Meso (Cyprus and Greece)

Meso 🇬🇷 🇨🇾
Location: Greece and Cyprus
Definition: Mobilisation of personal connections to influence formal procedures
Keywords: Greece – Cyprus – Europe – EU – Ties – Personal connections – Access – Network – Favour – Problem-solving
Clusters: Economies of favours – Redistribution
Author: George Hajipavli
Affiliation: Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford, UK

By George Hajipavli, Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford, UK

Meso(n) is a colloquial term used in Cyprus and Greece. To apply meso [in Greek: vazo (verb) meso (noun)], means to mobilise personal connections to influence a procedure to gain an advantage. While meso can benefit the requesting individual, the benefactors may instead be the requestor’s immediate or extended family, friends, or friends of friends given that Cypriot and Greek cultures are extensively collective (Georgas et al. 1997; Faustmann 2010: 270). Often used as synonyms to meso are the terms vyzma, donti, akri (prevalent in Greece), along with rousfeti. Although occasionally used as a synonym (e.g., Georgiades 2006: 125), rousfeti can acquire a more restrictive meaning than usually attributed to meso, in that it denotes favours granted by political parties (Trousas 2021).

In contrast to fakelaki (Knight 2018), assistance via meso does not necessitate, while it often precludes a financial exchange. It usually relies on a moral obligation to mutual assistance, though it can be used by political and other actors to indirectly obtain support (Faustmann 2010).

The most prevalent means of dispensing meso is via political mediation, rendering it particularly widespread in sectors connected to the political sphere. In a 2006 questionnaire, 89 and 54 per cent of Cypriot participants reported that meso is diffused in the public and semi-governmental sectors (Georgiades 2006: 127). These two sectors are where political mediation is most influential (Faustmann 2010), while they constituted the first and third most popular survey responses.

However, meso extends beyond political mediation. The same 2006 survey reveals 26 per cent of respondents locate meso in the banks, while 57 per cent find it everywhere (Georgiades 2006: 127). Therefore, like veze in Serbia, meso constitutes an umbrella term for all kinds of mediation. Yet, unlike Greece and Cyprus, Serbians have coined a dedicated term for political mediation - političke veze (Stanojevic and Stokanovic 2018). Meso can further be held to parallel torpil in Turkey because it similarly calls on powerful individuals to interfere with bureaucratic procedures to skew resource allocation (Yay 2018). Yet meso particularly reflects the prevalent role of political parties in Cypriot (Charalambous and Christophorou 2016) and Greek (Papadoulis 2006) society, especially when it concerns mediation.

Hence, while a variety of actors can be involved in meso, political elite usually lead the initiative. This was recently exemplified in ‘Cyprus Papers’, where leading politicians, including the legislature’s president, were accused of exploiting personal connections to circumvent formal requirements in procedures of citizenship acquisition against investment (Al Jazeera 2020). This outlines the existence of hierarchical networks led by the political elite, not dissimilar to those of political patronage in the post-Soviet region (Hale 2014: 1-18). Except parties, other stakeholders act as meso power brokers or dispensers, such as military officials, civil servants, and ranking members of the clergy. For instance, the Cypriot Archbishop admitted of ‘mediating’ with the Interior Minister to issue citizenship to a Church donor (Nestoros 2021).

Meso covers a variety of examples. Frequently, meso is used to skip the queue or secure preferred reservations at nightclubs. In certain instances, meso allows the requestor to circumvent cumbersome administrative procedures, resolving issues of functionality like other informal practices (see Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva 2017). An example is mediation for the purpose of securing the timely transportation of a critical patient to a better public medical facility. At other times, meso intends to grant an individual undue advantage based on personal connections (favouritism), inclusive of outright exemption from formal regulations, such as the avoidance of prosecution. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, reports emerged alleging individuals received a vaccine ahead of time (Konstantinou 2021). Regularly, meso is leveraged to achieve preferential employment, promotion, and transfer in the public, private sector, and the military.

Certain nuanced differences exist in how meso is dispensed in Cyprus compared to Greece. In both instances party linkages are utilised to achieve preferential treatment. In Greece, party favours appear to be based on clientelist linkages, reflecting a particular transactional exchange between the party and the voter (or voter representatives, like trade unions), similar to Parteibuchwirtschaft in Austria (Arbesleitner 2018). In Cyprus, meso usually relies more on strong interpersonal relations, thus exceeding the conventional boundaries of clientelism (Faustmann 2010: 270-1). For instance, the use of fakelaki is rare in Cyprus, while bribery is infrequent both in absolute and relative terms compared to Greece (Pring 2016: 17). While the difference might be exaggerated, a distinction can be recognised. A plausible explanation is the smaller size of society in Cyprus that allows stronger interpersonal relations with political mediators (Faustmann 2010). Interestingly, even though Turkish Cypriots invoke torpil and Greek Cypriots meso, there are similarities in the two Cypriot communities’ social practices, along with common differences in how these terms are deployed in Turkey and Greece. Factors that extend beyond the individual, such as sharing a common domestic origin or enjoying longstanding familial relations are important in incentivising mediation amongst Cypriots, while transactional aspects appear to be relatively more important in Greece and Turkey.

