Kupit’ Otsenku (Russia and FSU)
| Kupit' Otsenku 🇷🇺 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Location: Russia and FSU | ||
| Definition: Buying a grade to pass university exams | ||
| Keywords: Russia – FSU – Academia – Education – Examination – Bribe | ||
| Author: Eleanor Evans | ||
| Affiliation: Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | ||
By Eleanor Evans, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK
| Kupit’ otsenku (buy a grade), also called kupit’ ekzamen (buy an exam) and buy a grade za dengi (for money), is the practice of buying grades to pass university exams. This is usually an informal agreement between a student (or group of students) and a teacher or lecturer to set a price to pass, buy a specific grade for an exam, piece of work, or to increase a grade. There have also been cases of ‘covert’ bribes whereby students openly transfer money to their institutes’ accounts, allegedly for “repairs or similar needs”, to cover up for buying grades (Radio Svoboda 2002). In Russia, the price for grades appears to range anywhere from 500 RUB to 40,000 RUB depending on the university and department. Students can also pay for specific grades, the price increasing with the grade. Kupit’ otsenku is a form of monetary corruption and is prevalent in most post-communist countries. |
There are few published empirical studies on the scale of monetary corruption, because research participants and researchers conducting them might be involved in corruption or identified as ‘whistle-blowers’ and removed from their positions (Denisova-Schmidt 2013: 8). Additionally, if a student does buy a grade or exam result, there is no evidence confirming that this has happened, as bought grades are registered the same way as normal grades on student records. Research conducted by Donetskaia found that in 20.6% of higher education institutions across Russia most lecturers accept bribes, and in around half of higher education institutions bribery occurs relatively often. Furthermore, 60.5% of national research and federal universities (leading universities in Russia) have high levels of corruption. The highest levels of bribery are seen in agricultural, medical, physical education and sports faculties (Donetskaia 2017: 534). However, almost all Russian higher education institutions regardless of speciality engage in bribery, as it is an “indispensable condition for obtaining the necessary qualifications” (Donetskaia 2017: 538).
Looking at data from specific universities provides more insight to the varying levels of bribery, although the data is still patchy and unreliable. A survey of 400 students across four Russian higher education institutions found that 47% of respondents was involved in bribery and 26% had witnessed bribery” (Gostev, Demchenko and Borisova 2015: 167). A separate study in Khabarovsk universities found that 26% of students in selected faculties heard of bribery cases (Solovyeva 2020: 16). However, studies are often based on individual experiences or rely on honesty and estimations. It is therefore extremely difficult to understand clearly how prevalent kupit’ otsenku really is. It appears that kupit’ otsenku is prevalent in most of the universities in Russia. Although the majority of students will not practice kupit’ otsenku, it is common to hear of the practice taking place.
There are two important reasons behind kupit’ otsenku. Firstly, Chirikov and Shmeleva found that Russian students spend most of their time in lectures note taking with the goal of memorising information rather than critically analysing it (Chirikov and Shmeleva 2020: 154). This style of teaching does not encourage students to ask questions and benefits bribetakers and those engaging in corrupt practices (Meduza 2020). Secondly, overworked, and underpaid teachers are more willing to accept bribes at work to decrease their workload and supplement their salary. A new teacher can earn about 8,000 RUB per month despite high teaching loads: about 20 hours of classroom instruction a week and up to 30 hours to supplement income (Denisova-Schmidt 2013: 9). Furthermore, universities are understaffed compared to the number of students. For instance, in Sechenovskii University in 2020 there were more than 18,000 students and only 2,300 academic staff (Meduza 2020). Universities are highly dependent on high student enrolment rates, because half of their budget is based on numbers of enrolled students, and the other half from students’ tuition and fees (Denisova-Schmidt, Leontyeva and Prytula 2014). Expelling students for corrupt practices would mean economic losses which would then translate to staff cuts and further decline in education quality. Therefore, Russian higher education promotes higher tolerance towards corrupt practices (Denisova-Schmidt, Leontyeva and Prytula 2014).
