Okkul’t (Russia)

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Okkul’t 🇷🇺
Russia map.png
Location: Russia
Definition: A set of predictive and mediating practices used by the power elite for assisting decision-making and transforming reality
Keywords: Russia FSU Occult Fortune-telling Magic Shamanism Influence Protection Unconventional governance
Clusters: Domination Age Power Control Uncertainty Syncretism Motivational ambivalence
Author: Valeriy Solovei
Affiliation: Independent researcher, formerly a history professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)

By Valeriy Solovei, Independent researcher, formerly a history professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)

In Russian society, a significant proportion of people perceive magic, astrology and extrasensory perception seriously. Thirty-one percent say they believe in magic, 31% in the possibility of predicting the future, 18% in psychic phenomena (transmission of thoughts and telekinesis), while 15% say they trust astrology (VTsIOM 2019). According to anecdotal evidence, the proportion of such people is even higher among the Russian establishment, including the top elite, and has been rapidly increasing since 2012. In the context of the growing turbulence of the political situation in Russia since the annexation of Crimea and the 2022 warfare in Ukraine, the establishment seeks, with the help of the okkul’t, to look into the future, to gain and/or retain power, to ensure guarantees of personal security and to preserve their wealth. The okkul’t (mystical or magical) practices and shamanism (shamans are believed to have access to, and influence in, the world of good and evil spirits) play an instrumental role for the Russian establishment.

Recourse to the okkul’t is typical of the Russian elite in a time of uncertainty. In the early 20th century, the family of Russia’s last emperor Nicholas II came to rely on the services of the famous French medium Philip and the well-known Orthodox mystic Grigory Rasputin. Okkul’t and Orthodox mysticism were intricately intertwined and most popular among the Russian aristocracy at that time. When the Soviets came to power in Russia in 1917, atheism became officially propagated and enforced, yet occult followers continued to be found among communists (Znamenski 2011). Within several decades, interest in esotericism revived in the Soviet Union (USSR) in the 1960s. This research into paranormal human capabilities was headed by the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces together with the Committee for State Security (KGB) (Vilkov 2019, April 5).

The period from the second half of the 1980s to the first half of the 1990s saw intense interest in extrasensory phenomena in the USSR. Indeed, this interest acquired the character of an epidemic: the most famous psychics (Allan Chumak and, in particular, Anatoly Kashpirovsky) attracted whole stadiums to their sessions and even conducted them on state television. In the first half of the 1990s, parapsychology (the study of paranormal or psychic phenomena such as telepathy and telekinesis) was intensely developed within the framework of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Presidential Security Service (SBP), organisations that guarded Russia’s first president Boris Yeltsin and other senior officials in the newly established Russian Federation (Vilkov 2019, April 17). Okkul’t activities and esoteric experiences by the Russian establishment and society are described in grotesque and phantasmagorical yet somewhat accurate ways in several novels by the Russian writer Viktor Pelevin (Pelevin 2003, 2006, 2017, 2018).

In the 2000s, interest in extrasensory perception and occult practices prevailed among the Russian establishment, especially following the outbreak of war in Southern and Eastern Ukraine in 2014. There is an obvious historical analogy with Russia in the early 20th century when, as noted above, interest in the okkul’t increased as political turbulence spread in the Romanov empire. A second analogy is the interweaving of occultism with Orthodox mysticism. A qualitatively new feature of the modern situation is the use of shamanism (that is, attempting to communicate with and harness the power of the spiritual world) and syncretic (that is, bringing together and combining different philosophical, religious or cultural principles and practices) religious cults such as Santa Muerte, Voodoo and other African cults that are not normally found in Russia.

Today’s Russian establishment readily turns for advice to so-called Orthodox elders (monks and priests believed to have mystical abilities). Father Iliy (Elijah) Nozdrin is considered especially influential and is someone with whom Russian President Vladimir Putin and members of the top Russian elite reportedly meet from time to time (Rubin et al. 2019). Bishop Tikhonov (Shevkunov), considered to be the confessor of the Russian president, is one of the most influential Orthodox advisers too. The main requests addressed to the elders include predicting the future of a specific official, healing, and providing protection against the intrigues of competitors. Mystical rites have been employed to fight against Covid-19 (RIA Novosti 2020). The elders, including Iliy, also play an important psychotherapeutic role, legitimating the decisions taken by the authorities from the point of view of Orthodox mysticism.

The Russian establishment use astrology and fortune telling, including tarot cards, in order to predict the future and to seek advice on how to behave in a specific situation; they resort to magic in order to influence a specific situation, ensure security, gain protection against competitors, and eliminate competitors. As a rule, wives, daughters and mistresses of members of the Russian establishment turn to fortune-tellers for advice. Men, on the other hand, prefer to take part in magic rituals. Rituals often involve sacrifices: a black bird or animal will be brought to the ceremony. Magicians try to satisfy the demands of their high-ranking clients and to build confidence in the effectiveness of the rituals. All levels of the Russian establishment, including the topmost elite, engage in occult practices.

