Difference between revisions of "Mahallah (Uzbekistan)"

[[File:5_19_Mahallah.jpg|250px|thumb|left|‘Photograph depicting dinner at a Mahallah. Photograph by Rustamjon Urinboyev.’]]

[[File:5_19_Mahallah.jpg|250px|thumb|left|‘Photograph depicting dinner at a Mahallah. Photograph by Rustamjon Urinboyev.’]]

[[File:Photograph of Nosir Rahmon.jpeg|300px|thumb|right|Photograph of Nosir Rahmon breaking bread with fellow men in a Mahallah.]]

[[File:Photograph of Nosir Rahmon.jpeg|300px|thumb|right|Photograph of Nosir Rahmon breaking bread with fellow men in a Mahallah.]]

During the early Soviet period, the authorities attempted to eliminate the mahalla as an institution; these attempts were abandoned after it became evident that they would provoke social unrest (Abramson 1998)<ref>Abramson, D. 1998. ‘From Soviet to Mahalla: Community and Transition in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan.’ PhD thesis, Indiana University. Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services</ref>. As a result, the Soviet authorities changed their strategy and tried instead to use mahallas to disseminate communist ideology by integrating them into the state and party structures. As a result, mahallas continued to serve as local village councils throughout the Soviet period (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001)<ref>Bektemirov, K. and Rahimov, E., 2001. ‘Local Government in Uzbekistan’ in V. Popa and I. Munteanu (eds), Developing New Rules in the Old Environment. Local governments in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute Europe: 469–520</ref>.

During the early Soviet period, the authorities attempted to eliminate the mahalla as an institution; these attempts were abandoned after it became evident that they would provoke social unrest (Abramson 1998)<ref>Abramson, D. 1998. ‘From Soviet to Mahalla: Community and Transition in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan.’ PhD thesis, Indiana University. Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services</ref>. As a result, the Soviet authorities changed their strategy and tried instead to use mahallas to disseminate communist ideology by integrating them into the state and party structures. As a result, mahallas continued to serve as local village councils throughout the Soviet period (Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001)<ref>Bektemirov, K. and Rahimov, E., 2001. ‘Local Government in Uzbekistan’ in V. Popa and I. Munteanu (eds), Developing New Rules in the Old Environment. Local governments in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute Europe: 469–520</ref>.

[[File:Photograph of a group of men joining for food.jpeg|250px|thumb|left|Photograph representing a group of men joining for food at a Mahallah.]]

[[File:Photograph of a group of men joining for food.jpeg|250px|thumb|left|Photograph representing a group of men joining for food at a Mahallah.]]

After Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, the authorities expanded the role and responsibilities of mahallas (Koroteyeva and Makarova 1998; Louw 2007)<ref>Koroteyeva, V. and Makarova, E. 1998. ‘The Assertion of Uzbek National Identity: Nativization or State Building Process?’ in T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane (eds), Post-Soviet Central Asia. New York: I.B. Tauris</ref><ref>Louw, M., 2007. Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia, Central Asian Studies Series. London: Routledgew</ref>. The mahalla was transformed into the basic administrative unit of local government. Mahallas are now hybrid institutions, operating both as part of the formal system of public administration (formal mahalla) and as an informal, community-based welfare system (informal mahalla) (Sievers 2002; Urinboyev 2011, 2013, 2014)<ref>Sievers, E. 2002.’ Uzbekistan’s Mahalla: from Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations.’ The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent 2: 91–158</ref><ref>Urinboyev, R. 2011. Law, Social Norms and Welfare as Means of Public Administration: Case Study of Mahalla Institutions in Uzbekistan. The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 4 (1): 33–57</ref><ref>Urinboyev, R. 2013. ‘Living Law and Political Stability in Post-Soviet Central Asia. A Case Study of the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan.’ PhD Dissertation, Lund Studies in Sociology of Law. Lund University, Lund</ref><ref>Urinboyev, R. 2014. ‘Is There an Islamic Public Administration Legacy in Post-Soviet Central Asia? An Ethnographic Study of Everyday Mahalla Life in Rural Ferghana, Uzbekistan. Administrative Culture, 15 (2):35–57</ref>. One may distinguish between ‘formal‘ and ‘informal‘ mahalla by looking at their functions and regulatory structures: formal mahallas take the form of committees headed by a state-salaried chairman (rais) and act on behalf of the state; informal (social) mahallas are founded on moral ideas of solidarity and mutual help and are led by an oqsoqol chosen by residents.

After Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, the authorities expanded the role and responsibilities of mahallas (Koroteyeva and Makarova 1998; Louw 2007)<ref>Koroteyeva, V. and Makarova, E. 1998. ‘The Assertion of Uzbek National Identity: Nativization or State Building Process?’ in T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane (eds), Post-Soviet Central Asia. New York: I.B. Tauris</ref><ref>Louw, M., 2007. Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia, Central Asian Studies Series. London: Routledgew</ref>. The mahalla was transformed into the basic administrative unit of local government. Mahallas are now hybrid institutions, operating both as part of the formal system of public administration (formal mahalla) and as an informal, community-based welfare system (informal mahalla) (Sievers 2002; Urinboyev 2011, 2013, 2014)<ref>Sievers, E. 2002.’ Uzbekistan’s Mahalla: from Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations.’ The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent 2: 91–158</ref><ref>Urinboyev, R. 2011. Law, Social Norms and Welfare as Means of Public Administration: Case Study of Mahalla Institutions in Uzbekistan. The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 4 (1): 33–57</ref><ref>Urinboyev, R. 2013. ‘Living Law and Political Stability in Post-Soviet Central Asia. A Case Study of the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan.’ PhD Dissertation, Lund Studies in Sociology of Law. Lund University, Lund</ref><ref>Urinboyev, R. 2014. ‘Is There an Islamic Public Administration Legacy in Post-Soviet Central Asia? An Ethnographic Study of Everyday Mahalla Life in Rural Ferghana, Uzbekistan. Administrative Culture, 15 (2):35–57</ref>. One may distinguish between ‘formal‘ and ‘informal‘ mahalla by looking at their functions and regulatory structures: formal mahallas take the form of committees headed by a state-salaried chairman (rais) and act on behalf of the state; informal (social) mahallas are founded on moral ideas of solidarity and mutual help and are led by an oqsoqol chosen by residents.

Given the existence during the Soviet period of an all-encompassing social protection system, people in those days felt less need for a mahalla-based welfare system. But cutbacks in state welfare support in the post-Soviet period mean that mahallas have now become primary providers of social welfare. Sievers (2002: 103)<ref>Sievers, E. 2002.’ Uzbekistan’s Mahalla: from Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations.’ The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent 2: 91–158</ref> notes that, ‘The economic significance of mahalla has shifted from a vehicle through which to amass additional or disposable wealth to a vehicle for basic survival.’

Given the existence during the Soviet period of an all-encompassing social protection system, people in those days felt less need for a mahalla-based welfare system. But cutbacks in state welfare support in the post-Soviet period mean that mahallas have now become primary providers of social welfare. Sievers (2002: 103)<ref>Sievers, E. 2002.’ Uzbekistan’s Mahalla: from Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations.’ The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent 2: 91–158</ref> notes that, ‘The economic significance of mahalla has shifted from a vehicle through which to amass additional or disposable wealth to a vehicle for basic survival.’

Mahallas embody moral ideas of solidarity and mutual help. But while this mahalla-based solidarity is based on ties of kinship, reciprocity and good neighbourliness, it may also contribute to the emergence of initial elements of nepotism, cronyism and patron-client relations. According to informal norms of mahalla, the individual is expected to share his or her economic resources and political influence with his mahalla (family, relatives, neighbours). These mahalla norms shape the behaviour of individuals when they engage in public administration, business and social life. State officials frequently find themselves compelled to choose between, on the one hand, loyalty to their kin and mahalla, and, on the other hand, honesty at work. Therefore, upholding respect and loyalty for kin and mahalla networks often comes at the expense of the formal structures, thereby leading to an omnipresence of clientelistic relations in state institutions (Urinboyev and Svensson 2013a)<ref>Urinboyev, R. and Svensson, M. 2013a. ‘Corruption in a Culture of Money: Understanding Social Norms in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,’ in M. Baier (ed.) Social and Legal Norms. Farnham: Ashgate: 267–284</ref>. In this way, mahalla structures undermine the rule of law and good governance initiatives by promoting alternative versions of how people should behave.

Mahallas embody moral ideas of solidarity and mutual help. But while this mahalla-based solidarity is based on ties of kinship, reciprocity and good neighbourliness, it may also contribute to the emergence of initial elements of nepotism, cronyism and patron-client relations. According to informal norms of mahalla, the individual is expected to share his or her economic resources and political influence with his mahalla (family, relatives, neighbours). These mahalla norms shape the behaviour of individuals when they engage in public administration, business and social life. State officials frequently find themselves compelled to choose between, on the one hand, loyalty to their kin and mahalla, and, on the other hand, honesty at work. Therefore, upholding respect and loyalty for kin and mahalla networks often comes at the expense of the formal structures, thereby leading to an omnipresence of clientelistic relations in state institutions (Urinboyev and Svensson 2013a)<ref>Urinboyev, R. and Svensson, M. 2013a. ‘Corruption in a Culture of Money: Understanding Social Norms in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,’ in M. Baier (ed.) Social and Legal Norms. Farnham: Ashgate: 267–284</ref>. In this way, mahalla structures undermine the rule of law and good governance initiatives by promoting alternative versions of how people should behave.