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Difference between revisions of "Blood revenge (Caucasus)"
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Blood revenge in general, and specifically ch'ir, entails that following an insult – either verbal or physical – an offended male or his patrilineal relatives are expected to exact revenge on either the direct culprit of offence or his patrilineal relatives (Elster 1990, Souleimanov 2007: 24-29)<ref>Elster, E. 1990. 'Norms of revenge,' Ethics, 100(4): 862-885</ref><ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2014. The Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists: Why Ex-Militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the North Caucasus. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan</ref>. Grave verbal insults include those directed against a male or his female relatives, wife, or his/her ancestors. Significant injury, particularly injury leading to permanent disease or death, murder, manslaughter, rape or any form of defilement against women, including bride abduction, are regarded as grave physical attacks in Chechnya. In the past, a variety of acts were considered disrespectful, making a case for ch’ir. Killing one's dog or showing disrespect to a man's hat (papakh) by means of touching it with one’s feet or throwing it on the ground, were considered a grave insult in the Caucasus that was to be ‘washed off’ by the offender's or his relatives' blood. Nowadays, ch'ir is triggered almost exclusively by murder, manslaughter, and rape. | Blood revenge in general, and specifically ch'ir, entails that following an insult – either verbal or physical – an offended male or his patrilineal relatives are expected to exact revenge on either the direct culprit of offence or his patrilineal relatives (Elster 1990, Souleimanov 2007: 24-29)<ref>Elster, E. 1990. 'Norms of revenge,' Ethics, 100(4): 862-885</ref><ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2014. The Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists: Why Ex-Militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the North Caucasus. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan</ref>. Grave verbal insults include those directed against a male or his female relatives, wife, or his/her ancestors. Significant injury, particularly injury leading to permanent disease or death, murder, manslaughter, rape or any form of defilement against women, including bride abduction, are regarded as grave physical attacks in Chechnya. In the past, a variety of acts were considered disrespectful, making a case for ch’ir. Killing one's dog or showing disrespect to a man's hat (papakh) by means of touching it with one’s feet or throwing it on the ground, were considered a grave insult in the Caucasus that was to be ‘washed off’ by the offender's or his relatives' blood. Nowadays, ch'ir is triggered almost exclusively by murder, manslaughter, and rape. | ||
The perception of honour is closely linked to the understanding of an individual as part of a larger community made up of ties of common ancestry, ‘shared blood’ and identity. Individuals in Chechnya and Ingushetia are rarely treated without reference to their patrilineal family (nekye or dözal) or clan (teip) ties (Sokirianskaia 2005)<ref>Sokirianskaia, E. 2005. 'Families and Clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya. A Fieldwork Report,' Central Asian Survey, 24(4): 453-467</ref>. Therefore, offence against an individual is considered to extend to relatives. Retaliation, too, becomes the business of the entire family or clan. Failure to retaliate sharply decreases the social status of the offended individual and his or her clan. This may lead to opprobrium, with the entire family or clan dishonoured, and its male members regarded as weak and cowardly. Members of a dishonoured family or clan may be excluded from the community: girls lose the chance of a worthy marriage, while men are ridiculed and marginalised. It may take many years and great effort for a family or clan to restore lost honour. Triggered by the threat of social sanctions, members of the offended families and clans usually seek to ‘take their blood’ in order to avoid ‘losing their face’ (Souleimanov 2007: 24-29, Souleimanov 2015)<ref>Souleimanov, E. 2007. An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang</ref><ref>Souleimanove, E. 2015. 'An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia's Policy of | The perception of honour is closely linked to the understanding of an individual as part of a larger community made up of ties of common ancestry, ‘shared blood’ and identity. Individuals in Chechnya and Ingushetia are rarely treated without reference to their patrilineal family (nekye or dözal) or clan (teip) ties (Sokirianskaia 2005)<ref>Sokirianskaia, E. 2005. 'Families and Clans in Ingushetia and Chechnya. A Fieldwork Report,' Central Asian Survey, 24(4): 453-467</ref>. Therefore, offence against an individual is considered to extend to relatives. Retaliation, too, becomes the business of the entire family or clan. Failure to retaliate sharply decreases the social status of the offended individual and his or her clan. This may lead to opprobrium, with the entire family or clan dishonoured, and its male members regarded as weak and cowardly. Members of a dishonoured family or clan may be excluded from the community: girls lose the chance of a worthy marriage, while men are ridiculed and marginalised. It may take many years and great effort for a family or clan to restore lost honour. Triggered by the threat of social sanctions, members of the offended families and clans usually seek to ‘take their blood’ in order to avoid ‘losing their face’ (Souleimanov 2007: 24-29, Souleimanov 2015)<ref>Souleimanov, E. 2007. An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang</ref><ref>Souleimanove, E. 2015. 'An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia's Policy of Chechenization,' Post-Soviet Affairs, 31(2): 91-114</ref>. | ||
