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{{infobox | {{infobox | ||
| nameofpractice =Silovye Gruppirovki | |||
| flagemoji = 🇧🇬 | |||
| definition =Violent groups involved in violent entrepreneurship or organised crime | |||
| location =Bulgaria | |||
| imagemap =Bulgaria map.png | |||
| clusters = | |||
}} | [[:Category:Solidarity|Solidarity]] – [[:Category: Normative ambivalence| Normative ambivalence]] – [[:Category: Conformity| Conformity]] – [[:Category: Lock-in effect| Lock-in effect]] – [[:Category: Semi-closed lock-in| Semi-closed lock-in]] | ||
| categories = | |||
[[:Category:Bulgaria|Bulgaria]] – [[:Category: Balkans| Balkans]] – [[:Category: Europe| Europe]] – [[:Category: EU| EU]] – [[:Category: Violence| Violence]] – [[:Category: Intimidation| Intimidation]] – [[:Category: Gang| Gang]] – [[:Category: Organised crime| Organised crime]] | |||
| authorofpiece =Igor Mitchnik | |||
| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | |||
| authorwebsite =[https://uk.linkedin.com/in/igor-mitchnik-aa456168 Profile page at LinkedIn]}} | |||
<big>'''By Igor Mitchnik, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big> | |||
[[Category:Solidarity]] | |||
[[Category: Normative ambivalence]] | |||
[[Category: Conformity]] | |||
[[Category: Lock-in effect]] | |||
[[Category: Semi-closed lock-in]] | |||
[[Category:Bulgaria]] | |||
[[Category: Balkans]] | |||
[[Category: Europe]] | |||
[[Category: EU]] | |||
[[Category: Violence]] | |||
[[Category: Intimidation]] | |||
[[Category: Gang]] | |||
[[Category: Organised crime]] | |||
[[Category:Entry]] | |||
[[Category: Volume 1]] | |||
[[Category: Alumni]] | |||
[[Category: SSEES]] | |||
{| class="wikitable" | |||
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|style="font-size:1.1em;"| The Bulgarian term ''silovye gruppirovki'' can be literally translated as violent groups. The term, which is widely known in Bulgaria, can also be understood as a pun; in Bulgarian ''sila'' means both power and violence (Langenscheidt 2005: 180<ref>Langenscheidts Universal-Wörterbuch Bulgarisch. 2005. Bulgarisch-Deutsch. Deutsch-Bulgarisch. Berlin und München: Langendscheidt KG</ref>). The term is also commonly translated in English as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ and is used to describe a form of organised crime that developed in Bulgaria during the transition period of the 1990s (CSD 2009: 3<ref>Center for the Study of Democracy. 2009. Crime without Punishment: Countering Corruption and Organized Crime in Bulgaria (Report Summary), Sofia, URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileSrc.php?id=2655</ref>). | |||
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The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>). | The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>). | ||
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According to Bulgarian police sources, the majority of security and insurance companies are no longer involved in extortion or racketeering. Exceptions however are found within the agriculture sector in the Bulgarian provinces and in low-grade nightclubs where a culture of ‘protection’ is still evident (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015: 53f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>) Actors involved in the shadow economy are found to be implicated in violent ‘debt collection’ in the aforementioned sectors. Since the end of the 1990s, the re-establishment of state power and the increasing re-enforcement of the rule of law by the Bulgarian state have succeeded in marginalising the ''Silovye Gruppirovki''. Yet analysts of the security sector agree that informal contacts between the political class and the heads of private security and insurance companies, which replaced the ''Silovye Gruppirovki'', still persist (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>). | According to Bulgarian police sources, the majority of security and insurance companies are no longer involved in extortion or racketeering. Exceptions however are found within the agriculture sector in the Bulgarian provinces and in low-grade nightclubs where a culture of ‘protection’ is still evident (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015: 53f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>) Actors involved in the shadow economy are found to be implicated in violent ‘debt collection’ in the aforementioned sectors. Since the end of the 1990s, the re-establishment of state power and the increasing re-enforcement of the rule of law by the Bulgarian state have succeeded in marginalising the ''Silovye Gruppirovki''. Yet analysts of the security sector agree that informal contacts between the political class and the heads of private security and insurance companies, which replaced the ''Silovye Gruppirovki'', still persist (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>). | ||
== | ==References== | ||
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