Difference between revisions of "Fraktionszwang (Germany, Switzerland, Austria)"

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Fraktionszwang (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) (view source)

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Usually ''Fraktionszwang'' happens in a subtle way and starts with the internally communicated position of the ''Fraktion'' regarding voting on a bill. ''Fraktion''’s statutes usually require that the ''Fraktion''’s leadership committee be notified if deviating voting is intended by an MP (Bülow 2010). In this case, ''Fraktionsdisziplin'', the persuasion with constructive subject-related discussions on different hierarchal levels follows. If disciplining in this form of convincing is ineffective, a coercive process that exceeds subject-related discussions begins. This process can impose on the free mandate, is difficult to prove and therefore enters the grey area between ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' and the illegal ''Fraktionszwang''.
Usually ''Fraktionszwang'' happens in a subtle way and starts with the internally communicated position of the ''Fraktion'' regarding voting on a bill. ''Fraktion''’s statutes usually require that the ''Fraktion''’s leadership committee be notified if deviating voting is intended by an MP (Bülow 2010). In this case, ''Fraktionsdisziplin'', the persuasion with constructive subject-related discussions on different hierarchal levels follows. If disciplining in this form of convincing is ineffective, a coercive process that exceeds subject-related discussions begins. This process can impose on the free mandate, is difficult to prove and therefore enters the grey area between ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' and the illegal ''Fraktionszwang''.
   
   
[[File:Fraktionszwang_disziplin_solidarität.JPG|thumb|x300px|left|. Source: Christina Zimmermann. © Christina Zimmermann.]]
The threats with which an MP can be coerced can be divided into existential and non-existential ones. Non-existential threats entail the feeling of exclusion from group belonging and the daily political work. The methods include avoiding the MP and withdrawing favours; mobbing (Bülow 2010, Gutschker 2011); withdrawing information, e.g. by delaying forwarding documents; and restricting the public expression of the MP within the ''Fraktion'' by replacing them as public speakers or by prioritising topics outside of the domain of the defiant MP at ''Fraktion'' meetings (Lohse 2015). Defiant MPs are emotionally blackmailed, muzzled and lose important channels of influence, which hinders their daily political work (Kasten 1985, Lohse 2015).  
The threats with which an MP can be coerced can be divided into existential and non-existential ones. Non-existential threats entail the feeling of exclusion from group belonging and the daily political work. The methods include avoiding the MP and withdrawing favours; mobbing (Bülow 2010, Gutschker 2011); withdrawing information, e.g. by delaying forwarding documents; and restricting the public expression of the MP within the ''Fraktion'' by replacing them as public speakers or by prioritising topics outside of the domain of the defiant MP at ''Fraktion'' meetings (Lohse 2015). Defiant MPs are emotionally blackmailed, muzzled and lose important channels of influence, which hinders their daily political work (Kasten 1985, Lohse 2015).  


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The tension between the ''Fraktion''’s and MP's own will and the media attention the alleged ''Fraktionszwang'' attracts can lead to mental health problems and, eventually, to resignation from the post (Wolter 2019, Phoenix 2019). Younger MPs or those with caring duties or lack of alternative job opportunities are particularly vulnerable to ''Fraktionszwang'' (Bülow 2010). In contrast, elderly politicians in their final legislative terms pose a risk factor for their ''Fraktions'' since they are more likely to vote against the ''Fraktion''’s line (Schneider 2011).
The tension between the ''Fraktion''’s and MP's own will and the media attention the alleged ''Fraktionszwang'' attracts can lead to mental health problems and, eventually, to resignation from the post (Wolter 2019, Phoenix 2019). Younger MPs or those with caring duties or lack of alternative job opportunities are particularly vulnerable to ''Fraktionszwang'' (Bülow 2010). In contrast, elderly politicians in their final legislative terms pose a risk factor for their ''Fraktions'' since they are more likely to vote against the ''Fraktion''’s line (Schneider 2011).


Coercion is an inherent pragmatic feature of representative democracies that ensures clear majorities for a functioning decision-making process (Galka and Schuett-Wetschky 2007, Kasten 1985) but the voters view it critically if it is frequently employed. According to a Statista survey (2011), 50 percent of the Germans demand a more frequent suppression of ''Fraktionszwang'', and 31 percent demand its complete suppression. The voters expect the MPs to act on their behalf, but ''Fraktionszwang'' prevents them to follow their electoral promises and advertised attitudes. This can challenge the very idea of representative democracy. The media label the MPs who frequently vote in line with the ''Fraktion'' as ''Abnicker'' (ʻyes menʼ) and frequently glorify deviating MPs as democratic rebels. However, ''Fraktions'' with too diversified opinions are presented in the press as chaotic, paralysed and inefficient and the deviating MPs are called the ''Nestbeschmutzer'' (ʻtraitorsʼ) (Arnett et al. 2016, Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Fiedler 2017).
[[File: Fraktionszwang kol.jpg|thumb|x300px|left|]]
 
Coercion is an inherent pragmatic feature of representative democracies that ensures clear majorities for a functioning decision-making process (Galka and Schuett-Wetschky 2007, Kasten 1985) but the voters view it critically if it is frequently employed. According to a Statista survey (2011), 50 percent of the Germans demand a more frequent suppression of ''Fraktionszwang'', and 31 percent demand its complete suppression. The voters expect the MPs to act on their behalf, but ''Fraktionszwang'' prevents them to follow their electoral promises and advertised attitudes. This can challenge the very idea of representative democracy. The media label the MPs who frequently vote in line with the ''Fraktion'' as ''Abnicker'' (ʻyes menʼ) and frequently glorify deviating MPs as democratic rebels. However, ''Fraktions'' with too diversified opinions are presented in the press as chaotic, paralysed and inefficient and the deviating MPs are called the ''Nestbeschmutzer'' (ʻtraitorsʼ) (Arnett et al. 2016, Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Fiedler 2017).  


''Fraktionszwang'' is legal in many countries. The United States, the United Kingdom and many of its former colonies have institutionalised the practice of party discipline in the form of party whips, who officially secure majority votes by formal and informal cohesive methods (see [[dirtbook]] in the UK, also see Bowler et al. 1999). ''Dǎngjì'' (黨紀) is the legally constituted and expected party discipline in China (Cai 2008). Depending on the political system and culture, the extent of disciplining varies. Party discipline is typical for representative democracies with direct mandates and first-past-the-post electoral systems (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999).  
''Fraktionszwang'' is legal in many countries. The United States, the United Kingdom and many of its former colonies have institutionalised the practice of party discipline in the form of party whips, who officially secure majority votes by formal and informal cohesive methods (see [[dirtbook]] in the UK, also see Bowler et al. 1999). ''Dǎngjì'' (黨紀) is the legally constituted and expected party discipline in China (Cai 2008). Depending on the political system and culture, the extent of disciplining varies. Party discipline is typical for representative democracies with direct mandates and first-past-the-post electoral systems (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999).  


==Entries in the online encyclopaedia linking to ''fraktionszwang''==
==Entries in the online encyclopaedia linking to ''fraktionszwang''==
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