Difference between revisions of "Tapş (Azerbaijan)"

''Tapş'' differs from ''[[blat]]'', its closest analogue, in several significant respects. First is the structure of the exchange transactions. Although ''[[blat]]'', as well as ''[[vruzki]]'' and ''[[guanxi]]'', can involve circular chains of favours with many intermediaries, in its most basic form ''[[blat]]'' is a dyadic transaction between two people, one of whom provides and the other receives a favour.  ''Tapş'', on the other hand, is always a polyadic practice. The most basic form case of tapş is a triadic transaction, necessarily involving an intermediary. Hence another Russian euphemism for this practice in Baku: “''poprosit za kogo-to''” (to ask for someone).

''Tapş'' differs from ''[[blat]]'', its closest analogue, in several significant respects. First is the structure of the exchange transactions. Although ''[[blat]]'', as well as ''[[vruzki]]'' and ''[[guanxi]]'', can involve circular chains of favours with many intermediaries, in its most basic form ''[[blat]]'' is a dyadic transaction between two people, one of whom provides and the other receives a favour.  ''Tapş'', on the other hand, is always a polyadic practice. The most basic form case of tapş is a triadic transaction, necessarily involving an intermediary. Hence another Russian euphemism for this practice in Baku: “''poprosit za kogo-to''” (to ask for someone).

Finally, while blat is said to be waning in the post-Soviet period, the practice of tapş remains as strong as ever. In post-Soviet Russia blat is being replaced by monetised, ad-hoc bribery, as opposed to the personalized, long-term relationships of reciprocity that used to sustain it in the Soviet period (Ledeneva 2008).  In Azerbaijan, by contrast, the strengthening of patronage networks in the post-Soviet period and the practice of patronage control over distribution of considerable state wealth produced in the oil sector of the economy makes tapş a primary channel for gaining access to the distribution of these resources.

Finally, while blat is said to be waning in the post-Soviet period, the practice of tapş remains as strong as ever. In post-Soviet Russia blat is being replaced by monetised, ad-hoc bribery, as opposed to the personalized, long-term relationships of reciprocity that used to sustain it in the Soviet period (Ledeneva 2008).  In Azerbaijan, by contrast, the strengthening of patronage networks in the post-Soviet period and the practice of patronage control over distribution of considerable state wealth produced in the oil sector of the economy makes tapş a primary channel for gaining access to the distribution of these resources.

The research on informal practices in Azerbaijan is limited, and there have not yet been any significant attempts to conceptualize ''tapş'' as a practice specific to Azerbaijani society. This is, however, a common feature of informal practices – scholars often point out that informal practices are insufficiently researched despite their pervasiveness and influence<ref>Hutchings, K., & Weir, D. (2006). Guanxi and wasta: a comparison. Thunderbird International Business Review, 48(1), 141-156.</ref><ref>Ledeneva, A. V. (1998). Russia's economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange. Cambridge University Press.</ref>. Although there is at present no research focusing on tapş specifically, several studies deal with various aspects of tapş in the more general context of informal practices.  A variety of methods have been used for this research, including interviews<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013a) Informality in a Neopatrimonial State: Azerbaijan. In Giordano, C. and Hayoz, N. (eds.) Informality in Eastern Europe: Structures, Political Cultures and Social practices. Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 433-450</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013b) Azerbaijan: A Dictatorship Built on a Capitalist Economy. Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 50, 3 May 2013</ref>, ethnography<ref>Lepisto, E., & Kazimzade, E. (2008). Coercion or compulsion? Rationales behind informal payments for education in Azerbaijan. European Education, 40(4), 70-92.</ref> and survey<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Sadigov, T. (2013). Corruption and social responsibility: bribe offers among small entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan. East European Politics, (ahead-of-print), 1-20.</ref><ref>Hasanov, R. M. O. (2009). Social Capital, Civic Engagement and the Performance of Local Self-Government in Azerbaijan. Nationalities Papers, 37(1), 89-114. </ref>. Ethnographic methods in particular would be useful for understanding the complex structure of ''tapş'' transactions and the interaction of vertical and horizontal ties involved in them. However, like other other informal practices, taps is difficult to measure because of its hidden nature and the sensitivity of the issue due to its interlinking with illicit practices and political patronage.

The research on informal practices in Azerbaijan is limited, and there have not yet been any significant attempts to conceptualize ''tapş'' as a practice specific to Azerbaijani society. This is, however, a common feature of informal practices – scholars often point out that informal practices are insufficiently researched despite their pervasiveness and influence<ref>Hutchings, K., & Weir, D. (2006). Guanxi and wasta: a comparison. Thunderbird International Business Review, 48(1), 141-156.</ref><ref>Ledeneva, A. V. (1998). Russia's economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange. Cambridge University Press.</ref>. Although there is at present no research focusing on tapş specifically, several studies deal with various aspects of tapş in the more general context of informal practices.  A variety of methods have been used for this research, including interviews<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013a) Informality in a Neopatrimonial State: Azerbaijan. In Giordano, C. and Hayoz, N. (eds.) Informality in Eastern Europe: Structures, Political Cultures and Social practices. Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 433-450</ref><ref>Safiyev, R. (2013b) Azerbaijan: A Dictatorship Built on a Capitalist Economy. Caucasus Analytical Digest No. 50, 3 May 2013</ref>, ethnography<ref>Lepisto, E., & Kazimzade, E. (2008). Coercion or compulsion? Rationales behind informal payments for education in Azerbaijan. European Education, 40(4), 70-92.</ref> and survey<ref>Aliyev, H. (2013). Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1)</ref><ref>Sadigov, T. (2013). Corruption and social responsibility: bribe offers among small entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan. East European Politics, (ahead-of-print), 1-20.</ref><ref>Hasanov, R. M. O. (2009). Social Capital, Civic Engagement and the Performance of Local Self-Government in Azerbaijan. Nationalities Papers, 37(1), 89-114. </ref>. Ethnographic methods in particular would be useful for understanding the complex structure of ''tapş'' transactions and the interaction of vertical and horizontal ties involved in them. However, like other other informal practices, taps is difficult to measure because of its hidden nature and the sensitivity of the issue due to its interlinking with illicit practices and political patronage.

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