Difference between revisions of "Ch'ir (Chechnya and Ingushetia)"

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Ch'ir (Chechnya and Ingushetia) (view source)

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Since the mid-1990s, ''ch’ir'' has been instrumental in shaping violent mobilisation in Chechnya (Souleimanov 2007<ref>Souleimanov, E. 2007. An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang</ref>). Many Chechens took up arms in order to avenge their relatives' murder or fatal injury, or to seek ''ch’ir'' for the humiliation at the hand of the Russian counterinsurgents or their Chechen alllies. Those who mobilised even included politically neutral individuals and those with prior antipathy towards Chechen separatist elites and their ideas. Those who knew the individual perpetrator of an offence – who was typically a Russian officer or a ''kadyrovets'' (a member of Chechnya's pro-Moscow paramilitary force) – usually sought to retaliate on their own. There is evidence of insurgent units drawing on a network of relatives formed exclusively for the purpose of retaliation. Following a successful ''ch’ir'', some of these units disbanded, while others were absorbed into the insurgency and continued fighting. When the actual culprit of the offence was unknown or could not be found, the perception of the legitimate target of retaliation was broadened to ''all'' members of the Russian military or Russians as an ethnic community ''per se'' (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2015. 'Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency</ref>).
Since the mid-1990s, ''ch’ir'' has been instrumental in shaping violent mobilisation in Chechnya (Souleimanov 2007<ref>Souleimanov, E. 2007. An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang</ref>). Many Chechens took up arms in order to avenge their relatives' murder or fatal injury, or to seek ''ch’ir'' for the humiliation at the hand of the Russian counterinsurgents or their Chechen alllies. Those who mobilised even included politically neutral individuals and those with prior antipathy towards Chechen separatist elites and their ideas. Those who knew the individual perpetrator of an offence – who was typically a Russian officer or a ''kadyrovets'' (a member of Chechnya's pro-Moscow paramilitary force) – usually sought to retaliate on their own. There is evidence of insurgent units drawing on a network of relatives formed exclusively for the purpose of retaliation. Following a successful ''ch’ir'', some of these units disbanded, while others were absorbed into the insurgency and continued fighting. When the actual culprit of the offence was unknown or could not be found, the perception of the legitimate target of retaliation was broadened to ''all'' members of the Russian military or Russians as an ethnic community ''per se'' (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2015. 'Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency</ref>).


The codes of hospitality (Chechen: ''siskal'') and silence (Chechen: ''disttsakhilar'') are important sources of pro-insurgent support in the Northern Caucasus (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2015. 'Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars,' International Security, 40(2): 158-80</ref>). While considerably weakened over recent decades, these codes still persist, especially in rural and mountainous areas. Enshrined in the customary law, [[adat]], the code of hospitality requires the highlanders to provide support to those in need. Fugitives escaping enemies in ''ch’ir'', or ''abreks'' (outlaws or lone-wolf guerilla fighters) are required to be sheltered by fellow highlanders, regardless of the risk of armed confrontation with their guest's personal enemies or with the authorities (Bobrovnikov 2000<ref>Bobrovnikov, V. 2000. 'Abreki i gosudarstvo: kultura nasiliia na Kavkaze,' Vestnik Evrazii, 1(1): 19-46</ref>). This tradition partly survives in the North-East Caucasus. The code of silence, close to the South Italian custom of ''omertà'', requires highlanders to reject collaboration with outsiders, including formal authorities. Even in the case of severe inter-personal or inter-clan conflict, highlanders are not supposed to approach the authorities; such a move would expose the violators of the unwritten code of honour as fearful and weak. The code of silence prescribes highlanders to remain silent about their community's internal affairs and resolve their issues on their own, within the circle of clan or religious authorities. Insurgents have routinely been provided with shelter, food, medicine, clothes, and other basic needs by the local population. Even those disapproving of the insurgents and their activities are unlikely to report them to the authorities (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2015. 'Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency</ref>).  
The codes of hospitality (Chechen: ''siskal'') and silence (Chechen: ''disttsakhilar'') are important sources of pro-insurgent support in the Northern Caucasus (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2015. 'Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars,' International Security, 40(2): 158-80</ref>). While considerably weakened over recent decades, these codes still persist, especially in rural and mountainous areas. Enshrined in the customary law, [[adat]], the code of hospitality requires the highlanders to provide support to those in need. Fugitives escaping enemies in ''ch’ir'', or ''abreks'' (outlaws or lone-wolf guerilla fighters) are required to be sheltered by fellow highlanders, regardless of the risk of armed confrontation with their guest's personal enemies or with the authorities (Bobrovnikov 2000<ref>Bobrovnikov, V. 2000. 'Abreki i gosudarstvo: kultura nasiliia na Kavkaze,' Vestnik Evrazii, 1(1): 19-46</ref>). This tradition partly survives in the North-East Caucasus. The code of silence, close to the South Italian custom of [[omertà]], requires highlanders to reject collaboration with outsiders, including formal authorities. Even in the case of severe inter-personal or inter-clan conflict, highlanders are not supposed to approach the authorities; such a move would expose the violators of the unwritten code of honour as fearful and weak. The code of silence prescribes highlanders to remain silent about their community's internal affairs and resolve their issues on their own, within the circle of clan or religious authorities. Insurgents have routinely been provided with shelter, food, medicine, clothes, and other basic needs by the local population. Even those disapproving of the insurgents and their activities are unlikely to report them to the authorities (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015<ref>Souleimanov, E. and Aliyev, H. 2015. 'Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency</ref>).  
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