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Difference between revisions of "Pari pod masata (Bulgaria)"
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The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent. | The transition to market economy after 1989 is commonly seen as the catalyst of informal payments in Bulgaria. Economic reforms during the 1990s intensified the popularity of informal transactions and in-kind payments due to the unstable socio-economic situation caused by market liberalisation. The frequency of informal payments is also associated with the presence of clientelism (vruzki) because informal transactions are used when informal networks are absent. | ||
The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420) | The economic crisis of 1997 in Bulgaria set a precedent on alternative transactions. Due to rapid inflation the Bulgarian lev lost its value overnight. Consequently, public servants started not to accept cash payments but required alternative commodities, especially food. Thus, goods and cash became mutually substitutable. In 2000, the Bulgarian government introduced a reform that was expected to regulate informal payments in healthcare (Stepurko et al., 2013: 420)<ref>Stepurko, T., Pavlova, M., Gryga, I., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal payments for health services - Corruption or Gratitude? A study on public attitudes, perceptions and opinions in six Central and Eastern European Countries’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 46: 419-31</ref>. The reform consisted of installing additional formal co-payments for the health services in the benefits package. Nevertheless, a study conducted on 1,003 people in July 2010 showed that 20% of the respondents had reported paying informally in cash in the past year and 45% of them giving gifts in-kind (Atanasova et al., 2013: 733)<ref>Atanasova, E., Pavlova, M., Moutafova, E., Rachel, B., and Groot, W. 2013. ‘Informal Payments for Health Services: the experience of Bulgaria after 10 years of formal co-payments’, European Journal of Public Health, 24: 733-9</ref>. This can be considered an improvement given that in 1997, 86% of the respondents thought that ‘it is impossible to obtain adequate health care without giving bribes’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002: 264)<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73</ref>. | ||
Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655) | Pari-pod-masata identifies extortion when public officials act as gatekeepers. For example, medical officials can also require the payment of an unofficial fee for the general access to free treatment. Similarly, during the 1990s transition to market economy, the low salaries of public administrative officials led them to demand unwarranted fees for obtaining a document, state provisions, or filing institutional inquiries (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 1997: 655)<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., & Miller, W. 1997. ‘”Foolish to give and yet more foolish not to take” - in-depth interviews with post-communist citizens on their everyday use of bribes and contacts”. Europe-Asia studies, 50: 651-677</ref>. Public servants resorting to extortion might abuse their power even further by establishing an informal ‘levy’ (red tape) or ‘toll’ (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 77)<ref>Blundo, G., and Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. 2006. ‘Everyday Corruption in West Africa’, in G. Bludno, J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, N. Arifari, and M. Alou (eds.), Everyday Corruption in Africa: Citizens and Public Officials. Zed Books: 69-108</ref>. This is most frequently reported in relation to custom officials who act as informal tax collectors over travelers’ possessions (PARITENI 2014)<ref>PARITENI. 2014. ‘Nov podkup izobretiha mitnichari’, 24 January, https://www.pariteni.bg/novini/novini/nov-podkup-izobretiha-mitnichari-181398</ref>. A custom official can earn between 900 and 1,200 euros for a shift at the border with Serbia (24Chasa 2020)<ref>24 Chasa. 2020. ‘2000 evro na smyana ot podkupi na mitnicharite na Kalotina, 50 evro bili za shefa (Obzor)’, 7 February, https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/8163285</ref>. They demand informal payments to allow people to access certain administrative and state entities without confiscating anything, regardless the legality of passengers’ belongings. | ||
In the healthcare sector, pari-pod-masta might be offered to the doctor by the patient or his relatives to receive a quicker provision or to ensure the good quality of the treatment. If the payment is given in advance (ex-ante), then it bears the resemblance of a bribe. However, the payment can also represent a gift when it is given at the end (ex-post) of the treatment, to show gratitude. This conceptual timeframe is important because it differentiates bribes from gifts. Nevertheless, an ex-post payment becomes ex-ante for a future exchange transforming the gift into bribe (Moldovan 2013: 386) | In the healthcare sector, pari-pod-masta might be offered to the doctor by the patient or his relatives to receive a quicker provision or to ensure the good quality of the treatment. If the payment is given in advance (ex-ante), then it bears the resemblance of a bribe. However, the payment can also represent a gift when it is given at the end (ex-post) of the treatment, to show gratitude. This conceptual timeframe is important because it differentiates bribes from gifts. Nevertheless, an ex-post payment becomes ex-ante for a future exchange transforming the gift into bribe (Moldovan 2013: 386)<ref>Moldovan, A., & Van de Walle, S. 2013. ‘Gifts or Bribes? Attitudes on Informal payments in Romanian Health Care’, Public Integrity, 385-402.</ref>. Expensive gifts might create preferential relationships between the parties (Balabanova & McKee 2002: 251)<ref>Balabanova, D., and McKee, M. 2002. ‘Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 62: 243-73.</ref>. The Bulgarian Physicians’ Union differentiated officially ex-ante and ex-post payments, and the latter was described as ethical (Delcheva, Balabanova & Mckee, 1997: 91)<ref>Delcheva, E., Balabanova, D., and Mckee, M. 1997. ‘Under-the-counter payments for healthcare: Evidence from Bulgaria’, Health Policy, 89-100.</ref>. | ||
In the public education sector, pari-pod-masata takes the form of unreported donations for the educational institutions that lack state funding. It is a common practice for public schools in Bulgaria to require unofficial donations from the parents to improve infrastructures and facilities. These payments are destined for repairs, heating, events, presents, the purchase of extra materials and participation in extracurricular activities. These so-called donations are unregulated but sometimes mandatory. | In the public education sector, pari-pod-masata takes the form of unreported donations for the educational institutions that lack state funding. It is a common practice for public schools in Bulgaria to require unofficial donations from the parents to improve infrastructures and facilities. These payments are destined for repairs, heating, events, presents, the purchase of extra materials and participation in extracurricular activities. These so-called donations are unregulated but sometimes mandatory. | ||
In 2001, 34 % of the population considered informal payments as an unchangeable aspect of the country’s culture (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 2001: 140) | In 2001, 34 % of the population considered informal payments as an unchangeable aspect of the country’s culture (Grodeland, Koshechkina & Miller, 2001: 140)<ref>Grodeland, A., Koshechkina, T., and Miller, W. 2001. A culture of corruption? Coping with government in post-communist Europe. Budapest: Central European University.</ref>. Gift giving, in particular, was seen as legitimate because means to express gratitude and respect to the public servant. Media coverage of informal payments peaked at the turn of the century when major anti-corruption legislation was introduced, and the debates regarding informal payments entered the public discourse following international scandals. For instance, in 2002 Greece declared that it would not accept higher education diplomas issued from Bulgarian universities because of the widespread bribes in the sector. According to media investigations, in the 2000s an exam passing costed between 150 and 300 US dollars (Coalition 2000 & CSD, 2005, p. 14)<ref>Coalition 2000 and Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) 2005. Obrazovanie i antikoruptsiya. Sofia: CSD.</ref>. Nowadays, informal payments remain widespread: The Global Corruption Barometer for 2019 reported that 12% of public service users had given a bribe in the past year (Transparency International, 2019)<ref>Transparency International. 2019. ‘Our Work in: Bulgaria’, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bulgaria</ref>. Unregulated donations, showing gratitude to teachers, doctors and officials is still considered a cultural phenomenon rather than immoral behaviour. | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||