Attempts to influence political decision-making are conducted by means of shamans. The Russian establishment uses representatives of mainly two shamanic traditions: Siberian and Amazonian. President Putin flew several times to Siberia, Tuva and Khakassia (most recently in March 2021), where he allegedly took part in shamanic rituals. In the mid-2010s, the establishment sought services of shaman Kolya, an ethnic Nenets (the Nenets being one of the aboriginal peoples of the Russian North), who made predictions of the events in eastern Ukraine.

In 2019, a Yakut shaman, Alexander Gabyshev, began a march of approximately 5,000 miles (8,000 km) from his native Yakutsk to Moscow with the aim of performing a ritual that would remove President Putin from power (Sugueva 2021). In September 2019, the Russian authorities arrested Gabyshev and sent him against his will to a psychiatric hospital in Yakutsk (The Moscow Times, 2019; see also psykhushka). The police stopped Gabyshev when he made a second attempt to walk in December 2019. After he announced his third attempt in May 2020, he was again detained and committed by court order to a mental hospital (AFP, 2020).

To sum up, an influential syncretic system of religious, the okkul’t and shamanic practices has developed in Russia and is used by at least part of the Russian establishment. There was a noticeable increase of interest in such rituals in 2014 that has intensified further since 2020. According to some estimates, the total annual turnover of the magic-services market in Russia before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic was about 30 billion roubles (450-500 million US dollars) (Efimkina et al. 2019). The rituals and their practitioners (fortune-tellers, astrologers, magicians, sorcerers and shamans) do not directly determine key government decisions, but they do play an important psychotherapeutic role, helping to build confidence of their clients in their decisions and activities, as well as solve personal problems. These include predicting the future, achieving personal success, securing protection against competitors and outer forces alike.

References

AFP. 2020. ‘Anti-Putin Shaman Forced into Mental Asylum in Siberia,’ The Moscow Times, 20 June. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/02/anti-putin-shaman-forced-into-mental-asylum-in-siberia-a70460

Efimkina, N., Zhurenkova, O. and Bulygina, Yu. 2019. ‘Godovyye oboroty rossiyskikh magov otsenili v 30 mlrd rubley’ (The annual turnover of Russian magicians has been estimated at 30 billion rubles), 28 March. https://360tv.ru/news/obschestvo/godovye-oboroty-rossijskih-magov-otsenili-v-30-mlrd-rublej/

Kamakin, A. 2019. ‘Rossiyskiye chinovniki massovo uvleklis okkultizmom’ (Russian officials have been massively carried away by the occult), 20 June. https://www.mk.ru/politics/2019/06/20/rossiyskie-chinovniki-massovo-uvleklis-okkultizmom.html

Pelevin, V. 2003. Chisla; 2006. Empire V; 2017. Lampa Mafusaila, ili Kraynyaya bitva chekistov s masonami; 2018. Taynyye vidy na goru Fudzi.

RIA Novosti. 2020. ‘Izvestnyy starets obletel Moskvu i Peterburg s molitvoy ot koronavirusa’ (A well-known elder flew over Moscow and St Petersburg with a prayer against the coronavirus), 3 April. https://ria.ru/20200403/1569528602.html

Rubin, M., Badanin, R. with Lukyanova, Yu. and Zholobova, M. 2019. ‘The Kremlin’s Elder. How the Russian government fell in love with mysticism’, 29 May. https://www.proekt.media/en/article-en/kremlins-elder-elijah/ (see above)

Sugueva, Yu. 2021. ‘Ya luchshe syadu v koloniyu, no ne nado menya lechit. Dvukhletniy put’ shamana iz Yakutska v psikhiatricheskuyu kliniku’ (I'd rather go to the colony, you don't need to treat me. Shaman’s two-year journey from Yakutsk to psychiatric clinic), 21 May. https://zona.media/article/2021/05/21/shaman

The Moscow Times. 2019. Russia Sends Shaman en Route to Exorcise Putin to Psychiatric

Vilkov, S. 2019. ‘Upravleniye Genshtaba po delam nechistoy sily’ (Department of the General Stuff for evil spirits), 5 April. https://news.ru/society/upravlenie-genshtaba-po-delam-nechistoj-sily/; idem. 2019. ‘Pogony russkikh magov: kak «ekstrasensy» stali generalami FSO’ (Shoulder straps of Russian magicians: how ‘psychics’ became Federal Protective Service generals), 17 April. https://news.ru/society/pogony-russkih-magov-kak-ekstrasensy-stali-generalami-fso/

VTsIOM (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre). 2019. ‘Vera v neob’yasnimoye: Analiticheskiy monitoring’ (Belief in the unexplained: Analytical monitoring), 2 July. https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/vera-v-neobyasnimoe-monitoring

Znamenski, N. 2011. Red Shambhala: Magic, Prophecy, and Geopolitics in the Heart of Asia. Wheaton, IL: Quest Books