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''Kompromat'' may also be used within the regime itself, either to guarantee the continued loyalty of potential rivals, or as a result of political infighting. For example, Ukrainian MP and 1999 presidential hopeful, Yevhen Marchuk, used President Kuchma’s bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko, to gather'' kompromat ''on the President, which was used against him in the 1999 presidential election (Kuzio 2014<ref>Kuzio, T. 2014. ‘Crime, politics and business in 1990s Ukraine’, '' Communist and Post-Communist Studies'', 47: 2</ref>). A more recent example is the case of Rakhat Aliev, the former son-in-law of Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev. As head of Kazakhstan’s secret service (KNB), in 2005 Aliev allegedly wiretapped the offices of government officials and the president to gather ''kompromat ''on both his enemies and his allies. | ''Kompromat'' may also be used within the regime itself, either to guarantee the continued loyalty of potential rivals, or as a result of political infighting. For example, Ukrainian MP and 1999 presidential hopeful, Yevhen Marchuk, used President Kuchma’s bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko, to gather'' kompromat ''on the President, which was used against him in the 1999 presidential election (Kuzio 2014<ref>Kuzio, T. 2014. ‘Crime, politics and business in 1990s Ukraine’, '' Communist and Post-Communist Studies'', 47: 2</ref>). A more recent example is the case of Rakhat Aliev, the former son-in-law of Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev. As head of Kazakhstan’s secret service (KNB), in 2005 Aliev allegedly wiretapped the offices of government officials and the president to gather ''kompromat ''on both his enemies and his allies. | ||
''Kompromat ''can either be genuine, fabricated, exaggerated, or some combination of the three. The dubious legality of many business practices in the 1990s means that ''kompromat'' could be found on almost any individual who was active in business or politics during those years. The combination of underdeveloped political institutions and lack of an adequate legal framework created an environment where corruption and bribery could facilitate dubious business transactions, and were arguably unavoidable for a business to remain competitive in an economy where such practices were the norm. For instance, the chaotic privatisation process that took place in the early 1990s was often facilitated through questionable and sometimes illegal business practices. Unofficial elements, such as ties to illicit networks or organised crime, were a common feature during the privatisation of state | ''Kompromat ''can either be genuine, fabricated, exaggerated, or some combination of the three. The dubious legality of many business practices in the 1990s means that ''kompromat'' could be found on almost any individual who was active in business or politics during those years. The combination of underdeveloped political institutions and lack of an adequate legal framework created an environment where corruption and bribery could facilitate dubious business transactions, and were arguably unavoidable for a business to remain competitive in an economy where such practices were the norm. For instance, the chaotic privatisation process that took place in the early 1990s was often facilitated through questionable and sometimes illegal business practices. Unofficial elements, such as ties to illicit networks or organised crime, were a common feature during the privatisation of state resources, especially in certain sectors of the economy such as extractives. Criminal influence during the 1990s meant that many businesses either employed criminal groups as a ''[[krysha]]'' (‘roof’), or utilised criminal tactics for political or commercial gain. | ||
Importantly, the veracity of ''kompromat'' is not necessarily important; rather its utility is in how effective it can be as leverage against political or commercial opponents (Gambetta 2009<ref>Gambetta, D. 2009. ''Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate. '' Princeton: Princeton University Press</ref>). Unlike in many Western states where media outlets may act as watchdogs for political and commercial malfeasance, the publication of ''kompromat ''is less concerned with exposing corrupt or illicit activity and more with finding a pliant agency or journalist that will publish (for a price) the allegations. Once the allegations are published in one source, other news agencies may pick up the story. In some cases, the allegations may lead to formal investigations, the result of which varies from criminal persecution, resignation from public office or commercial entity, to reputational risks that could affect domestic and international standing. | Importantly, the veracity of ''kompromat'' is not necessarily important; rather its utility is in how effective it can be as leverage against political or commercial opponents (Gambetta 2009<ref>Gambetta, D. 2009. ''Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate. '' Princeton: Princeton University Press</ref>). Unlike in many Western states where media outlets may act as watchdogs for political and commercial malfeasance, the publication of ''kompromat ''is less concerned with exposing corrupt or illicit activity and more with finding a pliant agency or journalist that will publish (for a price) the allegations. Once the allegations are published in one source, other news agencies may pick up the story. In some cases, the allegations may lead to formal investigations, the result of which varies from criminal persecution, resignation from public office or commercial entity, to reputational risks that could affect domestic and international standing. | ||