Partiti (Corsica)
| Partiti | ||
|---|---|---|
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| Location: Corsica | ||
| Definition: A system of favours and clientelism between members of a clan | ||
| Keywords: France – Europe – EU – Community – Family – Friendship – Network – Patronage – Kinship – Ties – Political party – Honour – Clientelism – Favour – Clan | ||
| Clusters: Community lock-in – Kinship lock-in – Amoral familism – Informal governance – Solidarity – Patron-client networks – Economies of favours | ||
| Author: Paul Thomé | ||
| Affiliation: Alumnus, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London | ||
| Website: Profile page on LinkedIn | ||
By Paul Thomé, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London
| Partiti (singular: partitu) comes from the Italian partito, which means ‘party’ in the political sense. In Corsican, it is more associated with the idea of a faction or a clan. While partiti is a name used to designate a clan, the practice covers the system of favours and clientelism used between members of the same clan. The favours can be wide-ranging, from a simple gesture in everyday life to weaving cunning criminal or political schemes. The stability of the system is ensured by the Corsican culture of honour. Therefore, a member of a partiti is duty-bound to help other members of the same partiti. |
The three components of a partiti are parenti, amici and clienti, Corsican words meaning ‘parents’, ‘friends’ and ‘clients’, equally used to refer to the different clans (see also KhTsB). Parenti (singular: parente) in Corsican refers to all the blood relations of an individual. Parenti are the foundation of a Corsican clan, replacing the traditional family structure.
Amici (singular: amicu), meaning ‘friends’, must be understood in its wider meaning, as referring to everyone with whom an individual is on friendly terms. Because of the isolated location of Corsican villages, families and clans tend to live in the same location their entire lives, thus reinforcing the sense of Corsican identity, as well as the ties between villagers. This sense of community is therefore extended to anyone from the blood-related parenti (Gaudry, 2007) to a neighbour, a family friend, or the mayor of the village.
Clienti (singular: cliente), on the other hand, represent the part of the clan outside of the village. These are clients of the clan, who gain its protection in exchange for services. This type of patron-client relationship seems to be in existence since the late nineteenth century (Briquet 1990: 79-80), when clan leaders would gather scarce resources and distribute them to the clienti in exchange for their loyalty. With the modernisation of the economic structure in Corsica, clienti are now understood to be the individuals in a position of power, working for the clan’s best interests, such as doctors and lawyers. The clan structure represents the foundation of all forms of interaction in Corsica. Because of this, last names are not as important in denoting lineage or ancestral village and are often omitted. The names have the effect of a code shared among Corsicans, unknown to outsiders.
Its location in the Mediterranean Sea sets Corsica apart from other insular cultures. Mediterranean cultures place an emphasis on solidarity, kinship, as well as honour and justice (Adrey 2009: 145). Corsica’s isolation, its harsh environment and its history also influenced its culture. Unique circumstances have shaped unique social relations, which led to unique informal practices (Adrey 2009: 143-147). Among them, partiti represents a form of clan-based clientelism, endogenous to the island.
Being part of a clan ensures long-standing solidarity and strong mutual help in achieving success. The importance of lineage in this insular context generates a ‘lock-in effect’, whereby local and closed communities reward members with a safety net and support, expecting reciprocation (Ledeneva 2018: 213). The effect creates and reinforces the idea of a shared identity, which in turn solidifies bonds of solidarity between clan members and ensures their protection and 'help with difficulties'. Clan members are loyal to one another and help each other in times of need. To serve his partiti, a clan member working as a civil servant will find a way to help other members in need by using state resources, for example granting construction permits without requiring paperwork. The practice of partiti exists to solve problems, it represents the Corsican ‘way of getting things done’ (Ledeneva 2018: vii).
Like partiti, relationships such as yongo from South Korea, hemṣehricilik and ahbap-çavuş from Turkey and rushyldyq from Kazakhstan refer to helping people of shared origins. The yongo personal ties are based on kinship, shared locality or education. The Turkish ahbap-çavuş relationships are made on the basis of shared educational or military experience while hemṣehricilik is the basis of mutual help among Turkish emigrants. The Kazakhstani rushyldyq is the feeling of loyalty to one's ru, a sub-ethnic identity.