The societal implications of kupit’ otsenku are significant especially in sectors like medicine where bribery is prevalent. If a significant cohort of medical students can avoid doing exams, learning material or attending lectures then this will produce a significant number of poor-quality doctors. Unfortunately, even those that did not take part in the practice of kupit’ otsenku seem to leave university with a poor education. Meduza found that only 18% of Russian doctors could pass an exam to get a medical licence in Israel from 2014 to 2018, one of the lowest numbers compared to medical school graduates from other countries (Meduza, 2020). Furthermore, the difficulty in identifying which students have paid for grades makes quality control of doctors significantly difficult.
Students in corrupt universities with high number of kupit’ otsenku cases learn quickly that bribery and corruption are normal and widespread. In their study, Denisova-Schmidt and Leontyeva found that universities do not ‘teach’ students to be corrupt, as most students have prior experience of bribery before going to university (Denisova-Schmidt and Leontyeva 2013: 262). In addition, according to the 2014 MEMO survey, at the start of university, 81.9% of students were tolerant of cheating in exams, and at the end of university this increased to 87.3% (Chirikov and Shmeleva 2020: 153). This indicates that universities may not teach students to be corrupt, but most students leave higher education more tolerant of corruption.
The problem is exacerbated as students learn that kupit’ otsenku and other forms of bribery are normal and even those that do not participate in bribery, choose not to challenge it. Denisova-Schmidt’s study in Khabarovsk found that students tended to largely associate corruption with words like ‘crime’ and ‘evil’. Nonetheless, only 5% of them agreed to a roundtable discussion about the issue (Solovyeva 2020: 17), indicating a lack of will to tackle the problem. Thus, although there is an acceptance that bribery is bad, there is little motivation to do anything about it as it is perceived as a normality. The practice of kupit’ otsenku is widespread, difficult to prove and variable across universities and faculties. This practice is a response to failings within Russian higher education and contributes to wider societal issues of ambivalence towards corrupt practices.
References
Denisova-Schmidt, E (ed.). 2020. Corruption in Higher Education, Global Challenges and Responses, Vol. 46. Brill Sense
Denisova-Schmidt, E. 2013. Justification of Academic Corruption at Russian Universities: A Student Perspective. Edmond J. Safra Working Papers. 30
Denisova-Schmidt, E. and Leontyeva, E. 2013. ‘Do Russian Universities Teach their Students to be Corrupt? Some Empirical Evidence from the Far East’, Journal of International Scientific Publications: Educational Alternatives. 10
Denisova-Schmidt, E., Leontyeva, E., Prytula, Y. 2014. ‘Corruption at Universities is a Common Disease for Russia and Ukraine’, Edmond J. Safra Centre for Ethics, https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/corruption-universities-common-disease-russia-and-ukraine,
Donetskaia, S.S. 2017. ‘Researching Corruption in Russian Universities’, Problems of Economic Transition. 59
Gostev, A.N., Demchenko, T.S., Borisova, E.A. 2015. ‘Corruption in the System of Higher Education’, Russian Education & Society. 57:3
Levada Centre. 2018. ‘Eksperty Kydrina Izuchili Dushevnost’ i Korruptsiyu v Shkolazh I Bol’nitsazh’, 5 March, https://www.levada.ru/2018/03/05/eksperty-kudrina-izuchili-dushevnost-i-korruptsiyu-v-shkolah-i-bolnitsah/
Meduza. 2019. ‘Dat’ Vzyatku Vrachu- Obychnoe Delo v Rossii. Pochemu Corruptsiya Vredna Dazhe dlya tezh Patsientov, Kotoroe Mogut Zaplatit?’, 25 June, https://meduza.io/feature/2019/06/25/patsient-dazhe-ne-rassmatrivaet-varianta-ne-doplatit
Meduza. 2020. ‘Menya Nelzya Dopuskat k Patsientam’, 21 September, https://meduza.io/feature/2020/09/21/menya-nelzya-dopuskat-k-patsientam
Radio Svoboda. 2002. ‘Vzyatonichestvo v Rossiiskizh Vuzakh’, 28 May, https://www.svoboda.org/a/24226490.html
Temkina, A. and Rivkin Fish, M. 2020. ‘Creating health care consumers: The negotiation of unofficial payments, power and trust in Russian maternity care’, Social Theory and Health. 18