5,669
edits
| Line 495: | Line 495: | ||
<div class="mw-collapsible-content"> | <div class="mw-collapsible-content"> | ||
Carney, C. P. (1989) “International Patron-client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework.” Studies in Comparative International Development, 24(2): 42-55. | Carney, C. P. (1989) “International Patron-client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework.” Studies in Comparative International Development, 24(2): 42-55. | ||
Cooley, A. and Heathershaw J. (2017) Dictators without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. Yale University Press. | Cooley, A. and Heathershaw J. (2017) Dictators without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. Yale University Press. | ||
Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B. G. (2011) “Hegemonic Battles, Professional Rivalries, and the | |||
Dezalay, Y. and Garth, B. G. (2011) “Hegemonic Battles, Professional Rivalries, and the International Division of Labor in the Market for the Import and Export of State- Governing Expertise.” International Political Sociology, 5(3): 276–293. | |||
Fox, J. (1994) “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico.” World Politics, 46(2): 151-184. | Fox, J. (1994) “The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico.” World Politics, 46(2): 151-184. | ||
Geertz, C. (1960) “The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker.” | |||
Hilgers, T. and Macdonald, L. (eds.) (2017) Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: | Geertz, C. (1960) “The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2(2): 228– 249. | ||
Hirvi, M. and Whitfield, L. (2015) “Public‐Service Provision in Clientelist Political Settlements: | |||
Lessons from Ghana’s Urban Water Sector.” Development Policy Review 33(2): 135–58. | Hilgers, T. and Macdonald, L. (eds.) (2017) Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Subnational Structures, Institutions, and Clientelistic Networks. Cambridge University Press. | ||
Hirvi, M. and Whitfield, L. (2015) “Public‐Service Provision in Clientelist Political Settlements: Lessons from Ghana’s Urban Water Sector.” Development Policy Review 33(2): 135–58. | |||
Holland, A. C. (2014). Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America. Harvard University. | Holland, A. C. (2014). Forbearance as Redistribution: Enforcement Politics in Urban Latin America. Harvard University. | ||
Hönke, J. (2018) “Transnational Clientelism, Global (Resource) Governance and the Disciplining of Dissent.” International Political Sociology. | Hönke, J. (2018) “Transnational Clientelism, Global (Resource) Governance and the Disciplining of Dissent.” International Political Sociology. | ||
Hönke, J., and Müller, M.M. (2018) “Brokerage, Intermediation, Translation,” in Risse, Thomas, Tanja A. Börzel and Anke Draude (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood. Oxford University Press. | Hönke, J., and Müller, M.M. (2018) “Brokerage, Intermediation, Translation,” in Risse, Thomas, Tanja A. Börzel and Anke Draude (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood. Oxford University Press. | ||
Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S.I. (eds.) (2007) Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press. | Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S.I. (eds.) (2007) Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. Cambridge University Press. | ||
Ledeneva, A. (2018) The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality (2 vols.). UCL Press. | Ledeneva, A. (2018) The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality (2 vols.). UCL Press. | ||
Montambeault, F. (2015) The Politics of Local Participatory Democracy in Latin America. Stanford University Press. | Montambeault, F. (2015) The Politics of Local Participatory Democracy in Latin America. Stanford University Press. | ||
Pitt-Rivers, J. (1954) The People of the Sierra. University of Chicago Press. | Pitt-Rivers, J. (1954) The People of the Sierra. University of Chicago Press. | ||
Risse, T. (ed.) (2011) Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of | |||
Risse, T. (ed.) (2011) Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood. Columbia University Press. | |||
Schmidt, S. et al. (eds.), Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. University of California Press. | Schmidt, S. et al. (eds.), Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. University of California Press. | ||
Szwarcberg, M. (2012) “Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America: Why Parties Conduct Rallies in Argentina.” Comparative Politics, 45(1): 88– | |||
Szwarcberg, M. (2012) “Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America: Why Parties Conduct Rallies in Argentina.” | |||
Comparative Politics, 45(1): 88– 106. | |||
Stokes, S. C. (2005) “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” American Political Science Review, 99(3): 315-325. | Stokes, S. C. (2005) “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” American Political Science Review, 99(3): 315-325. | ||
Stokes, S. C., T. Dunning, M. Nazareno and V.Brusco (2013) Brokers, Voters, and | |||
Stokes, S. C., T. Dunning, M. Nazareno and V.Brusco (2013) Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge University Press. | |||
van de Walle, N. (2003) “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems.” | |||
The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(2): 297–321. | The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(2): 297–321. | ||
Wolf, E. R. (1956) “Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico.” American Anthropologist, 58(6): 1067– 1078. | Wolf, E. R. (1956) “Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico.” American Anthropologist, 58(6): 1067– 1078. | ||
</div> | </div> | ||
</div> | </div> | ||
==Informal Governance and Corruption - Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms== | |||
The research project Informal Governance and Corruption - Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms has [http://informalgovernance.baselgovernance.org published its findings]. The project is led by Dr Claudia Baez Camargo from Basel Institute on Governance, Professor Alena Ledeneva from University College London and Dr Scott Newton from SOAS, University of London and funded by the British Academy and UK Department for International development ([https://www.britac.ac.uk/informal-governance-and-corruption-transcending-principal-agent-and-collective-action-paradigms BA/DFID Anti-Corruption Evidence Partnership]). | |||
Among the outcomes of the project were four video interviews with participanting scholars of informality which are featured among our [[Interviews|teaching and learning resources]]. | |||