Difference between revisions of "Chernukha (Russia)"

''Chernukha'' involves negative campaigning which, scholarly research suggests, may play an essential role in democratic governance<ref>Mark, D. 2009. ''Going Dirty: The Art of Negative Campaigning.'' Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield</ref><ref>Schweitzer, E. J. 2010. ‘Global Patterns of Virtual Mudslinging? The Use of Attacks on German Party Websites in State, National and European Parliamentary Elections,’ ''German Politics'', 19(2): 200-211</ref><ref>Sullivan, J. and Sapir, E. V. 2012. ‘Modelling negative campaign advertising: evidence from Taiwan’, ''Asian Journal of Communication'', 22(3) 289-303 </ref><ref>Walter, A. 2014. ‘Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different?’ ''Political Studies'', 62: 42-60</ref>. What distinguishes Russian negative campaigning from its Western counterparts, however, is the ability of Russian political technologists to manipulate the law, treating it as an obstacle to be overcome and as a tool to be used on the path to victory. In addition, the weakness of Russian civil society, the absence of party politics, the underdeveloped culture of democracy and the volatile reputations of politicians all contribute to the effectiveness of ''chernukha'' as an electoral technology<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. ''How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business.'' Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp45-46.</ref>.

''Chernukha'' involves negative campaigning which, scholarly research suggests, may play an essential role in democratic governance<ref>Mark, D. 2009. ''Going Dirty: The Art of Negative Campaigning.'' Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield</ref><ref>Schweitzer, E. J. 2010. ‘Global Patterns of Virtual Mudslinging? The Use of Attacks on German Party Websites in State, National and European Parliamentary Elections,’ ''German Politics'', 19(2): 200-211</ref><ref>Sullivan, J. and Sapir, E. V. 2012. ‘Modelling negative campaign advertising: evidence from Taiwan’, ''Asian Journal of Communication'', 22(3) 289-303 </ref><ref>Walter, A. 2014. ‘Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different?’ ''Political Studies'', 62: 42-60</ref>. What distinguishes Russian negative campaigning from its Western counterparts, however, is the ability of Russian political technologists to manipulate the law, treating it as an obstacle to be overcome and as a tool to be used on the path to victory. In addition, the weakness of Russian civil society, the absence of party politics, the underdeveloped culture of democracy and the volatile reputations of politicians all contribute to the effectiveness of ''chernukha'' as an electoral technology<ref>Ledeneva, A. 2006. ''How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business.'' Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp45-46.</ref>.

When publishing leaflets vilifying their opponents during electoral campaigns, PR agencies are legally bound to disclose information both about themselves and about the client who placed the order. Without that, there is little chance of a printer taking on the work. Therefore, PR agencies often use a candidate as a front, or pay someone to put their name to the ''chernukha'' content and thus accept liability. They may set up a shell organization with an impressive-sounding title (‘The Honest City’, ‘The Leninskiy District Council’) on whose behalf the leaflets will be published. Given that people rarely pay attention to the piles of electoral flyers that come through their letterboxes, and even less to the details of who placed the order, the main message of ''chernukha'' is delivered in the title. For example, the title at the top of a leaflet distributed in Tomsk in 2009 and pictured here reads, ‘A criminal case against Aleksandr Deyev,’ thereby appearing to incriminate the individual named (''Dezhurniy po gorodu''). The subtitle at the bottom of the page reads, ‘Was there or wasn’t there [such a case]?’ While this means that no direct accusation has been made, the damage has already been done to the individual’s reputation.

When publishing leaflets vilifying their opponents during electoral campaigns, PR agencies are legally bound to disclose information both about themselves and about the client who placed the order. Without that, there is little chance of a printer taking on the work. Therefore, PR agencies often use a candidate as a front, or pay someone to put their name to the ''chernukha'' content and thus accept liability. They may set up a shell organization with an impressive-sounding title (‘The Honest City’, ‘The Leninskiy District Council’) on whose behalf the leaflets will be published. Given that people rarely pay attention to the piles of electoral flyers that come through their letterboxes, and even less to the details of who placed the order, the main message of ''chernukha'' is delivered in the title. For example, the title at the top of a leaflet distributed in Tomsk in 2009 and pictured here reads, ‘A criminal case against Aleksandr Deyev,’ thereby appearing to incriminate the individual named (''Dezhurniy po gorodu''). The subtitle at the bottom of the page reads, ‘Was there or wasn’t there [such a case]?’ While this means that no direct accusation has been made, the damage has already been done to the individual’s reputation.