Mzungu price (Kenya)

Mzungu price (Kenya) 🇰🇪
Location: Kenya
Definition: A price asked by Kenyans from white people, which is usually higher than what locals would pay.
Keywords: Race – Foreigner – Money – Payment – Double Standards – Market – Trade – System made me do it – Kenya – Ghana – Poverty
Clusters: Gaming the system – Redistribution – Market
Author: Yunqiao Xu
Affiliation: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK

By Yunqiao Xu, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK

The word mzungu is a popular Swahili term for white people or Europeans (Spitzer 2017). A mzungu price is the price charged by Kenyans to usually white foreigners and tourists, which is normally higher than what locals would be asked to pay. Charging foreigners a higher price is common in developing countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. In Kenya, it first appeared in urban street markets and has now become common throughout the country. Racial inequality contributes to the emergence of mzungu price. The word mzungu conveys money and wealth. The belief that to be white is to be superior is a lasting consequence of the country’s colonial past, as is the phrase ‘West is best’ (MacOireachtaigh 2015). In a country where racial inequality is substantial, white skin is equated with privilege.

The emergence of mzungu prices is largely attributed to the growth of informal economic activities in Kenya. In the early 2000s, employment in the informal sector increased by around 5 million, reaching 64 per cent of total employment in 2011 (Escudero et al. 2013). The institutional environment in Kenya disincentivises street traders from acquiring a license so their activities often remain a part of the informal sector (Racaud 2017). In major African cities, street trade is an important source of provision for poor urban families (Uwitije 2016). In 2016, there were over 10,000 street traders in Kisumu, a city with ca. 700,000 inhabitants (Racaud 2017).

Passenger taxi services is another typical area where mzungu prices are charged. The mzungu price for a boda-boda, a motorbike taxi popular in Kenya, is 3000 to 4000 Kenyan shillings (28 to 38 USD) more than the local price. Uber drivers are less common, so tourists normally use traditional taxis. Nonetheless, they use the Uber price, or a price suggested by local friends as the benchmark of a fair deal, making the ride-hailing applications a way to uncover and prevent overcharging. Before the expansion of these technologies into Kenya, ‘black’ taxis, run by drivers without taxi licenses, were prevalent. Nairobi had privately-owned minibuses called matatu, which provided transportation for locals. However, public transport is hard for foreigners to use as there are no bus signs or official route maps. The expansion of ride-hailing applications in Nairobi has reduced the window of opportunity for ‘black’ taxi drivers to charge mzungu prices and has consequently reduced their earnings (Interview, 2019). New technologies indirectly act as a means of price regulation for tourists, with direct consequences on the local incomes.

Persecution of street traders by authorities is common. Up to 44 per cent of street traders in Nakuru, Kenya have faced mistreatment such as having their goods confiscated without compensation (Roever 2016). Harassment from local officials leads to unstable working conditions and can force traders off the street (Mnyamwezi 2017). This type of repression also leads to social instability and protests (Chepngeno Lubanga 2020).

Street trade for female street traders is even more difficult, since women often care for children while they work. They also earn less compared to male street traders. There are two reasons for this: first, a limited access to capital and information, which narrows the range and quantity of commodities they sell and; second, working shorter hours because they attend to domestic chores (Alila and Mitullah 1999: 11-12).

Charging mzungu prices results in tourist dissatisfaction. It can affect tourists’ willingness to travel to Kenya, as they prefer destinations where they will not be deceived by local people (Garg 2015). But mzungu prices also have positive impacts. Firstly, they contribute to poverty alleviation by providing families with extra income. Secondly, mzungu prices indirectly create new means of income for Kenyans. Foreigners will sometimes pay local workers to help them buy items in order to access local prices.

In the absence of market regulation, the informal Kenyan traders base the prices of their ware on what they believe mzungu are willing to pay rather than on the value of the products. Street traders usually make only minimal profits and do not enjoy social protection. This incentivises them to establish a mzungu price. One estimation suggested that street traders earned between $1.4 and $14.3 daily profits on average in Nairobi Central Business District in 2007 (Kamunyori 2007). The UN places the poverty line for sub-Saharan Africa at $1.9 per day (United Nations, n.d.). The broad range in daily profits depends on the trader's selling skills – the ability to set the highest viable mzungu price.

