Difference between revisions of "Fraktionszwang (Germany, Switzerland, Austria)"

| authorofpiece = Christina Zimmermann

| authorofpiece = Christina Zimmermann

| authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK

| authorinstitution = Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK

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<big>'''By Christina Zimmermann, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big>  

<big>'''By Christina Zimmermann, Alumna, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK'''</big>  

[[Category:  Europe]]

[[Category:  Europe]]

[[Category:  Parliament]]

[[Category:  Parliament]]

[[Category:  Public service]]

[[Category:  Public service]]

[[Category:  Rule-bending]]

[[Category:  Rule-bending]]

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Despite frequent public-interest clashes in political debates amongst politicians within their ''Fraktion'', the voting behaviour of MPs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland is mainly uniform (Arnett et al. 2016). This implies the existence of informal mechanisms within parliamentary groups, such as ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' (parliamentary group discipline), ''Fraktionssolidarität'' (parliamentary group solidarity) and ''Fraktionszwang''. The outcome of these three concepts – aligned voting and consensus – is similar, but the concepts differ fundamentally in terms of the degree of the MPs’ freedom of action, and their legitimacy and legality (Katsenelinboigen 1971).

Despite frequent public-interest clashes in political debates amongst politicians within their ''Fraktion'', the voting behaviour of MPs in Germany, Austria and Switzerland is mainly uniform (Arnett et al. 2016). This implies the existence of informal mechanisms within parliamentary groups, such as ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' (parliamentary group discipline), ''Fraktionssolidarität'' (parliamentary group solidarity) and ''Fraktionszwang''. The outcome of these three concepts – aligned voting and consensus – is similar, but the concepts differ fundamentally in terms of the degree of the MPs’ freedom of action, and their legitimacy and legality (Katsenelinboigen 1971).

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However, there is indirect evidence that ''Fraktionszwang'' exists in these countries. First-hand accounts provided by the media, analysts, former employees of the parliament and MPs, indicate that ''Fraktionszwang'' contributes to the ''Fraktion''’s unity (Bülow 2010, Reyher 2010, Günther 2000: 332f). Another indicator of the existence of ''Fraktionszwang'' is the MPs' frequent public demand to extricate their votes from the ''Fraktion'' line (freigeben), or to turn them into ''Gewissensentscheidung'' (a vote of conscience) in order to be able to vote according their personal will without negative consequences (Spiegel 2017, Roßmann 2016, Prantl 2018). ''Fraktion''’s leaders can then either 'allow' deviating voting, as was the case with the same-sex marriage (§1353 BGB), or they 'rejec' the request for a vote of conscience, as was the case with the abortion law (§219 STGB) (Prantl 2018, Müller and Pfister 2011).  

However, there is indirect evidence that ''Fraktionszwang'' exists in these countries. First-hand accounts provided by the media, analysts, former employees of the parliament and MPs, indicate that ''Fraktionszwang'' contributes to the ''Fraktion''’s unity (Bülow 2010, Reyher 2010, Günther 2000: 332f). Another indicator of the existence of ''Fraktionszwang'' is the MPs' frequent public demand to extricate their votes from the ''Fraktion'' line (freigeben), or to turn them into ''Gewissensentscheidung'' (a vote of conscience) in order to be able to vote according their personal will without negative consequences (Spiegel 2017, Roßmann 2016, Prantl 2018). ''Fraktion''’s leaders can then either 'allow' deviating voting, as was the case with the same-sex marriage (§1353 BGB), or they 'rejec' the request for a vote of conscience, as was the case with the abortion law (§219 STGB) (Prantl 2018, Müller and Pfister 2011).  

Usually ''Fraktionszwang'' happens in a subtle way and starts with the internally communicated position of the ''Fraktion'' regarding voting on a bill. ''Fraktion''’s statutes usually require that the ''Fraktion''’s leadership committee be notified if deviating voting is intended by an MP (Bülow 2010). In this case, ''Fraktionsdisziplin'', the persuasion with constructive subject-related discussions on different hierarchal levels follows. If disciplining in this form of convincing is ineffective, a coercive process that exceeds subject-related discussions begins. This process can impose on the free mandate, is difficult to prove and therefore enters the grey area between ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' and the illegal ''Fraktionszwang''.

Usually ''Fraktionszwang'' happens in a subtle way and starts with the internally communicated position of the ''Fraktion'' regarding voting on a bill. ''Fraktion''’s statutes usually require that the ''Fraktion''’s leadership committee be notified if deviating voting is intended by an MP (Bülow 2010). In this case, ''Fraktionsdisziplin'', the persuasion with constructive subject-related discussions on different hierarchal levels follows. If disciplining in this form of convincing is ineffective, a coercive process that exceeds subject-related discussions begins. This process can impose on the free mandate, is difficult to prove and therefore enters the grey area between ''Fraktionsdisziplin'' and the illegal ''Fraktionszwang''.

