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Difference between revisions of "Silovi Grupirovki (Bulgaria)"
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| authorofpiece =Igor Mitchnik | | authorofpiece =Igor Mitchnik | ||
| authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | | authorinstitution =Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK | ||
| authorwebsite =[https://uk.linkedin.com/in/igor-mitchnik-aa456168 Profile page | | authorwebsite =[https://uk.linkedin.com/in/igor-mitchnik-aa456168 Profile page on LinkedIn]}} | ||
<big>'''By Igor Mitchnik, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big> | <big>'''By Igor Mitchnik, Alumnus, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big> | ||
[[Category:Solidarity]] | [[Category:Solidarity]] | ||
| Line 37: | Line 37: | ||
The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>). | The members of these violent groups are known as ''mutri'', meaning ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Bagasheva/ Pencheva 2009: 455<ref>Bagasheva, A. and Pencheva, M. 2009. Bulgarian-English Dictionary. Sofia: Naouka i izkoustvo</ref>; Bulanova-Hristova 2011: 342<ref>Bulanova-Hristova, G. 2011. Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft</ref>; Carvajal/ Castle 2008<ref>Carvajal, D. and Castle, S. 2008. ‘Mob Muscles Its Way Into Politics in Bulgaria’, The New York Times, 16 October, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1431F935A25753C1A96E9C8B63&pagewanted=all</ref>). Vadim Volkov described the Russian equivalent of ''silovye gruppirovki'' as racketeers, who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. They were – and to some extent still are – 'violent entrepreneurs' who ‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 2000: 710; 725<ref>Volkov, Vadim. 2000. 'The Political Economy of Protection Rackets in the Past and the Present', Social Research, 67: (3): 709-744</ref>). In the 1990s members of the ''silovye gruppirovki'' groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure environment and thereby they created a demand for their services from both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of personal security. The rates offered to clients were two-to-three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova/ Rusev 2015: 32f.<ref>Dzhekova, R. and Rusev, A. 2015. ‘Bulgaria’, in: Franziska Klopfer and Nelleke van Amstel (eds.), A Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 31-60</ref>). | ||
The noticeable success of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' resulted from the specific social and political circumstances prevalent in post-communist Bulgaria. Firstly, the collapse of the centralised Bulgarian communist system in 1989 left immense resources, which had to be transformed from state assets to private property (Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | The noticeable success of the ''Siloviye Gruppirovki'' resulted from the specific social and political circumstances prevalent in post-communist Bulgaria. Firstly, the collapse of the centralised Bulgarian communist system in 1989 left immense [[resources]], which had to be transformed from state assets to private property (Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | ||
Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). During the period of the chaotic privatisation process in Bulgaria, Communist elites, who were fully cognisant of the extent and value of the resources, sought to accumulate wealth by buying and selling them (Ganev 2007: 186<ref>Ganev, V. I. 2007. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). During the period of the chaotic privatisation process in Bulgaria, Communist elites, who were fully cognisant of the extent and value of the resources, sought to accumulate wealth by buying and selling them (Ganev 2007: 186<ref>Ganev, V. I. 2007. Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press</ref>; Bulanova 2008: 57<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | ||
Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). This personal accumulation of wealth was facilitated by the ‘gradual loss of statehood’ during the transition period – characterised by legal chaos, lack of institutional and judicial regulation, as well as widespread insecurity (Bulanova 2008: 66<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | Corrupt Democratization in the Context of European Integration’, Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8: 53-68</ref>). This personal accumulation of wealth was facilitated by the ‘gradual loss of statehood’ during the transition period – characterised by legal chaos, lack of institutional and judicial regulation, as well as widespread insecurity (Bulanova 2008: 66<ref>Bulanova, G. 2008. ‘From Sofia to Brussels – | ||