Difference between revisions of "L'argent du carburant (Sub-Saharan Africa)"

''L'argent du carburant'' is part of a wide range of practices of donations with nothing in return that occur in day-to-day social relationships. When visiting headquarters for a meeting, one customs officer who had obtained a very gainful position (i.e. one which provides plenty of opportunity to earn extra money, both legally through bonuses as a share of fines on detected frauds and sometimes through bribes) gave his mission ''per diems'' to a colleague and friend, telling him it was for his ‘fuel’. Another, who no longer works at the port, was given an envelope by a forwarding agent with whom he had ceased to have any relations, for old time’s sake. Fuel money also facilitates relations between subordinates and their bosses, who, deprived of contact with users because of their position, cannot increase their income like their subordinates do. This is referred to as ‘giving account’. Although ''l'argent du carburant'' is not a form of bribery (in that it is not given for an immediate result in return), nor should it be considered a ‘gift’, given out of gratitude with no expectation of anything in return. Rather, ''l'argent du carburant'' facilitates connections that may be exploited subsequently. Although in practice such connections may never be used, they can be employed if necessary. In the case of relations between a boss and his subordinates, it is similarly not certain that a subordinate will need his boss to cover him in an event of a problem, or that the boss has means to control his subordinates’ real activity. However, the main role of ''l'argent du carburant'' may be to ensure what Gluckman called ‘peace in the feud’, i.e. the constraint of conflict by custom.

''L'argent du carburant'' is part of a wide range of practices of donations with nothing in return that occur in day-to-day social relationships. When visiting headquarters for a meeting, one customs officer who had obtained a very gainful position (i.e. one which provides plenty of opportunity to earn extra money, both legally through bonuses as a share of fines on detected frauds and sometimes through bribes) gave his mission ''per diems'' to a colleague and friend, telling him it was for his ‘fuel’. Another, who no longer works at the port, was given an envelope by a forwarding agent with whom he had ceased to have any relations, for old time’s sake. Fuel money also facilitates relations between subordinates and their bosses, who, deprived of contact with users because of their position, cannot increase their income like their subordinates do. This is referred to as ‘giving account’. Although ''l'argent du carburant'' is not a form of bribery (in that it is not given for an immediate result in return), nor should it be considered a ‘gift’, given out of gratitude with no expectation of anything in return. Rather, ''l'argent du carburant'' facilitates connections that may be exploited subsequently. Although in practice such connections may never be used, they can be employed if necessary. In the case of relations between a boss and his subordinates, it is similarly not certain that a subordinate will need his boss to cover him in an event of a problem, or that the boss has means to control his subordinates’ real activity. However, the main role of ''l'argent du carburant'' may be to ensure what Gluckman called ‘peace in the feud’, i.e. the constraint of conflict by custom.

''L'argent du carburant'' can turn into a major issue when change or innovation – for instance, a technical reform – breaks the equilibriums. In Cameroon in 2008, when a new IT system was installed that allotted declarations at random according to workloads, certain customs officers began to process them as quickly as possible by settling them without fully checking. This meant that the system would allot them more declarations so that they could increase their income though ''l'argent du carburant''. This fast-tracking created informal income inequalities among customs officers working in the same office, resulting in some officials blowing the whistle on this malpractice among their colleagues. The system has now been adjusted to resolve this problem. It could be said that to some extent the system of ''l'argent du carburant'' has led to a legal improvement, since the ‘bad’ customs officials do now spend more time on controlling declarations. As with ''l'argent du carburant'', all informal practices related to money generate competition among officials, as well as creating fragile equilibriums. At border offices where the trade traffic is low, a collectivisation of ''l'argent du carburant'' has been reported: the figures of the amounts given to each official are recorded in a book and the total amount is shared among officials according to their hierarchical rank on a weekly or monthly basis.

''L'argent du carburant'' can turn into a major issue when change or innovation – for instance, a technical reform – breaks the equilibriums. In Cameroon in 2008, when a new IT system was installed that allotted declarations at random according to workloads, certain customs officers began to process them as quickly as possible by settling them without fully checking. This meant that the system would allot them more declarations so that they could increase their income though ''l'argent du carburant''. This fast-tracking created informal income inequalities among customs officers working in the same office, resulting in some officials blowing the whistle on this malpractice among their colleagues. The system has now been adjusted to resolve this problem. It could be said that to some extent the system of ''l'argent du carburant'' has led to a legal improvement, since the ‘bad’ customs officials do now spend more time on controlling declarations. As with ''l'argent du carburant'', all informal practices related to money generate competition among officials, as well as creating fragile equilibriums. At border offices where the trade traffic is low, a collectivisation of ''l'argent du carburant'' has been reported: the figures of the amounts given to each official are recorded in a book and the total amount is shared among officials according to their hierarchical rank on a weekly or monthly basis.