Difference between revisions of "Taps"

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(Created page with "'''''Original Text: Leyla Sayfutdinova, PhD candidate, Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University''''' ''Tapş'' is an informal practice of obtaining favours...")
 
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The role of ''tapş'' in Azerbaijan's politics, economy and society is highly ambivalent. Like any other informal practice, ''tapş'' reduces the transaction costs of the actors. As a practice based on traditional kinship networks, it is often perceived as a part of cultural tradition, and therefore a form of resistance to the individualism and alienation that Western-style modernization brings. It also allows disenfranchised individuals and groups to access some state-controlled resources through intermediaries, bridging otherwise disconnected networks. At the same time, ''tapş'' is a particularistic practice that undermines the development of universal norms and generalised trust. ''Tapş'' also interacts with other practices from Azerbaijan's rich repertoire of informality, including various forms of corruption. Although many ''tapş'' transaction are ad hoc in nature and involve asking for individual favours in time of need, there can be more permanent arrangements, such as ‘protection’ for entrepreneurs. Known in Russian as ''krysha'' (literally ‘roof’) and in Azerbaijani, ''arxa'' (literally ‘the back’), it refers to patronage protection by state officials against both legal taxes and the extortion of bribes.  While this use of ''tapş'' undermines the universalistic logic of market competition, it does enable business activity to take place which would otherwise be impossible in Azerbaijan<ref>Safiyev, R. (2013b) Azerbaijan: A Dictatorship Built on a Capitalist Economy. Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 50, 3 May 2013</ref>. ''Tapş'' favours can also sometimes be reciprocated by gifts or informal payments, which links the practice to bribery (''hormet'', referring to payments made out of gratitude for an action already done, or ''ruşvet'', referring to payments that are offered or demanded for future actions). In other cases, ''tapş'' can serve as an alternative to bribery, by providing access to advantage which would otherwise require monetary payment. For example, in Azerbaijan's highly corrupt educational system having ''tapş'' can protect students from extortion of informal payments by instructors and teachers.
The role of ''tapş'' in Azerbaijan's politics, economy and society is highly ambivalent. Like any other informal practice, ''tapş'' reduces the transaction costs of the actors. As a practice based on traditional kinship networks, it is often perceived as a part of cultural tradition, and therefore a form of resistance to the individualism and alienation that Western-style modernization brings. It also allows disenfranchised individuals and groups to access some state-controlled resources through intermediaries, bridging otherwise disconnected networks. At the same time, ''tapş'' is a particularistic practice that undermines the development of universal norms and generalised trust. ''Tapş'' also interacts with other practices from Azerbaijan's rich repertoire of informality, including various forms of corruption. Although many ''tapş'' transaction are ad hoc in nature and involve asking for individual favours in time of need, there can be more permanent arrangements, such as ‘protection’ for entrepreneurs. Known in Russian as ''krysha'' (literally ‘roof’) and in Azerbaijani, ''arxa'' (literally ‘the back’), it refers to patronage protection by state officials against both legal taxes and the extortion of bribes.  While this use of ''tapş'' undermines the universalistic logic of market competition, it does enable business activity to take place which would otherwise be impossible in Azerbaijan<ref>Safiyev, R. (2013b) Azerbaijan: A Dictatorship Built on a Capitalist Economy. Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 50, 3 May 2013</ref>. ''Tapş'' favours can also sometimes be reciprocated by gifts or informal payments, which links the practice to bribery (''hormet'', referring to payments made out of gratitude for an action already done, or ''ruşvet'', referring to payments that are offered or demanded for future actions). In other cases, ''tapş'' can serve as an alternative to bribery, by providing access to advantage which would otherwise require monetary payment. For example, in Azerbaijan's highly corrupt educational system having ''tapş'' can protect students from extortion of informal payments by instructors and teachers.
    
    
The research on informal practices in Azerbaijan is limited, and there have not yet been any significant attempts to conceptualize ''tapş'' as a practice specific to Azerbaijani society. This is, however, a common feature of informal practices – scholars often point out that informal practices are insufficiently researched despite their pervasiveness and influence<ref>Hutchings, K., & Weir, D. (2006). Guanxi and wasta: a comparison. Thunderbird International Business Review, 48(1), 141-156.</ref><ref>Ledeneva, A. V. (1998). Russia's economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange. Cambridge University Press.</ref>. Although there is at present no research focusing on tapş specifically, several studies deal with various aspects of tapş in the more general context of informal practices.  A variety of methods have been used for this research, including interviews<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013a) Informality in a Neopatrimonial State: Azerbaijan. In Giordano, C. and Hayoz, N. (eds.) Informality in Eastern Europe: Structures, Political Cultures and Social practices. Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 433-450</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013b) Azerbaijan: A Dictatorship Built on a Capitalist Economy. Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 50, 3 May 2013</ref>, ethnography<ref>Lepisto, E., & Kazimzade, E. (2008). Coercion or compulsion? Rationales behind informal payments for education in Azerbaijan. European Education, 40(4), 70-92.</ref> and survey<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Sadigov, T. (2013). Corruption and social responsibility: bribe offers among small entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan. East European Politics, (ahead-of-print), 1-20.</ref><ref>Sadigov, T. (2013). Corruption and social responsibility: bribe offers among small entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan. East European Politics, (ahead-of-print), 1-20.</ref>. Ethnographic methods in particular would be useful for understanding the complex structure of ''tapş'' transactions and the interaction of vertical and horizontal ties involved in them. However, like other other informal practices, taps is difficult to measure because of its hidden nature and the sensitivity of the issue due to its interlinking with illicit practices and political patronage.
The research on informal practices in Azerbaijan is limited, and there have not yet been any significant attempts to conceptualize ''tapş'' as a practice specific to Azerbaijani society. This is, however, a common feature of informal practices – scholars often point out that informal practices are insufficiently researched despite their pervasiveness and influence<ref>Hutchings, K., & Weir, D. (2006). Guanxi and wasta: a comparison. Thunderbird International Business Review, 48(1), 141-156.</ref><ref>Ledeneva, A. V. (1998). Russia's economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange. Cambridge University Press.</ref>. Although there is at present no research focusing on tapş specifically, several studies deal with various aspects of tapş in the more general context of informal practices.  A variety of methods have been used for this research, including interviews<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013a) Informality in a Neopatrimonial State: Azerbaijan. In Giordano, C. and Hayoz, N. (eds.) Informality in Eastern Europe: Structures, Political Cultures and Social practices. Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 433-450</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013b) Azerbaijan: A Dictatorship Built on a Capitalist Economy. Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 50, 3 May 2013</ref>, ethnography<ref>Lepisto, E., & Kazimzade, E. (2008). Coercion or compulsion? Rationales behind informal payments for education in Azerbaijan. European Education, 40(4), 70-92.</ref> and survey<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Sadigov, T. (2013). Corruption and social responsibility: bribe offers among small entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan. East European Politics, (ahead-of-print), 1-20.</ref><ref>Hasanov, R. M. O. (2009). Social Capital, Civic Engagement and the Performance of Local Self-Government in Azerbaijan. Nationalities Papers, 37(1), 89-114. </ref>. Ethnographic methods in particular would be useful for understanding the complex structure of ''tapş'' transactions and the interaction of vertical and horizontal ties involved in them. However, like other other informal practices, taps is difficult to measure because of its hidden nature and the sensitivity of the issue due to its interlinking with illicit practices and political patronage.


==Notes==
==Notes==

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