Difference between revisions of "Tenderpreneur (South Africa)"

On the other hand, tenderpreneurship has a negative connotation associated with corrupt practices. The association was particularly noticeable in respect to state procurement processes whereby tenders to supply goods and services were increasingly awarded to individuals with personal linkages to the ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC) (Dlamini 2010<ref> Dlamini, Jacob. 2010. ''Native Nostalgia.'' Jacana.</ref>). One of the highest profile early examples was the South African Arms Deal, initiated in 1999, in which bribes were paid to high-ranking politicians, fixers, the ANC, and allied community development projects (Southall 2008<ref> Southall, Roger. 2008. ‘The ANC for sale? Money, morality & business in South Africa’. ''Review of African Political Economy'', 35(116), 281-299.</ref>). Key to this transition is the ANC’s ideology of liberation nationalism that defines the party as the champion of the black oppressed, who constitute the primary part of the South African nation; and its intersection with the access to resources enabled by party dominance at election time (Piper 2015<ref> Piper, Laurence. 2015. ‘From Party-State to Party-Society in South Africa: SANCO and the Informal Politics of Community Representation in ‘Imizamo Yethu’, Hout Bay, Cape Town’, in C. Bénit-Gbaffou (ed). ‘Popular Politics in South African Cities: Unpacking Community Participation’. Pretoria: ''HSRC Press'', pp. 21-41. 978-0-7969-2464-3.</ref>).

On the other hand, tenderpreneurship has a negative connotation associated with corrupt practices. The association was particularly noticeable in respect to state procurement processes whereby tenders to supply goods and services were increasingly awarded to individuals with personal linkages to the ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC) (Dlamini 2010<ref> Dlamini, Jacob. 2010. ''Native Nostalgia.'' Jacana.</ref>). One of the highest profile early examples was the South African Arms Deal, initiated in 1999, in which bribes were paid to high-ranking politicians, fixers, the ANC, and allied community development projects (Southall 2008<ref> Southall, Roger. 2008. ‘The ANC for sale? Money, morality & business in South Africa’. ''Review of African Political Economy'', 35(116), 281-299.</ref>). Key to this transition is the ANC’s ideology of liberation nationalism that defines the party as the champion of the black oppressed, who constitute the primary part of the South African nation; and its intersection with the access to resources enabled by party dominance at election time (Piper 2015<ref> Piper, Laurence. 2015. ‘From Party-State to Party-Society in South Africa: SANCO and the Informal Politics of Community Representation in ‘Imizamo Yethu’, Hout Bay, Cape Town’, in C. Bénit-Gbaffou (ed). ‘Popular Politics in South African Cities: Unpacking Community Participation’. Pretoria: ''HSRC Press'', pp. 21-41. 978-0-7969-2464-3.</ref>).

Political commentators have described tenderpreneurship as linked to a ‘dominant party syndrome’ of the ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC) (Giliomee & Simkins 1998). The ANC has won every national election for the last 25 years with over 60% of the vote. This lack of electoral accountability at the national level (and in most municipalities, apart from the large metropolitan municipalities) means that ANC politicians get returned to office even when government does not perform as committed on development plans, or simply performs poorly. Consequently, many in the ANC take political office for granted and abuse it by enabling non-competitive procurement, tenderpreneurship and nepotism in employment. This dominant party syndrome has advanced to a state of kleptocracy, whereby the political elites manipulate the three arms of government (legislature, executive and judiciary) with the intention of capturing resources for self-enrichment, the ‘elite capture’ (Booysen 2015<ref> Booysen, Susan. 2015. ''Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma''. Wits University Press.</ref>). The growing perception of Zuma’s rule as kleptocracy is beginning to hurt the ANC in the realm of public debates.  For the first time, in the local government elections of 2016 four of the largest metropolitan municipalities switched from the ANC to the opposition Democratic Allowance party (Chipkin 2016<ref> Chipkin, I. 2016. ‘The decline of African nationalism and the state of South Africa’. ''Journal of Southern African Studies'', 42(2), 215-227.</ref>).

Political commentators have described tenderpreneurship as linked to a ‘dominant party syndrome’ of the ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC) (Giliomee & Simkins 1998). The ANC has won every national election for the last 25 years with over 60% of the vote. This lack of electoral accountability at the national level (and in most municipalities, apart from the large metropolitan municipalities) means that ANC politicians get returned to office even when government does not perform as committed on development plans, or simply performs poorly. Consequently, many in the ANC take political office for granted and abuse it by enabling non-competitive procurement, tenderpreneurship and nepotism in employment. This dominant party syndrome has advanced to a state of kleptocracy, whereby the political elites manipulate the three arms of government (legislature, executive and judiciary) with the intention of capturing resources for self-enrichment, the ‘elite capture’ (Booysen 2015<ref> Booysen, Susan. 2015. ''Dominance and decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma''. Wits University Press.</ref>). The growing perception of Zuma’s rule as kleptocracy is beginning to hurt the ANC in the realm of public debates.  For the first time, in the local government elections of 2016 four of the largest metropolitan municipalities switched from the ANC to the opposition Democratic Allowance party (Chipkin 2016<ref> Chipkin, I. 2016. ‘The decline of African nationalism and the state of South Africa’. ''Journal of Southern African Studies'', 42(2), 215-227.</ref>).

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