The threats with which an MP can be coerced can be divided into existential and non-existential ones. Non-existential threats entail the feeling of exclusion from group belonging and the daily political work. The methods include avoiding the MP and withdrawing favours; mobbing (Bülow 2010, Gutschker 2011); withdrawing information, e.g. by delaying forwarding documents; and restricting the public expression of the MP within the ''Fraktion'' by replacing them as public speakers or by prioritising topics outside of the domain of the defiant MP at ''Fraktion'' meetings (Lohse 2015). Defiant MPs are emotionally blackmailed, muzzled and lose important channels of influence, which hinders their daily political work (Kasten 1985, Lohse 2015).  

The threats with which an MP can be coerced can be divided into existential and non-existential ones. Non-existential threats entail the feeling of exclusion from group belonging and the daily political work. The methods include avoiding the MP and withdrawing favours; mobbing (Bülow 2010, Gutschker 2011); withdrawing information, e.g. by delaying forwarding documents; and restricting the public expression of the MP within the ''Fraktion'' by replacing them as public speakers or by prioritising topics outside of the domain of the defiant MP at ''Fraktion'' meetings (Lohse 2015). Defiant MPs are emotionally blackmailed, muzzled and lose important channels of influence, which hinders their daily political work (Kasten 1985, Lohse 2015).  

The tension between the ''Fraktion''’s and MP's own will and the media attention the alleged ''Fraktionszwang'' attracts can lead to mental health problems and, eventually, to resignation from the post (Wolter 2019, Phoenix 2019). Younger MPs or those with caring duties or lack of alternative job opportunities are particularly vulnerable to ''Fraktionszwang'' (Bülow 2010). In contrast, elderly politicians in their final legislative terms pose a risk factor for their ''Fraktions'' since they are more likely to vote against the ''Fraktion''’s line (Schneider 2011).

The tension between the ''Fraktion''’s and MP's own will and the media attention the alleged ''Fraktionszwang'' attracts can lead to mental health problems and, eventually, to resignation from the post (Wolter 2019, Phoenix 2019). Younger MPs or those with caring duties or lack of alternative job opportunities are particularly vulnerable to ''Fraktionszwang'' (Bülow 2010). In contrast, elderly politicians in their final legislative terms pose a risk factor for their ''Fraktions'' since they are more likely to vote against the ''Fraktion''’s line (Schneider 2011).

Coercion is an inherent pragmatic feature of representative democracies that ensures clear majorities for a functioning decision-making process (Galka and Schuett-Wetschky 2007, Kasten 1985) but the voters view it critically if it is frequently employed. According to a Statista survey (2011), 50 percent of the Germans demand a more frequent suppression of ''Fraktionszwang'', and 31 percent demand its complete suppression. The voters expect the MPs to act on their behalf, but ''Fraktionszwang'' prevents them to follow their electoral promises and advertised attitudes. This can challenge the very idea of representative democracy. The media label the MPs who frequently vote in line with the ''Fraktion'' as ''Abnicker'' (ʻyes menʼ) and frequently glorify deviating MPs as democratic rebels. However, ''Fraktions'' with too diversified opinions are presented in the press as chaotic, paralysed and inefficient and the deviating MPs are called the ''Nestbeschmutzer'' (ʻtraitorsʼ) (Arnett et al. 2016, Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Fiedler 2017).  

Coercion is an inherent pragmatic feature of representative democracies that ensures clear majorities for a functioning decision-making process (Galka and Schuett-Wetschky 2007, Kasten 1985) but the voters view it critically if it is frequently employed. According to a Statista survey (2011), 50 percent of the Germans demand a more frequent suppression of ''Fraktionszwang'', and 31 percent demand its complete suppression. The voters expect the MPs to act on their behalf, but ''Fraktionszwang'' prevents them to follow their electoral promises and advertised attitudes. This can challenge the very idea of representative democracy. The media label the MPs who frequently vote in line with the ''Fraktion'' as ''Abnicker'' (ʻyes menʼ) and frequently glorify deviating MPs as democratic rebels. However, ''Fraktions'' with too diversified opinions are presented in the press as chaotic, paralysed and inefficient and the deviating MPs are called the ''Nestbeschmutzer'' (ʻtraitorsʼ) (Arnett et al. 2016, Borst and Hildebrandt 2014, Fiedler 2017).