Akin to multiple informal practices, public perception of meso is ambivalent (Ledeneva 2018). The term is frequently the source of tension due to the inequality it leads to from endowing certain individuals with skewed access to resources and opportunities. Christophoros Fokaides, a former Cypriot defence minister, acknowledged the preferential treatment certain citizens enjoy due to party-based meso, resulting in a widespread perceived sense of injustice (Sigmalive 2016). Nonetheless, despite the criticism meso often draws, a significant segment of the population feels the practice is justified when it is them or kinship that engages with it.

An understudied aspect of meso are the conditions of membership. For example, minority groups with access to meso can benefit from added occupational mobility, as with the Roma community in Greece following their acquisition of voting rights (Themelis 2013: 195-8). Yet, individuals not belonging to the national majority are less likely to possess interpersonal relations with local power brokers, leading to reduced access to meso, unless they can ‘purchase’ it.

Recently, the commercialisation of meso in Cyprus arising from the country’s increasing interaction with global capital is becoming more common. There are frequent reports of wealthy foreigners ‘purchasing’ bureaucratic access through private service providers, like the expedient or undue acquisition of citizenship and residence permits. While the financial compensation obtained for the services can be shared within the domestic network, personal connections continue to remain a prevalent condition for meso access domestically. As such, certain service firms connected to or comprising of political actors receive preferential access to bureaucracy, as evidenced by the skewed distribution of successful citizenship-for-investment applications amongst such firms (Zachariou 2020). This highlights that, like other informal practices, meso transverses the boundaries of the private and public domains.

References

Al Jazeera. 2020. ‘The Cyprus Papers Undercover’, 12 October, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oj18cya_gvw

Arbesleitner, R. 2018. ‘Parteibuchwirtschaft’ in Ledeneva A. (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, Volume 1. London: UCL University Press: 58-61

Baez-Camargo, C. and Ledeneva, A. 2017. ‘Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania’, Slavonic and East European Review, 95: 367-370

Charalambous, G. and Christophorou, C. (eds.), Party-Society Relations in the Republic of Cyprus. London and New York: Routledge

Faustmann, H. 2010. ‘Rusfeti and Political Patronage in the Republic of Cyprus’, The Cyprus Review, 22: 269-289

Georgas, J., Christakopoulou, S., Poortinga, Y. H., Angleitner, A., Goodwin, R. and Charalambous, N. 1997. ‘The Relationship of Family Bonds to Family Structure and Function Across Cultures’, Journal of Cross-Culture Psychology, 28: 303-320

Georgiades, S. D. 2006. ‘Favouritism as a Form of Injustice in Cyprus’, The Cyprus Review, 18: 105-127

Hale, H. E. 2014. Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Knight, D. M. 2018. ‘Fakelaki (Greece)’, in Ledeneva A. (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, Volume 1. London: UCL University Press: 182-4

Konstantinou, G. 2021. ‘Limassol: Reports individuals vaccinated with meso’. 31 March, Sigmalive. https://www.sigmalive.com/news/local/761924/lemesoskataggelies-gia-emvoliasmo-mi-dikaiouxonatoma-emvoliastikan-me-meso

Ledeneva, A. 2018. ‘Future Challenges of Corruption Studies’, Südosteuropa, 66: 418-425

Papadoulis, K. J. 2006. ‘Clientelism, Corruption and Patronage in Greece: A Public Administration Approach’, Teaching Public Administration, 26: 13-24

Pring, C. 2016. People and Corruption: Europe and Central Asia. Berlin: Transparency International

Sigmalive. 2016. ‘Φωκαΐδης: Στα χακί οι 3.000 οπλίτες’, 1 August. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jk86IknWg_o

Stanojevic, D. and Stokanic, D. 2018. ‘Veza’, in Ledeneva A. (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, Volume 1. London: UCL University Press: 58-61

Themelis, S. 2013. Social Change and Education in Greece: A Study in Class Struggle Dynamics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US

Yay, O. 2019. ‘Torpil (Turkey)’, in Ledeneva A. (ed.), The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, Volume 2. London: UCL University Press: 213-216

Nestoros, C. 2021. ‘Passport to Jho Low: The Archbishop admits he mediated’, Alpha News. https://www.alphanews.live/cyprus/diabatirio-ston-jho-low-paradehetai-oti-mesolabise-o-arhiepiskopos-binteo.

Trousas, F. 2021. ‘Το ρουσφέτι ως ισχυρή ιδιομορφία της ελληνικής κοινωνικοπολιτικής ζωής’, Lifo.gr, 24 January, https://www.lifo.gr/now/greece/roysfeti-os-ishyri-idiomorfia-tis-ellinikis-koinonikopolitikis-zois

Zachariou, K. 2020. ‘This is the hidden Nouris List – All those who ‘gave’ golden passports’, Dialogos, https://dialogos.com.cy/idoy-i-kryfi-lista-ton-parochon-ypiresion-gia-ta-chrysa-diavatiria/