The main barrier to effective regulation is lack of enforcement, despite frequent attempts by the local authorities to limit the growth of the informal sector (Pohl 2002). Police actions are rarely effective as compliance from citizens is low. Regulation gets even more complicated with formally licenced traders, who nevertheless retain a small margin of freedom when setting prices, thereby enabling prices to be based on unfair subjective decisions. The Micro and Small Enterprises Act issued by the Kenyan government in 2012 was an attempt to register street traders as micro enterprises. However, the trading licenses were not issued broadly enough. According to estimates, Nairobi had 500,000 street traders, while only 7,000 licenses were issued in 2005 (Lyons and Snoxell 2005). The complex licensing process and the limited number of licenses granted discourage people from registering.

Local non-profit policy-making institutions, such as the Kenyan National Association of Street vendors and Traders and the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, are responsible for adding to the volatility of the street vending environment. These organisations lobby for negotiations between street traders and the government, helping the government to integrate informal trade into urban development and governance. However, inconsistencies in policies from different institutions slow down their implementation (Schlegel and Racaud 2016).

References

Alila, P. and Mitullah, W. 1999. ‘Women street vendors in Kenya: policies, regulations and organisational capacity,’ International Research Development Centre, University of Nairobi. [1]

Chepngeno, E. and Lubanga, D. 2020. ‘Eldoret traders protest over ‘rogue’ enforcement officers,’ Daily Nation, March 5. [nation.co.ke/counties/uasingishu/Eldoret-traders-close-shops-in-protest/1183334-5479644-o0l0w0/index.html]

Garg, A. 2015. ‘Travel Risks vs Tourist Decision Making: A Tourist Perspective,’ International Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Systems, 8:1-9

Escudero, V., Mourelo, E. L., and Rashid, H. 2013. ‘Kenya: Making Quality Employment the Driver of Development,’ International Institute for Labour Studies: 123-129 [2]

Kamunyori W, S. 2007. ‘A Growing Space for Dialogue: The Case of Street Vending in Nairobi’s Central Business District’ MIT Libraries. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Lyons, M. and Snoxell, S. 2005. ‘Creating urban social capital: some evidence from informal traders in Nairobi,’ Urban Studies, 42(7): 1073-1092

MacOireachtaigh, P. 2015. ‘My skin colour represents privilege and status. But it makes me an outsider too,’ The Guardian, 10 September. [theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/10/white-in-africa-outsider]

Mitullah, W. 2005. ‘Enterprise: street trade in Kenya: the contribution of research in policy dialogue and response’, in H. Nabeel (ed.), Urban Futures: Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction. London: ITDG Publication

Mnyamwezi, R. 2020. Kenya traders on Taveta border complain of harassment by Tanzania authorities, Standard Digital, 26 November. [standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001261321/kenya-traders-on-taveta-border-complain-of-harassment-by-tanzania-authorities]

Pohl, O. 2002. ‘Kenya Cracking Down on 'Beach Boys' Gigolos Serving Tourists,’ New York Times, 14 February. [nytimes.com/2002/02/14/world/kenya-cracking-down-on-beach-boys-gigolos-serving-tourists.html]

Racaud, S. 2017. ‘Ambiguous Resource: ‘Informal’ Street Trading in Kisumu, Kenya’, Articulo – revue de sciences humaines, 17-18

Roever, S. 2016. ‘Informal Trade Meets Informal Governance: Street Vendors and Legal Reform in India, South Africa, and Peru’, Cityscape, 18(1): 27–46

Schlegel, P. and Racaud, S. 2016. ‘Urbanization and Street Vending: How street vending, an individual and a collective resource, can be integrated into the urban governance?’ French Institute for Research in Africa: 38-40

Spitzer, H. 2017. ‘Social work in East Africa: A mzungu perspective’, International Social Work, 62(2): 567-580

United Nations (2015), 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 17 Sustainable Development Goals, [3]

Uwitije, C. 2016. ‘Contribution of Street Vending on Livelihood of Urban Low Income Households in the City of Kigali, Rwanda’, University of Nairobi Research active: 2-3