Since the mid-1990s, ch’ir has been instrumental in shaping violent mobilisation in Chechnya (Souleimanov 2007)<ref>Souleimanov, E. 2007. An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang</ref>. Many Chechens took up arms in order to avenge their relatives' murder or fatal injury, or to seek ch’ir for the humiliation at the hand of the Russian counterinsurgents or their Chechen alllies. Those who mobilised even included politically neutral individuals and those with prior antipathy towards Chechen separatist elites and their ideas. Those who knew the individual perpetrator of an offence – who was typically a Russian officer or a kadyrovets (a member of Chechnya's pro-Moscow paramilitary force) – usually sought to retaliate on their own. There is evidence of insurgent units drawing on a network of relatives formed exclusively for the purpose of retaliation. Following a successful ch’ir, some of these units disbanded, while others were absorbed into the insurgency and continued fighting. When the actual culprit of the offence was unknown or could not be found, the perception of the legitimate target of retaliation was broadened to all members of the Russian military or Russians as an ethnic community per se (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015)<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2015a. 'Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya,' Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(5): 678-703</ref>. | |||
The codes of hospitality (Chechen: siskal) and silence (Chechen: disttsakhilar) are important sources of pro-insurgent support in the Northern Caucasus (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015b)<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H.2015b. 'Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars,' International Security, 40(2): 158-80</ref>. While considerably weakened over recent decades, these codes still persist, especially in rural and mountainous areas. Enshrined in the customary law, adat, the code of hospitality requires the highlanders to provide support to those in need. Fugitives escaping enemies in ch’ir, or abreks (outlaws or lone-wolf guerilla fighters) are required to be sheltered by fellow highlanders, regardless of the risk of armed confrontation with their guest's personal enemies or with the authorities (Bobrovnikov 2000)<ref>Bobrovnikov, V. 2000. 'Abreki i gosudarstvo: kultura nasiliia na Kavkaze,' Vestnik Evrazii, 1(1): 19-46</ref>. This tradition partly survives in the North-East Caucasus. The code of silence, close to the South Italian custom of omertà, requires highlanders to reject collaboration with outsiders, including formal authorities. Even in the case of severe inter-personal or inter-clan conflict, highlanders are not supposed to approach the authorities; such a move would expose the violators of the unwritten code of honour as fearful and weak. The code of silence prescribes highlanders to remain silent about their community's internal affairs and resolve their issues on their own, within the circle of clan or religious authorities. Insurgents have routinely been provided with shelter, food, medicine, clothes, and other basic needs by the local population. Even those disapproving of the insurgents and their activities are unlikely to report them to the authorities (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015)<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H.2015a. 'Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya,' Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(5): 678-703</ref>. | The codes of hospitality (Chechen: siskal) and silence (Chechen: disttsakhilar) are important sources of pro-insurgent support in the Northern Caucasus (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015b)<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H.2015b. 'Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars,' International Security, 40(2): 158-80</ref>. While considerably weakened over recent decades, these codes still persist, especially in rural and mountainous areas. Enshrined in the customary law, adat, the code of hospitality requires the highlanders to provide support to those in need. Fugitives escaping enemies in ch’ir, or abreks (outlaws or lone-wolf guerilla fighters) are required to be sheltered by fellow highlanders, regardless of the risk of armed confrontation with their guest's personal enemies or with the authorities (Bobrovnikov 2000)<ref>Bobrovnikov, V. 2000. 'Abreki i gosudarstvo: kultura nasiliia na Kavkaze,' Vestnik Evrazii, 1(1): 19-46</ref>. This tradition partly survives in the North-East Caucasus. The code of silence, close to the South Italian custom of omertà, requires highlanders to reject collaboration with outsiders, including formal authorities. Even in the case of severe inter-personal or inter-clan conflict, highlanders are not supposed to approach the authorities; such a move would expose the violators of the unwritten code of honour as fearful and weak. The code of silence prescribes highlanders to remain silent about their community's internal affairs and resolve their issues on their own, within the circle of clan or religious authorities. Insurgents have routinely been provided with shelter, food, medicine, clothes, and other basic needs by the local population. Even those disapproving of the insurgents and their activities are unlikely to report them to the authorities (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015)<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H.2015a. 'Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya,' Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(5): 678-703</ref>. | ||