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In principle, service users who do not give ''l'argent du carburant'' do not suffer any adverse effects other than a reputation for stinginess. In fieldwork conducted by the author in Cameroon, no respondent stated that a person who had not handed money over had been discriminated against on subsequent occasions. The forwarding agents interviewed were too verbose to fail to mention any penalties they would have incurred had they not offered such payments. ''L'argent du carburant'' is thus more of a custom than a source of corruption. | In principle, service users who do not give ''l'argent du carburant'' do not suffer any adverse effects other than a reputation for stinginess. In fieldwork conducted by the author in Cameroon, no respondent stated that a person who had not handed money over had been discriminated against on subsequent occasions. The forwarding agents interviewed were too verbose to fail to mention any penalties they would have incurred had they not offered such payments. ''L'argent du carburant'' is thus more of a custom than a source of corruption. | ||
''L'argent du carburant'' is part of a wide range of practices of donations with nothing in return that occur in day-to-day social relationships. When visiting headquarters for a meeting, one customs officer who had obtained a very gainful position (i.e. one which provides plenty of opportunity to earn extra money, both legally through bonuses as a share of fines on detected frauds and sometimes through bribes) gave his mission ''per diems'' to a colleague and friend, telling him it was for his ‘fuel’. Another, who no longer works at the port, was given an envelope by a forwarding agent with whom he had ceased to have any relations, for old time’s sake. Fuel money also facilitates relations between subordinates and their bosses, who, deprived of contact with users because of their position, cannot increase their income like their subordinates do. This is referred to as ‘giving account’. Although ''l'argent du carburant'' is not a form of bribery (in that it is not given for an immediate result in return), nor should it be considered a ‘gift’, given out of gratitude with no expectation of anything in return. Rather, ''l'argent du carburant'' facilitates connections that may be exploited subsequently. Although in practice such connections may never be used, they can be employed if necessary. In the case of relations between a boss and his subordinates, it is similarly not certain that a subordinate will need his boss to cover him in an event of a problem, or that the boss has means to control his subordinates’ real activity. However, the main role of ''l'argent du carburant'' may be to ensure what Gluckman called ‘peace in the feud’, i.e. the constraint of conflict by custom. | ''L'argent du carburant'' is part of a wide range of practices of donations with nothing in return that occur in day-to-day social relationships. When visiting headquarters for a meeting, one customs officer who had obtained a very gainful position (i.e. one which provides plenty of opportunity to earn extra money, both legally through bonuses as a share of fines on detected frauds and sometimes through bribes) gave his mission ''per diems'' to a colleague and friend, telling him it was for his ‘fuel’. Another, who no longer works at the port, was given an envelope by a forwarding agent with whom he had ceased to have any relations, for old time’s sake. Fuel money also facilitates relations between subordinates and their bosses, who, deprived of contact with users because of their position, cannot increase their income like their subordinates do. This is referred to as ‘giving account’. Although ''l'argent du carburant'' is not a form of bribery (in that it is not given for an immediate result in return), nor should it be considered a ‘gift’, given out of gratitude with no expectation of anything in return. Rather, ''l'argent du carburant'' facilitates connections that may be exploited subsequently. Although in practice such connections may never be used, they can be employed if necessary. In the case of relations between a boss and his subordinates, it is similarly not certain that a subordinate will need his boss to cover him in an event of a problem, or that the boss has means to control his subordinates’ real activity. However, the main role of ''l'argent du carburant'' may be to ensure what Gluckman called ‘peace in the feud’<ref>Gluckman, M. 1955. ‘The Peace in the Feud’, Past and Present, 8(1): 1-14 | ||
</ref>, i.e. the constraint of conflict by custom. | |||
The environment of customs administration is indeed fundamentally combative in nature, due to the conflicting interests of the actors involved. Such competitive interactions take place both between service users and customs officers, and among the officers themselves. Service users aim to pay as little as possible, while officials seek either to maximise revenue to meet monthly targets (and thus advance their career), or to take the highest possible bribe in the light of the risk taken. Customs officers also compete with each other to be appointed to the best positions (Cantens 2012)<ref>Cantens, T. 2012. 'Is it possible to reform a Customs administration? The role of bureaucratic elite in Cameroon', in A. H. Amsden, A. Di Caprio and J. A. Robinson, The Role of Elites in Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 281-306</ref>. ''L'argent du carburant'' is one of many unofficial practices that anticipate or resolve the conflicts among officials and between officials and taxpayers, a form of courtesy that finds its legitimacy in the latent conflicts. Other practices exist, such as various kinds of negotiation of the tax pressure on the big taxpayers and on the ‘informal sector’ (Cantens 2013<ref>Cantens, T. 2013. 'Other People's Money and Goods: the Relationship Between Customs Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa', Sociologus, 63(1- 2): 37-58</ref>; Cantens et al. 2014<ref>Cantens, T., Kaminski, J., Raballand, G. and Tchapa, T. 2014. 'Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors: A Cameroon Case Study'. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network</ref>). | The environment of customs administration is indeed fundamentally combative in nature, due to the conflicting interests of the actors involved. Such competitive interactions take place both between service users and customs officers, and among the officers themselves. Service users aim to pay as little as possible, while officials seek either to maximise revenue to meet monthly targets (and thus advance their career), or to take the highest possible bribe in the light of the risk taken. Customs officers also compete with each other to be appointed to the best positions (Cantens 2012)<ref>Cantens, T. 2012. 'Is it possible to reform a Customs administration? The role of bureaucratic elite in Cameroon', in A. H. Amsden, A. Di Caprio and J. A. Robinson, The Role of Elites in Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 281-306</ref>. ''L'argent du carburant'' is one of many unofficial practices that anticipate or resolve the conflicts among officials and between officials and taxpayers, a form of courtesy that finds its legitimacy in the latent conflicts. Other practices exist, such as various kinds of negotiation of the tax pressure on the big taxpayers and on the ‘informal sector’ (Cantens 2013<ref>Cantens, T. 2013. 'Other People's Money and Goods: the Relationship Between Customs Officers and Users in Some Countries of Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa', Sociologus, 63(1- 2): 37-58</ref>; Cantens et al. 2014<ref>Cantens, T., Kaminski, J., Raballand, G. and Tchapa, T. 2014. 'Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors: A Cameroon Case Study'. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network</ref>). | ||