). These deliberately undermined the city government’s efforts and made it extremely difficult for them to enforce their regulations. It is this highly politicised nature of the sector, and the way in which it became a focus of conflict between the central government under the National Resistance Movement and the opposition-controlled Kampala City Council, that gives boda-bodas their particular socio-political significance. The drivers in the sector were effectively cultivated as a client group by the central government, both through micro-credit schemes and through ‘protecting’ them from the city government’s efforts to regulate. This played a key role in the ruling party’s strategy for building political support in an opposition-controlled city. | These efforts overwhelmingly failed, often due to interventions by central government politicians who would make announcements saying that these new regulatory systems were not compulsory or that the tax was inappropriate (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012<ref>Goodfellow, T. and K. Titeca. 2012. Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s Informal Economy, Cities, 29: 264-270.</ref>; Goodfellow 2015<ref>Goodfellow, T. 2015. Taming the ‘Rogue’ Sector: Studying State Effectiveness in Africa through Informal Transport Politics, Comparative Politics 47(2): 127-147. | ||
Howe, J., & Davis, A. 2002. Boda Boda – Uganda’s rural and urban low-capacity transport services, in Godard, X. and Fatonzoun, I. (eds.), Urban Mobility for All, Lisse: AA Balkema Publishers: 235-240.</ref>). These deliberately undermined the city government’s efforts and made it extremely difficult for them to enforce their regulations. It is this highly politicised nature of the sector, and the way in which it became a focus of conflict between the central government under the National Resistance Movement and the opposition-controlled Kampala City Council, that gives boda-bodas their particular socio-political significance. The drivers in the sector were effectively cultivated as a client group by the central government, both through micro-credit schemes and through ‘protecting’ them from the city government’s efforts to regulate. This played a key role in the ruling party’s strategy for building political support in an opposition-controlled city. | |||
These political dynamics further fuelled the growth of the sector, because the continued absence of controls or taxes made it ever more appealing as a livelihood option, particularly given the lack of alternative employment opportunities. In 2011, the central government abolished the City Council and replaced it with a new Kampala Capital City Authority that pledged to ‘clean up’ the city. Yet even though the central government was now officially committed to greater regulation, the vested interests in the sector were so powerful that it was difficult to bring about any effective change. The police regularly round up drivers who lack the relevant paperwork and confiscate their motorcycles, but this rarely achieves much beyond creating opportunities for bribes and recirculating some of the resources in the sector among the police. | These political dynamics further fuelled the growth of the sector, because the continued absence of controls or taxes made it ever more appealing as a livelihood option, particularly given the lack of alternative employment opportunities. In 2011, the central government abolished the City Council and replaced it with a new Kampala Capital City Authority that pledged to ‘clean up’ the city. Yet even though the central government was now officially committed to greater regulation, the vested interests in the sector were so powerful that it was difficult to bring about any effective change. The police regularly round up drivers who lack the relevant paperwork and confiscate their motorcycles, but this rarely achieves much beyond creating opportunities for bribes and recirculating some of the resources in the sector among the police. | ||
The uncontrolled growth of this sector and the failure to formalise, regulate or tax it over successive decades contrasts strongly with neighbouring Rwanda, where the same phenomenon (known as taxi-moto) was brought under tight regulatory control from 2007, with strict limits on numbers and the introduction of numerous taxes (Rollason 2013; Goodfellow 2015). In Uganda, boda-boda drivers are now such a substantial component of the urban population that they have come to represent a broader socioeconomic category, sometimes referred to as the ‘boda-boda class’, which implies an uneducated, roguish urban underclass with particular political leanings. In reality, this is not always an accurate characterisation, as many boda-boda drivers are actually highly educated – some even have university degrees – and engage in this practice simply because it is the best option available to them. | The uncontrolled growth of this sector and the failure to formalise, regulate or tax it over successive decades contrasts strongly with neighbouring Rwanda, where the same phenomenon (known as taxi-moto) was brought under tight regulatory control from 2007, with strict limits on numbers and the introduction of numerous taxes (Rollason 2013<ref>Rollason, W. 2013. Performance, poverty and urban development: Kigali’s motari and the spectacle city, in Afrika Focus 26.2: 9-29.</ref>; Goodfellow 2015<ref>Goodfellow, T. 2015. Taming the ‘Rogue’ Sector: Studying State Effectiveness in Africa through Informal Transport Politics, Comparative Politics 47(2): 127-147. | ||
Howe, J., & Davis, A. 2002. Boda Boda – Uganda’s rural and urban low-capacity transport services, in Godard, X. and Fatonzoun, I. (eds.), Urban Mobility for All, Lisse: AA Balkema Publishers: 235-240.</ref>). In Uganda, boda-boda drivers are now such a substantial component of the urban population that they have come to represent a broader socioeconomic category, sometimes referred to as the ‘boda-boda class’, which implies an uneducated, roguish urban underclass with particular political leanings. In reality, this is not always an accurate characterisation, as many boda-boda drivers are actually highly educated – some even have university degrees – and engage in this practice simply because it is the best option available to them. | |||
Even though the state has achieved little by way of control of the sector, various entrepreneurs have entered to try and capitalise on and improve the operation of boda-boda activities in recent years. One initiative is Safe Boda, a business start-up along the lines of the global taxi phenomenon Über, which was set up by a former Deloitte employee and – interestingly – a former advisor to the government of Rwanda, in conjunction with local drivers. Through a mobile phone application, users of this service can guarantee to be linked to trained, registered boda-boda drivers. Though a promising initiative, drivers registered to this service numbered only 50 in 2015 – a small drop in the ocean of boda-boda operators. Another initiative is Tugende, a company started up by an American entrepreneur that aims to provide hire-purchase motorcyles to large numbers of boda-boda drivers on more favourable terms than were otherwise available to them. | Even though the state has achieved little by way of control of the sector, various entrepreneurs have entered to try and capitalise on and improve the operation of boda-boda activities in recent years. One initiative is Safe Boda, a business start-up along the lines of the global taxi phenomenon Über, which was set up by a former Deloitte employee and – interestingly – a former advisor to the government of Rwanda, in conjunction with local drivers. Through a mobile phone application, users of this service can guarantee to be linked to trained, registered boda-boda drivers. Though a promising initiative, drivers registered to this service numbered only 50 in 2015 – a small drop in the ocean of boda-boda operators. Another initiative is Tugende, a company started up by an American entrepreneur that aims to provide hire-purchase motorcyles to large numbers of boda-boda drivers on more favourable terms than were otherwise available to them. | ||