The Mediterranean concept of amici, amigos is close to the idea of amici in Corsica, especially to the instrumentalisation of friendship and the impossibility to refuse a request. However, amici in Corsica need not be of the same social standing, and reciprocity is not expected. The continuity of the partiti practice is ensured by honour, an important concept in the Mediterranean. Refusing a request brings shame to both the individual and his or her clan. By offering protection, the protector’s honour is at stake, and honour is valued more highly than reciprocity or material interest (Lenclud 1993).
The political dimension of partiti in Corsica is comprised of four elements: two-party system, mandatory affiliation, clientelist organisation and partisan exercise of power (Lenclud 1986: 138). Their combination is what makes the political climate of Corsica unique. Bipartism means that in every locus of power there can only be one party in power, (the partitu) and another one in the opposition (the contrapartitu). This antagonism between clans contributes to the formation of their identities: one clan exists because it opposes another (Briquet 1990). Clientelism refers to ‘protection’ from the partiti. The dyadic relationship between protector and client, although instrumentalised, relies on the basis of emotional friendship. This ambivalence between ‘affective and effective friendship’ (Briquet 1990: 37) represents another fundamental characteristic of partiti, in which substantial favours are neither gifts, nor commodities, nor payment – as is often the case in informal practices (Ledeneva et al. 2018: 10). In Corsica such favours are symbols of friendship, an important component of this relationship (Lenclud 1986: 142). They showcase the values of honour and trust that are preeminent in the Corsican culture. Even a small favour to a member of a partiti entails a deeper meaning: the sense of belonging to a clan. The nature and quality of the act matter less than the act in itself, as favour is remembered by the clan. This entails that favours shall be returned by other members of the partiti. Finally, partiti is part and parcel of a personalised system of power in Corsica, creating the conditions for a subjective exercise of power, where the members of one’s own clan take precedence.
Further reading
Loughlin, J.P., 1987. Regionalism and ethnic Nationalism in France: a case study of Corsica (Thesis). European University Institute of Florence.
References
Adrey, J.-B., 2009. Unity and Diversity in Corsica: Patterns of Identity and Political Separatism, in: Adrey, J.-B. (Ed.), Discourse and Struggle in Minority Language Policy Formation: Corsican Language Policy in the EU Context of Governance, Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, pp. 142–159.
Briquet, J.-L., 1990. Les amis de mes amis... Registres de la mobilisation politique dans la Corse rurale. Mots Lang. Polit. 25, 23–41.
Candea, M., 2010a. Corsican Fragments: Difference, Knowledge, and Fieldwork. Indiana University Press.
Candea, M., 2010b. Anonymous Introductions: Identity and Belonging in Corsica. J. R. Anthropol. Inst. 16, 119–137.
Constanty, H., 2017. Corse, l’étreinte mafieuse. Fayard.
Dupoirier, É., 2001. La question de l'identité et des partis régionalistes corses. (Thesis) Observatoire Interrégional du Politique, Universitat Aùtonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona.
Fabiani, J.-L., 2001. La Corse ou les servitudes de l’authenticité. Études 395, 27–40. Gaudry, F.-R., 2007. Les grandes familles de Corse : l’île aux clans. LExpress.fr. Lefébvre, C., 1992. Nationalismes corses et perspectives européennes. Cultures & Conflits. Lenclud, G., 1988. Des idées et des hommes : patronage électoral et culture politique en Corse. RFSP 38, 770–782.
Lenclud, G., 1993. S’attacher. Le régime traditionnel de la protection en Corse. Terrain Anthropol. Sci. Hum. 81–96.
Lenclud, G., 1986. De bas en haut, de haut en bas: Le système des clans en Corse. Études Rurales. 137–173.
Molas, I., 2000. Partis nationalistes, autonomie et clans en Corse (Thesis). Universitat Aùtonoma de Barcelona, Barcelona.
Pomponi, F., 1978. Structure de clan et structure de classe en Corse. Cahiers de la Méditerranée 3, 143–157.
Tillard, D., 2003. L’île de corse face au droit français : l’opposition culturelle en question. As 27, 167–184.