Difference between revisions of "Stoyanshik (Georgia)"

{{infobox

  | nameofpractice = Stoyanshik

  | location = Georgia

  | imagemap = Georgia map.png

  | imageflag = Georgia flag.png

  | authorofpiece = Lela Rekhviashvili

  | authorinstitution = Central European University

}}

'''''Original text: Lela Rekhviashvili, Central European University'''''

 

The practice emerged in the late Soviet years, but became much more widespread in the 1990s, when crimes rates rocketed as a result of the collapse of the USSR and resulting loss of state authority. Stoyanshiki’s services – ensuring the security of cars against theft or vandalism – were thus in high demand. Later in the 1990s stoyanshiki became semi-formalised when the Tbilisi city government licensed the guards, distributing special uniforms and using them as agents for collecting parking charges. Given that at that point Georgia was one of the most corrupt countries in the region (Shelley, Scott and Latta 2013)<ref>Shelley, L., Scott, E. R., and Latta, A. (eds.) 2013. Organized Crime and Corruption in Georgia. London; New York: Routledge.</ref>, a share of the rents collected by the guards was most probably informally distributed among state officials. By the mid-2000s, however, two crucial factors making stoyanshiki’s services relevant – the rent collection and ensuring cars’ safety – were eliminated. Since 2003, crime rates in Georgia have fallen significantly due to high-profile reforms pursued by the United National Movement headed by President Saakashvili (2003-2012) (Engvall 2012; Slade 2012)<ref>Engvall, J. 2012. 'Against the Grain: How Georgia Fought Corruption and What It Means'. Silk Road Paper. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program</ref><ref>Slade, G. 2012. 'No Country for Made Men: The Decline of the Mafia in Post-Soviet Georgia', Law & Society Review, 46(3): 623–649, http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2012.00508.x</ref>. Moreover, the Tbilisi city government stopped relying on individual stoyanshiki for revenue collection for parking services in the city from 2007, when it held an open tender for parking management in the city. The winning company, C.T. Park, marked the parking slots and established annual parking fees to be paid by drivers, which meant that stoyanshiki’s role as unofficial collectors of parking fees became redundant.

Due to the very nature of the service, car guarding services are susceptible to what in economics is known as the ‘free riding problem’ – the opportunity for people to benefit from a service or resource being paid for by others. Car guarding can be seen as a semi-public good: it is mostly non-excludable and non-rival (McEwen and Leiman, 2008)<ref>McEwen, H., and Leiman, A. 2008. The Car Guards of Cape Town: A Public Good Analysis. Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper No. 25. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town. Retrieved from http://localhost:8080/handle/11090/30</ref>. This means that if the parking guard is present at the parking site, their very presence will ensure the security for all the cars present (non-rival), and that drivers will benefit from the service whether they pay for it or not (non-excludable). However, car guarding persists, indicating that the practice withstands the free riding problem and generates enough income for the guards to continue the activity. Explanations for drivers’ willingness to pay ‘tips’ include altruistic motivations (ibid), and desire to gain social approval (Saunders and Lynn 2010)<ref>Saunders, S. G., and Lynn, M. 2010. 'Why tip? An empirical test of motivations for tipping car guards', Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(1): 106–113, http://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2009.11.007</ref>. Another possible explanation is that to a certain degree the parking guards’ presence is beneficial for local private businesses and in some cases the local and national authorities, who are therefore willing to support the activity. In Cape Town, for example, private businesses came to endorse the services of the car guards as beneficial for their customers. While guards were rarely hired officially and largely depended on informal tips, the business owners offered selected guards a uniform, nametag and permission to operate on their company’s car park. Moreover, the city municipality started contracting the parking guards to collect compulsory parking payments from drivers (McEwen and Leiman 2008)<ref>McEwen, H., and Leiman, A. 2008. The Car Guards of Cape Town: A Public Good Analysis. Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper No. 25. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town. Retrieved from http://localhost:8080/handle/11090/30</ref>.  

==Notes==